From Artificial to Super: Trump’s AI Rebranding and the Politics of Technological Power
AI is a broad field of study that focuses on the development of computational systems that seek to perform tasks that require aspects of human intelligence, including learning, prediction, language understanding, pattern recognition and decision-making. Through the rhetoric of great powers competing for a technological edge, the existing classification of “Artificial Intelligence” (AI) has changed into “Super Intelligence” (SI) at the United Nations. It is not because of a new machine or some scientific discovery. Rather, it is a matter of the political language that is used to describe, classify and control an important technology.
Governments shape the policy context for technology discussion, since the words they use to talk about technology are defined in part by them. In addition to the control over the language of AI, there is the question of whether the political language and capabilities that engender technological power are congruent. To manage these capabilities, the National Security Council should establish legally binding AI infrastructure standards based on semiconductor manufacturing and computing power.
On September 22, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump, in his address to the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, announced that he was replacing the term “Artificial Intelligence” with the term “Super Intelligence.” He argued that AI is fake intelligence; yet in reality, intelligence emanating from these technologies is real and impactful. Only the discourse of the U.S. government surrounding the technology changed. This move stands out because it is quite rare for government figures to directly reshape the language around existing technology. Is it a technology, a science, a regulation, a security issue, a strategic asset of the future, or a techno-economic tool? Different responses give rise to different political agendas; thus, who controls the meaning of SI becomes a broader matter of international relations.
Technological power is not only about chips, computing power, data, and algorithms but also about establishing legally binding AI infrastructure standards based on semiconductor manufacturing capacity and computing power. President Trump is putting an already developed technology in a new conceptual framework. As President Trump brands the general term as SI, the political connotation of the word shifts, but what is at stake and its political significance is still disputed.
With his selection of the term “SI”, the focus returns to technological capability and national superiority. Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge explains that naming is an important aspect of exercising power, as the classification of an object can influence the parameters of political thinking and decision-making.
History has shown that technologies that affect economic productivity, military strength, intelligence, and technological independence have been at the core of strategic competition. AI is now being added to this current geopolitical landscape.
States take note of technological development in other states and take appropriate action to improve their own relative power and preserve sovereignty. Technological sovereignty is the ability of a state to affect key technologies, infrastructures, knowledge, and standards. AI development depends on international supply chains, private companies, big computing sources, data flows, and requires the collaboration of states, companies, and technical communities in its development. Meanwhile, states are trying to develop national technological capabilities by means of industrial policy, investment, export controls and strategic regulation.
Washington and Beijing are fiercely competing in a number of technology areas such as advanced computing, semiconductors and AI, evidenced by strict global export licensing updates regarding high-performance quantum semiconductor devices.
The United States’ technological capability has been increasingly linked with their national power. Trump and the Republicans have been stressing how fast AI is progressing, how much China is competing, and how over-regulation could give China a competitive advantage. It is such progress that expands the policy space for the term “Super Intelligence” to expand. AI could thus be a security risk as one state may try to enhance its abilities, leading to other states trying to expedite their programs. This is also leading to the integration of AI into the traditional logic of international competition. President Trump’s statement is in line with this competitive landscape. It alters the understanding of how competitive policy discussions can be understood, and shifts the focus to technological capability and political leadership.
Political narratives can shape the choices of governments as to which of these material resources to prioritize. Technological independence does not necessarily mean an end to dependence on global value chains, private enterprises, foreign expertise and knowledge; it can be an end goal of a state. AI is an issue of acceptable vulnerabilities and how much control a state can have over a critical technology.
The resulting regulatory debate should not be a simple one of innovation or restriction. So what are the boundaries for governments about AI? Is there a possibility of developing international common standards, and should technology companies be central as they hold a lot of the knowledge and infrastructure in hand? Rather than one form of authority being more important than another, the issue is the distribution of authority within the transnational networks that the technology relies on. National sovereignty and international governance of technology are not necessarily conflictual, but can become problematic when states want to have more control over technologies that require cooperation for development. AI policy will thus have to deal with the national power of the technology and the desire for international governance.
This is evident in White House Executive Order 14434, Launching the Era of Super Intelligence, which requests executive departments and agencies use the term “SI” instead of “AI” in official correspondence, public communications, websites, reports, policy documents and other non-statutory documents. The other part of the order lays the groundwork for its application by providing a definition of SI based on the current statutory definition of AI . The important policy question is not about terminology, but about substance. The National Security Council, in collaboration with Congress, should establish legally binding AI infrastructure standards, based on technical factors like semiconductor manufacturing capacity and computing power. These benchmarks would help to ensure that technological sovereignty is based on material capabilities and not on changing discourse. The politics of AI begins with a name, but technological power is ultimately rooted in the material power behind it.
Staff Editor: Tyler Johnson
Managing Editor: Natalia Dussán