A Year in Review: South Korea’s Foreign Policy

The geopolitical position of the Korean peninsula has remained an integral aspect of its national security policies. Its remote isolation and natural boundaries have historically induced South Korea to pursue isolationist and inward-looking policies. Simultaneously, its proximity to great powers, such as China, Russia, and Japan, has ensnared it in issues beyond its boundaries. Considering regional and environmental factors, such as nuclear build-up and the rise of China, I believe a combination of balancing, networking, regionalism, and hedging would be the optimal security policy for South Korea which can mitigate tensions while avoiding limiting its choices. However, the degree to which South Korea pursues these policies is dependent on the strategic environment in Asia and how it unfolds in the coming years. 

Strategic Environment

 China’s economic rise over the past two decades has empowered it to become more determined and aggressive in its actions. Recently, the nation initiated a significant military build-up, took a more confident and brazen approach to its maritime issues, exhibited an  increasingly belligerent behavior towards Taiwan, and showed despotic behavior domestically. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has heightened tensions with Taiwan – especially with Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s high-profile trip to Taiwan which enraged Beijing.

Furthermore, North Korea has brazenly accelerated its nuclear weapons program. In 2022, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missile tests and declared a new doctrine of North Korean nuclear power, which identifies itself as a nuclear weapons state. On February 2, 2022, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) announced it identified a completed long-range ballistic missile operation base 15 miles inward near the North Korea-China border near Hoejung-ni. A key detail behind this base is that it is not subject to any previous denuclearization talks conducted with the United States. 

Moreover, South Korea’s security strategy is greatly affected by the endemic political polarization that has increasingly worsened in recent years and which reached a peak in the 2022 presidential elections. While the People’s Power Party gained the Blue House under Yoon Suk Yeol, the opposing Democratic Party maintained a majority in the National Assembly and blocked nearly all new bills that Yoon’s administration had tried to pass. This division holds profound consequences for Yoon’s strategic policies. At the beginning of March this year, South Korea held its general Presidential election. Yoon Suk Yeol of the People's Power Party won over 48% of the vote.

Yoon Suk Yeol’s Current Security Policies

With the election of Yoon to the Blue House, South Korea saw a reversal of political power. During his campaign, Yoon did not shy away from stating his agenda. As his presidency unfolded, he has held no reservations about his desire to create a closer relationship with the United States. Yoon was often critical of the previous administration’s more conciliatory behavior towards North Korea and, typical of his party, opposes a policy of unreserved reconciliation. Like his predecessor, Yoon maintains that any security partnership South Korea holds is solely to neutralize the North Korean threat. 

In a 2022 interview with the New York Times, Yoon delineated South Korea’s stance on the U.S.-China issue as predictable, straightforward, and in favor of the United States. As a part of this, he reinstated the joint military exercises which were canceled and downsized under the Moon Jae-In and Donald Trump administrations. Yoon has also rejected Moon’s “three-no” policy and views the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system as an integral aspect of South Korea's defense strategy. Furthermore, Yoon has expanded and deepened South Korea’s bilateral and regional ties including those of the Quad and NATO. Yoon also joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which some define as an American tactic to hinder Chinese economic advancements in the race to secure global supply chains. So far, Yoon’s approach to security has been predictably politically conservative, with his sights set on improving ties with the U.S. and maintaining hardline stances against North Korea and China. 

Security Policy Recommendation

South Korea must work to mitigate tensions yet avoid limiting its choices, all the while considering regional and environmental factors. Therefore, a combination of balancing, networking, regionalism, and hedging would be the optimal security policy for South Korea. However, the degree to which South Korea pursues these policies depends on Asia's strategic environment and how it unfolds in the coming years. This means the level of balancing pursued by South Korea could be minimal but, as it becomes necessary, could increase. 

Yoon’s current policies towards China are more antagonistic than necessary. Pushing against China comes with disproportionate risk for the South Korean economy, as demonstrated in 2017 with the installation of THAAD. China’s retaliation exposed South Korea’s vulnerability and dependence of South Korea’s economy on China, the proper limitations in the relationship between South Korea and the United States, and feelings of dissatisfaction across the country with the lack of assistance post-retaliation from the United States. South Korea cannot and should not ignore China. South Korea must acknowledge its limitations and bide its time until it is necessary to honestly and transparently pick one side over the other. Otherwise, South Korea has little to gain from true accommodation of China or true pro-American balancing. 

South Korea should focus on its regional and multilateral security mechanisms and networking diplomacy, particularly with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan. South Korea needs to cooperate and move forward with Japan toward substantive cooperation on issues. Narratives must be addressed and nuances to history must be evoked and pushed to the forefront. Japanese conservatives associate discussing their country’s past colonial actions with an effort to humiliate and denigrate Japan. Including new perspectives might open doors to better and healthier dialogue. Furthermore, cooperation must focus on issues where South Korea and Japan find consensuses, such as nuclear power safety, climate change, economic development, global health, and anti-piracy operations. Even initially focusing on issues outside of the security realm, and once more trust and faith have been built, integrating these systems into its security policy can benefit Korea-Japan relations. 

Improving the relationship with ASEAN should be an integral part of Yoon’s foreign policy. ASEAN is South Korea’s second-largest trading partner, second-largest investment destination, and a critical partner in various free trade agreements. Moreover, Korea hosted the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit in November 2019, demonstrating the importance of ASEAN-Korea relations. While the credibility and effectiveness of ASEAN have repeatedly been questioned over the past few years over issues like its failed handling of the coup in Myanmar, ASEAN is regardless one of the few regional organizations in Asia and South Korea would benefit from a closer relationship. Therefore, aiding ASEAN in its successes and guiding it through its failures is integral to the survival and effectiveness of this regional organization. Doing so gives credence to South Korea’s desired role on the world stage. 

While an amalgamation of multiple policies is proposed, in the current geopolitical environment South Korea faces, the ambiguous hedging strategy should be the primary focus for the Yoon administration along with an emphasis on regional cooperation with ASEAN and Japan. 


Isabelle Brito, Staff Writer

Isabelle Brito is an M.A. candidate at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs with a concentration in East Asia-U.S. relations. She holds a B.A. in International Relations from Florida International University. She can be reached at ibrit008@gwu.edu.

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