Clarity & Coherence: The Wilson Administration’s 1918 Aide-Mémoire & Its Relevance

Over the past two years of President Trump’s second term, the U.S. has engaged in several major military operations such as Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela, Operation Southern Spear targeting alleged drug smugglers in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, and Operations Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury against Iran. These military campaigns have varied in their scale, timeline, and objective, yet all raise questions about consent, command, and accountability. These questions are far from new; they have been asked in numerous American conflicts throughout history, including during the lesser-known involvement in the Russian Civil War. In July 1918, President Woodrow Wilson’s administration issued an Aide-Mémoire on U.S. support for the Allied intervention into the Russian Civil War.  Overall, Wilson’s policy reflects how a lack of political direction for military operations can lead to weakened coherence in national policy.

The Aide-Mémoire states a military intervention in Russia would exacerbate domestic turmoil and would not provide an advantage in the war effort against Imperial Germany causing the administration to reject to participate in or sanction an intervention “in principle.” This objection is undercut by the agreement to commit a small force to assist the Czecho-Slovak legion, guard Allied supply depots, and support efforts at “self-government or self-defense” in which Russians “may be willing to accept assistance.” These are military tasks that the Wilson Administration is willing to perform, but there is no description of the larger political objective they are meant to serve. This presents a challenge in communicating and evaluating the purpose of the mission and under what circumstances the mission has been accomplished. The mission is further complicated by the ambiguity of who can give consent on behalf of the Russian public after repeatedly emphasizing the importance of Russian acceptance of aid. A deployment that emphasizes local consent will require knowing which faction can provide this approval. The document also does not identify which Russian forces the administration hopes to help organize for the self-defense of Russia. Not identifying which faction the U.S. hopes to engage with poses an additional challenge toward the Wilson Administration’s goal of noninvolvement in Russian affairs since any assistance to a Russian force will come with political implications within Russia. The ambiguous language and conflicting statements are evident of a bigger problem with the communication of U.S. policy towards the intervention that would be exacerbated by difficulties in the transmission of Aide-Mémoire in theater. Some Allied and American officials on the ground were not informed of the document until after U.S. forces arrived and once informed, there were differing interpretations of the administration’s policy. The importance of policy coherence and clarity is not unique to this often-overlooked intervention or the ongoing conflict with Iran. 

Similarities can be seen with the lack of coherence and clarity with U.S. strikes against Iran. The hostilities with Iran happened despite President Trump’s 2024 campaign platform of keeping the U.S. out of wars and internal skepticism by Vice President JD Vance. Furthermore, the objectives of the conflict have shifted over time from targeting Iran’s nuclear program to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. This is not to say that war objectives must remain stagnant, if there are shifts in objectives, they should be clearly communicated and explained. Based on a Reuters/Ipsos poll, as of May 2026, two out of three Americans do not believe the president has clearly explained the war.  Collectively, both conflicts support two recommendations for present and future policymakers: the president should act in alignment with their administration’s position, and they should emphatically pursue clarity in their communication of intent.

From the Aide-Mémoire, the president should act in alignment with the administration’s communicated position. If the administration does not view the use of military force as beneficial, it should not be used. If there are concerns about how this may impact allied relations, the president can leverage alternative non-combat options such as intelligence sharing or logistical support. When force is employed, the president should state their political objective, who they are engaging with, and conditions that are required to cease hostilities. This is not intended to totally constrain war objectives. War and the employment of military force are a messy, uncertain, and difficult challenge on both the personal and political level. Nonetheless the lack of clarity, especially during the initiation period, can undermine and challenge policy coherence once the use of military force has been decided.

Staff Editor: Samantha Moore

Managing Editor: Emma Hopp

Thor Moy, Staff Writer

Thor Moy is a graduate student in the Security Policy Studies program at the Elliott School and Staff Writer for IAR. He has a B.A. in History with a minor in Political Science from the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. His interests are in nuclear policy, U.S. history, and defense issues.

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