The Sources of Russian Conduct in Ukraine

The calamity of Russia’s maniacal war in Ukraine stems from a security policy rooted in deep mistrust and a desire to control the Russian-speaking world. The entirety of the Russian Federation’s security policy, when boiled down to its most simple elements, can be defined by one phrase: “debilitating insecurity.” Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the Russian Federation have sought to maximize their influence via aggressive actions which they view as justified and necessary to regain the primacy they once held. This manufactured crisis will continue to get worse – both within the legal borders of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. 

The collapse of the USSR

Similar to the USSR of the 1920s, post-Soviet Russia of the late 1990s was plagued by chaos, rampant instability, and lawlessness – much like the chaos that George Kennan notes the USSR was born out of. Conditions on the ground warranted reverting to the old system of dictatorial power. In turn, this led to the installation of a robust security apparatus to neuter the sheer lawlessness that enveloped the Russian Federation in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR. 

The near anarchy that enveloped Russia in the final years of the 20th century also left the Russian Federation devoid of a cultural identity or core defining ideology. Though not every citizen was an ardent communist, the state-run Communist Party apparatus no longer provided compulsory education for Russian/Soviet citizens. With the state no longer in charge of culture, there was a seeming need to reinstate a traditional upholding of “Russian cultural values” to overcome the sense of insecurity stemming from a lack of ideology. 

This insecurity is reflected by the term “culture” being referenced 23 times in the most updated version of the Russian Federation national security strategy. Specifically, the security strategy calls for the “creation of a system of spiritual-moral and patriotic education of citizens”, as well as noting that “threats…in the sphere of culture are the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.” The root of this insecurity is the deep suspicion that much of Russia’s struggles in the 1990s were the result of Western interference in the internal affairs of Russia. As a result, Russia’s security apparatus is laser focused on the need to build a robust and definable culture and quash any “foreign” threat over a fundamental fear of a return to aimless wandering. 

Geographic Insecurity

In a 2005 speech, President Vladimir Putin noted that he believes that “the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophes of the 20th century.” Putin has, in subsequent public remarks, doubled down on those comments. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left millions of ethnic Russians abroad in newly-sovereign countries and away from Moscow’s influence. Former republics suddenly had total control over their sovereignty and foreign policy, and no control over the Russian speakers no longer living under Moscow’s dominion. This insecurity in particular is evident in the Russian National Security Strategy, published in 2015. The strategy repeatedly references the need to defend the rights of its compatriots abroad. 

In light of recent events in Ukraine, it is also important to analyze the Russian Security Strategy in the context of the near abroad, specifically in Ukraine. The strategy states that American and European Union (EU) support for the 2014 revolution in Ukraine materialized an “armed conflict” in Ukraine. Further, the security strategy notes that “the deep socioeconomic crises are turning Ukraine into a chronic seat of instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders.” To Moscow, states cannot be truly sovereign unless they are great powers – smaller states are mere vessels for great powers to exercise influence. Moscow’s behavior – cyberattacks, misinformation campaigns, hybrid warfare, and outright military invasions of its neighbors – is rooted deeply in a culture of viewing true security as a measure of outright military power. This aggressive worldview is rooted in Russia’s sheer geographic size coupled with its vulnerability to invasion, thus creating the insecurity complex referenced earlier. 

Ukraine now

Vladimir Putin’s February 21 speech on Ukraine, riddled with historical revisionism and brazen gaslighting, outlined the Kremlin’s view that Ukraine is not an independent country. Indeed, Putin spelled out that Ukraine and all other former Soviet republics in fact are historically part of Russia, playing into the Kremlin’s paranoia and geographic insecurity about not having buffer states between itself and the rest of the world. Refer back to the 2015 security strategy’s mention of Ukraine. It views the “instability” –  Ukraine’s move towards democracy – as a direct threat to its influence and its own survival. In their minds, what it does not control will be controlled by the West – an example of Russia projecting its worldview on the other side. 

What Happens Next?

The Kremlin is losing on two fronts: it is losing the ground war against a very determined and united Ukraine, and it is losing the information war amongst its own people. The Kremlin is determined to control both the narrative and Ukraine. With crippling sanctions, skyrocketing prices, and information proliferating domestically, Russia will not be able to control its people or the protests that come from this war. At this point, it is all or nothing, and anything short of victory in Ukraine is an unacceptable failure to the Kremlin. The Russian military could begin to unleash more powerful weapons and missile strikes in the name of trying to turn the tide of the war against Ukraine. In a more serious and uncomfortable development, Vladimir Putin put his nuclear forces on an elevated alert status. Though the utilization of nuclear weapons in a theater of war is highly unlikely, it is a possibility NATO governments have to consider. 

A fundamental mistake that many Western policymakers make is that they do not consider the Russian worldview, which is a lens of immense insecurity. Recent Russian politics can be viewed not through an ideological lens, but instead through the lens of security through power. During recent times of turmoil, the Russian Federation gravitated towards autocracy as a counterweight to lawlessness and disorder, which in turn is why the Russian government pays a significant amount of attention to maintaining culture. Their insecurity is the depraved source of their actions. Paradoxically, through waging war through aggressive actions, Russia’s leaders believe that they can achieve a lasting peace. It is impossible to know distinctly what the days and weeks ahead hold for this conflict. However, it is abundantly clear that the Kremlin is going to continue to escalate its inhumane and cruel war against Ukraine at any cost until such a time that Vladimir Putin is not in power. 

Austin Schlueter, Contributing Writer

Austin R. Schlueter is from Atlanta, Georgia and is in the final semester of pursuing his M.A. in Security Policy Studies with a focus in Conflict Resolution at GWU. He graduated from Clemson University in May of 2020 with a B.A. in Political Science and History with a focus on Balkan Politics. His areas of expertise include Russian Security policy and Balkan Politics. He presently works as a federal contractor at the Department of State. His views represent his only and do not reflect those of his employers. 

Twitter handle @aschlueter161 

Email: aschlueter@gwu.edu

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