The Bukele Model: Militarization of Organized Crime Policy in Latin America

In 2015, El Salvador recorded the world’s highest homicide rate. Gang activity and even de facto control over neighborhoods made violence commonplace. Nayib Bukele, the country’s president since 2019, has made the fight against gang-driven crime the centerpiece of his political agenda. He has employed a range of hardline tactics, now dubbed the “Bukele Model.” 

For the purposes of this article, the “Bukele Model” is the use of one or more of the following measures to counter organized crime: emergency executive powers, military deployment, mass incarceration, and prison expansion. Through this approach, Bukele’s administration has drastically reduced homicide in El Salvador, though not without controversy. Human rights groups allege widespread abuses in the country’s newly constructed prison system, while the use of emergency powers raises concerns about democratic backsliding. 

Frustrated with crime, Latin American voters have increasingly turned to right-wing governments. Recently elected administrations in Colombia, Ecuador, and Costa Rica (among others) are adopting elements of the “Bukele Model,” raising the question of whether emergency measures and militarized enforcement can provide sustainable solutions to Latin America’s security problem.  

El Salvador’s Indefinite State of Emergency

Nayib Bukele has described himself as the “world’s coolest dictator,” a moniker that encapsulates the controversial nature of his presidency. Previously the mayor of El Salvador’s capital, San Salvador, Bukele was elected with 53.4% of the vote in 2019. 

Immediately after his election, Bukele took aim at the gangs who had exercised control in the country for decades, particularly Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Barrio 18. In 2022, with the support of the legislature, Bukele declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency suspended the right to legal defense and restricted freedom of movement, while it allowed the government to conduct arrests without warrants and intercept civilian communications. Legally, the state of emergency only lasts for 30 days, but it has been extended over 50 times, and is still active as of October 2026.

Human Rights Abuses in Prisons

Bukele’s security apparatus also includes the mass incarceration of suspected gang members. Since 2022, over 90,000 Salvadorans have been arrested, some simply due to their tattoos. El Salvador, now with the world’s highest prison population rate (per 100,000 people), constructed the “Terrorism Confinement Center” (known as CECOT) in 2022, built to hold up to 40,000 inmates. The Trump administration has sent over 200 deportees to CECOT since 2025.

International human rights groups have raised concerns about the conditions inside CECOT. Alleged abuses include cramped conditions, lack of food, water, and medical treatment, denial of communication with lawyers and family members, beatings, and torture. Human Rights Watch reports over 350 people have died in El Salvador’s prison system since 2022, with 66 documented cases of children subject to abuse, including torture. 

Bukele’s Popularity

Despite international condemnation of Bukele’s hardline policies, he has remained popular in El Salvador. Bukele’s approval rating sits at 87% as of May 2026. 

Bukele’s popularity presents a challenge to critics of his tactics, and the proliferation of his ideas beyond El Salvador shows that there is broader support for a militarized approach to crime. The popularity of the model, however, does not demonstrate that it provides a long-term solution to organized crime nor that it addresses its social, economic, and political drivers.

Is the “Bukele Model” Spreading in Latin America? 

In the early 2000s, Latin America experienced a surge in left-wing governments, a trend known as the “pink tide.” Today, the region is in the midst of another political shift. Voter frustration with crime has led to the recent election of right-wing governments. Now in power, these administrations are eager to fulfill campaign promises, and the “Bukele Model” presents opportunities for visible reductions in crime and the expansion of executive authority.  

Ecuador

Ecuador’s president since 2023, Daniel Noboa, centered his campaign on crackdowns on the country’s cartel groups, relying on emergency powers.  Most recently, in September 2026, Noboa declared a state of emergency in 10 of Ecuador’s 24 provinces. Lasting for 60 days, the state of emergency affords Noboa’s administration wide-ranging powers, including military raids on private homes without a warrant.

Ecuadorian authorities have also conducted mass arrests, straining the country’s prison system. As of August 2026, the World Prison Brief reports Ecuador’s prison population is 39,300. The official capacity of Ecuador’s prison system is only 27,631. The overcrowding has led to concerns about inhumane conditions and contributed to violence inside prisons, with over 1,000 deaths in 2025.

Colombia

Colombia has a particularly complex history of armed violence. A hotspot for narcotics trafficking, Colombia’s government has struggled to rein in both insurgent guerrilla groups and cartels for decades. In June 2026, Colombia elected right-wing businessman Abelardo de la Espriella. Espriella’s campaign centered on security, promising to deploy the military against armed rebel groups, rather than continuing peace talks. Critics of Espriella fear a more militarized approach could return the country to active armed conflict.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica is a country with no standing military and a history absent of recent conflict, making the 2026 election of right-wing politician Laura Fernández particularly telling. Costa Rica’s stability has been undermined by an increase in narcotics trafficking, as it has become a logistics hub for cartels. Fernández’s campaign took a hard stance on crime, promising to build a CECOT-style prison system and to “take criminals off the streets and put them where they belong – in jail.” Costa Rica was once considered an “oasis of democracy,” but Bukele-style enforcement could have long-term effects on its institutions. 

An Alternative to Authoritarianism 

The “Bukele Model” provides impressive short-term reductions in crime, but it fails to address the underlying social, economic, and political factors that have facilitated organized crime in Latin America. Additionally, emergency executive powers have the potential to erode institutions and weaken democracy. 

An aggressive security apparatus can reduce criminal activity, but institutions must constrain its use. Latin American governments should strengthen judicial oversight, investigative capacity, financial intelligence, and human-rights safeguards. These measures allow authorities to take a strong stance on security while ensuring that institutions respect human rights and due process.

Economic insecurity also drives illicit activity. Neoliberal policies implemented across Latin America have promoted privatization, austerity, and labor market liberalization. The resulting inequality has marginalized communities, leaving them vulnerable to recruitment by criminal groups. 

In order to support Latin American governments and address long-term drivers of crime,  international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, should promote economic opportunities in marginalized communities and support targeted development and infrastructure projects that address conditions exploited by criminal organizations.

Staff Editor: Carly Gordon

Managing Editor: Aidan Fernandes