Introduction: What Really Defines a U.S. Victory in Iran?
According to a Pew Research Center survey conducted from September 28 to October 4, 2026, 65 percent of Americans disapprove of President Donald Trump’s handling of the Iran War, with 47 percent anticipating that the war will last for more than another year.
The question is: What amounts to a U.S. victory in Iran?
U.S. Vice President JD Vance stated that the administration’s current priority is to curb Iranian uranium enrichment, which could potentially be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, Iran-backed proxy groups could prevent the United States from simply stepping away from the conflict.
U.S. Objectives and the Threat of Iran-Backed Proxies
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran through Operation Epic Fury, a joint operation targeting Iranian officials, military capabilities, missile infrastructure, and key nuclear sites.
Despite the February strikes and subsequent military operations, nuclear nonproliferation remains a U.S. concern due to Iran’s history of concealing nuclear activities, disputes over its international nuclear obligations, and its continued development of long-range ballistic missiles. These concerns extend to regional partners, including Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states, due to their geographic vulnerability to potential Iranian attacks.
In the early 1980s, during the Lebanese Civil War, Iran supported the emergence of Hezbollah, a militant organization developed to counter Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon at the time, establishing its first major proxy in the region. Since then, Iran has developed relationships with other anti-U.S. and anti-Israel groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Houthis, and militias in Iraq.
Iran provides funding, training, and military equipment to extend its influence beyond its borders. These groups have different missions, with Hezbollah and Hamas targeting Israel, the Houthis targeting the Gulf states, and Iraqi militias targeting U.S. forces. Many groups have also established significant political influence.
Despite Iran’s potential weakening, these groups may retain political power and pursue independent ambitions, complicating U.S. and regional efforts to achieve lasting security.
Lessons from Iraq in 2003 and the U.S.’s Dilemma
In 2003, President George W. Bush believed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, prompting an invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein and removed the Ba’ath Party from power. However, the suspected WMD stockpiles were never found, and the United States remained in Iraq until 2011.
The U.S. invasion and its de-Baathification policy contributed to sectarian conflict, insurgencies, and the development of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which eventually evolved into ISIS. Although President Barack Obama withdrew U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011, ISIS’s expansion prompted U.S. troops to return in 2014. Non-state actors continued to shape U.S. involvement even after its initial intervention in 2003.
The United States continues to balance its enforcement of nuclear nonproliferation objectives with regional security. Significantly reducing Iranian uranium enrichment may help end the war, but it would not eliminate threats posed by Iran-backed groups.
Given what happened in Iraq and the persistence of Iran-backed proxies, two questions remain even if the United States achieves its nonproliferation goals in Iran:
What stops Iran-backed proxies from continuing to weaken the United States and its regional allies through attacks on military forces, critical infrastructure, and economic interests? And why would reducing uranium enrichment be enough to secure a peace agreement that ends regional conflict and prevents renewed U.S. military intervention?
The Iraq War illustrates that achieving initial military goals does not prevent non-state actors from drawing the United States into prolonged regional conflict.
Historical and Contemporary Limitations of a Nuclear Deal
Halting Iranian uranium enrichment should remain a national security concern for the United States and its regional allies. A potential nuclear weapon in Iran’s hands would pose a significant threat to regional and international security. However, a nuclear agreement alone may not guarantee a lasting end to the current war or U.S. involvement.
Previous nuclear diplomatic efforts with Iran have failed to produce a lasting resolution, and disputes over compliance have repeatedly resurfaced. The two major international arrangements relevant to Iran’s nuclear program are the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015.
Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states committed to neither producing nuclear weapons nor assisting another state in their production. Iran has been a party to the treaty since 1970; however, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Tehran resumed its nuclear program partly in response to perceived Iraqi weapons threats. In 2025, Iran’s parliament adopted legislation to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), further raising concerns over Iranian compliance with its nuclear obligations.
The JCPOA illustrates the challenges of sustaining nuclear restrictions. The agreement required Iran to dismantle parts of its nuclear infrastructure and accept IAEA verification in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran complied initially; however, after the United States exited the agreement in 2018 over concerns around Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional proxies, Iran began expanding its enrichment activities in 2019, primarily at Fordow and subsequently at Natanz.
While nuclear agreements are important for preventing Iranian nuclear proliferation, their limitations demonstrate why the United States must address regional security separately. Nuclear weapons remain a valid concern when considering Iran’s capabilities, but an agreement will not eliminate U.S. security commitments to Israel, Jordan, and Gulf partners or the threats posed by Iran-backed proxy groups.
Path to Sustainable Victory in the Region: Looking Past Tehran
The United States should pursue three strategies to reduce the likelihood of prolonged military involvement in the region:
1) Strengthen allied military capabilities through training and intelligence systems.
As a first line of defense, the United States should expand joint military exercises with regional allies, including Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states, to improve deterrence and defensive coordination while bolstering their command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. This strategy should prioritize early-warning systems and missile and drone defenses against attacks by Iran-backed groups.
2) Develop a greater regional defense strategy.
The United States should expand existing security and intelligence cooperation agreements to incorporate greater intelligence sharing, joint threat assessments, and coordinated responses. Regular communication between military and intelligence officials could strengthen regional security while reducing the need for U.S. intervention.
3) Increase diplomatic dialogue.
The United States should pursue diplomatic discussions with Tehran and regional partners through separate or mediated negotiations when direct talks are unrealistic. Where feasible and considered absolutely necessary, diplomatic engagement should also extend to Iran-backed proxy groups, recognizing their political influence and independent interests. Negotiations should address Iranian nuclear activities, proxy violence, and respect for state sovereignty. Military force should remain a last resort.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Even with these three strategies, future U.S. military involvement may remain necessary. However, through intentional preparation, regional cooperation, and diplomacy, the United States may be able to reduce the likelihood of prolonged intervention. A sustainable victory must look beyond Tehran.
Staff Editor: Carly Gordon
Managing Editor: Emma Hopp
