Kosovo Reckons with Thaçi War Crimes Verdict

The Verdict

On September 16, a long-awaited verdict in the Hague shocked the small Balkan state of Kosovo, the youngest country in Europe. Former leader Hashim Thaçi was convicted on a plethora of war crimes and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Thaçi previously served as the state’s first prime minister, the political director of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and as Kosovo's president at the time of his indictment in 2020. He is among the state’s most revered personas, and was long seen as one of the West’s most reliable partners. While Thaçi and his three fellow defendants intend to appeal the judgment and believe they may yet walk free, its pronouncement provides a unique and useful opportunity to reflect on the social and political ramifications of yet another post-Yugoslav courtroom drama.

Before the Trial

Kosovo is a unique state for many reasons. It was the site of mass crackdowns and repression by the Milošević regime in its latter days from 1998 to 1999 that triggered a war and ended with a 78-day bombing campaign of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO. Today, a lack of official UN and other  recognition, stemming from continued disputes with and rejection by Serbia, the state from which it seceded in February 2008, have left it in a political void, with attempts to win entry into international organizations routinely obstructed.

Hashim Thaçi served as the adored political director of the KLA during the war, winning the hearts of his countrymen and of the West. His role as a founding father of his country extended beyond the war, leading it to independence and later steering it to a pro-European course diplomatically engaged with non-recognizing neighbor Serbia before his arrest. In 2020, the chief prosecutor for the Kosovo Specialist Chamber – a court technically under Kosovar law but based in the Hague, staffed by international judges and lawyers, deeply unpopular within Kosovo but very popular among European governments – filed the charges. The prosecutor was Jack Smith, a man with a unique career path perhaps better known to readers for cases closer to home. These proceedings followed the 2019 friendly presentation of a national award to former President Clinton and came as Thaçi was en route to Washington for a meeting with then-President Trump and Serbian President (and Kosovo War-era FRY information minister) Aleksandar Vučić. The meeting, which presented an unprecedented opportunity for high stakes talks between the leader of Serbia and that of its now-unrecognized former province, both with European inclinations, was scuttled, as Thaçi surrendered to face charges.

The Outcome

Six years later, as Kosovar leaders predicted the acquittal of their ally or rival (depending on political camp), the small country was shaken to see him handed a quarter-century imprisonment for war crimes relating to alleged KLA kidnappings and extrajudicial killings. One unifier among Kosovar Albanian leadership, who represent the overwhelming majority ethnic background of the former Serbian province, was objection. Despite two inconclusive parliamentary elections since early 2025, Kosovo’s political leaders joined together in their public opposition to the judgment against one of their own. The Kosovar parliament voted 99-0 to condemn the judgment on September 28.

One clear winner from this verdict will be Kosovo’s incumbent PM, Albin Kurti, whose populist party has successfully rivaled Thaçi’s more moderate, pro-European outlook. Thaçi and Kurti have been rivals since their shared days as rebels of the Kosovo war; while the former led the political sector of the KLA, the latter led a student movement more averse to dialogue and reconciliation. Kurti’s crusade evolved into his party, Vetëvendosje (LVV), or Self-Determination. From the war years to their tense days as president and prime minister together, Thaçi has routinely sought to ingratiate the EU and negotiate with Belgrade while Kurti has sought to underscore Prishtina’s independence and aversion to compromise on Kosovar sovereignty. The prevention of Thaçi’s return to the political scene must undoubtedly offer relief to the embattled PM, who has narrowly managed to maintain his office after two subsequent elections without a clear majority in the country’s 120-seat assembly.

Parallel and seemingly detached from the dialogue among Kosovo’s angry domestic and diasporic population is that among Serbians. Serbian officials — who just weeks ago mourned the death of convicted genocidaire General Ratko Mladić, known for his brutality in the Bosnian War (and particularly, the Srebrenica massacre and siege of Sarajevo) — have criticized the sentences (ranging between 13 and 25 years) for being too lenient, compared to the prosecution’s requested 45. Serbia continues to play a major role in Kosovo’s affairs as its former home, wartime adversary, and current obstacle to international recognition.

Meanwhile, the question may have been opened — for the first time — of whether Kosovar faith in the West can be shaken.

Beyond the Balkans

While Euroscepticism has raged within EU member and candidate states for years and faith in U.S. reliability repeatedly shaken in the twenty-first century, Kosovo citizens’ support for the EU and the U.S. has traditionally polled around or above 90 percent. As Western judges weighed and continue to weigh the fate of Kosovo’s path-charting leader, it is worth watching whether such a significant new development can shake so strong a partnership. American leaders would do well to consider the extent to which they should involve themselves in the small Balkan nation where their country is perhaps most popular, as Trump administration ally Richard Grenell has regularly commented in defense of Thaçi, and opposition to Kurti.

For now, policymakers and diplomats should treat such legacies of the conflict with the sensitivity they deserve while promoting what dialogue and diplomacy can be found in a deeply divided region. In a time of such political turmoil, the United States must be wary of forgetting or forsaking even its smallest allies, especially one so loyal. Despite political distractions at home and abroad, policymakers in the State Department, Congress, and the EU should at the very least project interest in the trial’s outcome, whether through reaffirmation of the court and for Kosovo’s other state institutions, its leaders, or both. They must express, and through diplomatic engagement, prove their continued motivation to assist Prishtina in its reforms, and its drive to gain recognition on the world stage.

Staff Editor: Flynn Struckmann

Managing Editor: Emma Hopp