China has long sought to develop what it calls the Polar Silk Road. In October 2025, a Chinese-produced containership completed the 7,500-nautical-mile voyage from the East China Sea to a British port in a record 21 days via a shipping route through the Arctic. China calls itself a “Near Arctic State” despite its closest point of proximity located 900 miles away.
The effects of climate change open new geopolitical opportunities and challenges in the Arctic. They require a new policy playbook. The United States should develop its own shipping and enforcement capabilities, strengthen partnerships, and use international bodies to establish norms to ensure that increased activity in the Arctic does not lead to escalation or conflict. The United States should work with its allies to build Arctic governance.
An Arctic route cuts in half the time it takes ships to reach European ports from China’s eastern seaboard. It translates into lower costs for fuel, labor, and maintenance. China produces and transports about 73 percent of all global shipping by tonnage and has signed agreements with Russia to develop Arctic commercial routes. Arctic routes offer energy security by creating another route for Chinese fuel imports, avoiding the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz. Although the route cannot fully replace supply from the Gulf to China, the Oxford Institute expects Arctic LNG 2 flows to China to resume, offering a strong geopolitical hedge.
For the United States to maintain leadership in the Arctic, it needs to develop its icebreaker fleet. Icebreakers are a wholly separate class of ship, representing the only mechanism by which a state can demonstrate Arctic capabilities. Despite China’s desire to operationalize the Arctic, it only has five polar-capable vessels, none of which are technically icebreakers. As a result, their ships often require a Russian escort. In 2022, Russia had 57 icebreakers, including eight that are nuclear-powered. Geopolitical rivals cooperating in an area of strategic interest without U.S. presence will create future dependency risks and enforcement issues.
The urgency to act is increasing. On October 12, A South Korean ship returned from a round-trip voyage through a Russian shipping lane in 50 days. South Korea had to consult with Russia beforehand and rely on Russian permits for travel. While this trip was motivated by shipping disruptions in the Middle East and there is no clear business case as of yet (the ship ran at 30 percent capacity), South Korea is aiming for regular service around 2030. This trip signals a trend, and without a coordinated U.S. policy, risks creating a new dependency on Russia and new sanctions enforcement issues.
Forging partnerships is key. Finland already has the capacity and know-how to develop ships fit for the Arctic. It accounts for 80 percent of icebreaker design and 60 percent of global manufacturing, a lead created out of necessity by its often frozen ports. President Trump has already waived the requirement that U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard ships must be built domestically, citing national security grounds. Finland’s Rauma Marine Constructions will build six icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard for an estimated $3.3 billion, with plans to build 11 Arctic Security Cutters, four of them to be built in Finland.
Canada will also be key in any future collaborative efforts to ensure peaceful development and maintenance of strategic resources. In March, Canada announced about $25 billion in Arctic funding. Canada was also a partner in the US-Finland Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, with Canadian company Seaspan providing the design for the ships. However, Canada began courting European partners in September, a sign that middle powers may not trust the US’s leadership. While Canada is still a partner in the Trilateral Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, the hedging of the partnership demonstrates that unnecessary diplomatic and trade disputes undermine potential cooperation with our allies over long-term national security needs.
Policy changes are also necessary. In 2025, China sent five research ships through the United States’ Extended Continental Shelf near Alaska. Research vessels are civilian vessels, but they can support military actions, creating a gray zone. The U.S. and its allies should define clear flagging and operational protocols governing these research vessels. They might not end the practice, but they will raise the diplomatic cost for countries that flagrantly violate those rules.
Russia has turned its geography into leverage by requiring ships to obtain a permit from a government agency under the state-owned company Rosatom, plus paid pilotage and escort. Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires non-discriminatory rules, and Moscow’s rules go beyond what it permits, which Russia has also admitted. However, the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, undermining its ability to take up this claim and requiring a coalition approach.
The United States and its allies should use the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Polar Code, which already certifies ships for ice conditions, to argue that qualified vessels should not be forced to buy escorts, and press for transparent, cost-based fees. That effort requires the United States to show up at the IMO as a participant, not an obstacle.
Establishing global norms for the Arctic begins with the U.S. demonstrating to other countries that it will be a reliable, long-term partner. Allied relationships are not functional in the long term under a “might equals right” approach. A United States that will not bully allies would eliminate a public relations coup for China by demonstrating the United States’ ability to follow global norms and be a trustworthy partner.
Some might point to the futility of international law, but this is misguided. As a binding legal framework, international law serves little use. However, its creation of norms is underestimated. Yes, norms can be violated, and not every issue can be covered. Still, setting out the rules of the road prevents head-on collisions
Each day without a unified policy for Arctic governance risks escalation and the U.S. falling behind its rivals. The United States should work with its allies to build icebreakers, strengthen partnerships, and create and enforce norms governing the Arctic. We should cultivate trust with our allies. Leadership is not a burden but a strength. By coming together to address pressing issues, we and our allies will build a better future.
Staff Editor: Tyler Johnson
Managing Editor: Natalia Dussán
