Two Case Studies of Russian Propaganda in Romania and Hungary
Abstract
The Kremlin’s current disinformation campaign against the West, unlike similar projects undertaken during the Cold War, is no longer based on the dissemination of an overarching ideology or “selling” Russia as an alternative. The contemporary logic of propaganda takes a highly nation-specific approach, and messages differ widely in subject matter, tone, character, and frequency. By examining the nature of state-sponsored propaganda, it is possible to determine whether the Kremlin views individual nations as friendly, up-for-grabs, or hostile, and what the underlying goals of such coverage may be. While the Kremlin’s propaganda campaign is multilayered and spans a wide variety of platforms, this paper focuses on messaging and its evolution from two outlets that often serve as starting points for the spread of disinformation: Sputnik and RT. In order to determine differences in coverage and government perception, Hungary and Romania are chosen for their near polar opposite representation in the aforementioned outlets.
INTRODUCTION
Following the return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency, the Russian Federation has undertaken a drastic campaign to reassert itself on the world stage. Building on the seizure of Crimea, the war in East Ukraine, and the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West, Putin’s Russia has sought to overcome its relative military and economic deficiencies by weaponizing information against Western targets. According to Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews of the RAND Corporation, this “Firehose of Falsehood” propaganda model, “takes advantage of technology and available media,” including, “the internet, social media…[and] professional and amateur journalism,” to saturate the entire information sphere with, “a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions.” The Russian aim here is to, “entertain, confuse, and overwhelm the audience.” 1
Unlike the rigidly ideological and uniform propaganda of the Soviet era, contemporary Russian propaganda takes a highly localized approach to politics, problems, prejudices, and neighborhood of specific targets. Russian sponsored media focuses on a range of the target’s pressure points, amplifies these issues, and seeks to inflame the audience’s existing prejudice, anger, and sense of helplessness. While Russia itself is frequently left out of the narrative, Russian propaganda identifies the source of these problems as either explicitly or implicitly the fault of the United States or the European Union. By focusing on relatively smaller issues within the target countries, Russia hopes to inflame anti-EU, NATO, and U.S. sentiment in order to achieve its larger goal of undermining the post-Cold War political consensus and global security architecture.
The subjects of analysis in this paper are two former Warsaw Pact states, Hungary and Romania, whose foreign policy agendas toward Russia have taken on very different characters over the past decade. Under the leadership of PM Viktor Orban, Hungary’s domestic politics and foreign policy have drifted towards illiberalism, Euroskepticism, and a measure of closeness to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. By contrast, Romania has an abundant domestic energy supply, as well as a lack of close economic ties and a population that is largely hostile to Russia. As a result, Romania has a much more EU friendly agenda. While the scope of Russia’s information warfare extends across a wide range of platforms, the two primary sources of propaganda analyzed are the state-supported news outlets Sputnik and RT between 2013 and 2017. Stories originating from these sources frequently trickle down into social media and are amplified by bots, elements of the far right, Russia sympathizers, and the unknowing dupes of misinformation, spreading across different kinds of media and distorting mainstream narratives. In the following sections, I will provide an outline of the factors that leave Romania and Hungary vulnerable to Russian propaganda, the messages being advanced, and possible solutions to counter this growing problem.
HUNGARY: ILLIBERAL POSTER CHILD
FOUNDATIONS OF INFLUENCE
The most significant factor that makes Hungary susceptible to Russian propaganda is its enormous dependency on Russian energy. While Hungary (and the EU as a whole) has attempted to diversify its sources of energy, it is still largely reliant on Russian gas and oil. Unlike the neighboring Czech Republic, Hungary does not have sufficient coal reserves to serve as a hedge in its dealings with Russian energy firms. Indeed, while Hungary produces about nine million tons of coal per year, this accounts for only about 19% of Hungary’s electricity mix and this percentage is projected to begin declining around 2020 as its largest coal-fired plants near the end of their lifecycles.2 Additionally, production of hard coal ceased in the 1990s, and 60% of Hungarian coal derived energy comes from lignite, the lowest quality of the mineral, which demonstrates their reliance on Russian energy.3 About 40% of Hungary’s total oil demand is met by Russian exports, and between 45-50% of its natural gas needs are also supplied by Russia.4 Russia is also heavily involved in Hungary’s nuclear energy sector stemming from a 2014 agreement whereby Russian state nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, was given a sole-source contract to construct two reactors at Paks for 12 billion Euros.5
Politically, Hungary’s PM Viktor Orban has pursued a course of soft-to moderate Euroskepticism and friendly overtures to Putin’s Russia. In 2014, Orban publicly outlined his ideas for Hungary as an “illiberal democracy,” envisioning a recalibration of Hungary's role in the EU and world order. At his seminal speech in Balvanyos, Transylvania, he chastised the failure of liberal democracy to “protect community assets,” and called for the re ordering of Hungary into a nation that “is not simply a group of individuals, but a community that must be organized, reinforced, and in fact constructed.” He excoriated neoliberalism, rejected the role of civil society in democracy, denounced the “paid political activists” of NGOs, and called attention to the increasingly non-democratic, nationalist “stars of international analysts today… Singapore, China, India, Russia, and Turkey.”6 In addition, the Hungarian government began to renationalize several key industries in the country beginning in 2011, including the banking, insurance, and oil sectors, and created several new state monopolies, notably for tobacco, which demonstrates Orban’s rejection of the free market model.7 In sum, Orban’s vision is essentially a soft-authoritarianism that calls for an ethnically homogenous, monolithic state. This has philosophically drawn him toward Vladimir Putin despite Hungary’s bloody past with Russia and the more tangible economic benefits that come from European integration.
Viktor Orban’s wish for self-preservation also keeps him open to Kremlin overtures. While Orban’s center-right Fidesz party holds a large majority in the National Assembly (114/199 seats), it must continuously contend with the rising popularity of the Russian-backed, far-right populist Jobbik party (24 seats). Indeed, Jobbik is critical of NATO, wants to renegotiate EU membership, has supported the seizure of Crimea, and rode a wave of popular opposition against refugee resettlement and Islam at-large to parliament.8 The party therefore represents a threat to both Orban’s majority in the National Assembly as well as the party’s national prestige and status.
Additionally, large segments of the Hungarian population are receptive to Orban’s politics. Building on a decade of economic stagnation in the 2000s,9 some of the lowest wages in the EU10, and the continued perception that Western Europe does not treat Eastern Europe as equal, citing the 2017 East-West food quality scandal,11 Hungarians are more susceptible to both Orban’s hardline politics and Russian propaganda.
WHAT THEY SAY
#1: THE LOSS OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
HUNGARIAN MINORITIES
From the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis to the present, Sputnik and RT have consistently stoked Hungarian fears of the exploitation of its ethnically Hungarian minorities in neighboring states, especially in Ukraine, Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania in order to advance Russian interests. While Hungary has minorities in multiple nations along its borders, the coverage from Russian media outlets exclusively focused on the allegedly precarious situation of Hungarian minorities in one nation: post-Yanukovych Ukraine. In 1991, the residents of the Transcarpathian region were given a vote concurrent with the independence referendum that would have granted the region (which has a sizable Hungarian minority) autonomy within Ukraine. While 78% of voters approved the initiative, the Supreme Council of Ukraine did not fully abide by the result, leaving many ethnic minorities within the region embittered toward Kiev.12
In 2015, RT prominently featured the efforts of Hungarian minorities in Western Ukraine to form a Cross-National Assembly of Transcarpathia. This Cross-National Assembly, a joint project with other non-Ukrainian minorities, had the intent of establishing an assembly uniting the Hungarian minority with Romanian and Rusyn minorities in order to “protect the interests, rights, and culture of nearly one million people” in the west of the nation. The Co-Chairman of the Assembly called for Ukraine’s new government to “act in accordance with the country’s constitution” and for the Assembly to be “neither separatists or extremists,” focusing rather on, “champion[ing] their rights
and values, as well as their cultural and historic heritage.”13 While Hungary nominally backs the EU/NATO position on the conflict in Ukraine, including sanctions leveled at Russia, the historical fear of Hungarian minorities’ rights being trampled weakens their support for the common EU policy against Russian interference and dulls Hungarian support for their Ukrainian ally.
In the same week, Sputnik echoed the words of a former French Minister of Transport by calling Kiev “hypocritical” for complaining about the Russian treatment of Crimean Tatar minorities while allegedly “car(ing) less [about the] rights of Hungarians in Zakarpattia [Transcarpathia].” In addition, the Right Sector faction’s clashes with local government that are rumored to involve attempts to cut off smuggling routes are framed as an existential crisis to the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, which is “deeply concerned with violence conducted by the Right Sector.”14
In February of 2015, Sputnik amplified the public statements of two minor Hungarian officials that Hungarians in Ukraine were being drafted into the Ukrainian army at disproportionate rates. Sputnik offered further evidence from the pro-Russian Ukrainian hacker group CyberBerkut allegedly revealing, “massive casualties and terrible morale among the Kiev troops fighting in eastern Ukraine,” which painted a picture of a Ukrainian government that was “desperately trying to cover up the real situation in the country’s east.”15 In the past, the group has targeted other Western targets including NATO, the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, and various EU figures.
In the final series of minority stories in the summer of 2015, Sputnik ran a story on Janos Lazar’s intelligence report to parliament that revealed how “Hungarian spies have been active in Kiev,” in order to safeguard the interests of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, and that the civilian intelligence agency believes that “the future of Hungarians living in the Transcarpathia will be a serious issue in the coming decade.” Also included is a portion of an Orban speech in May that calls for “dual citizenship and broad autonomy rights” for the 12% of the Transcarpathian population that claimed Hungarian citizenship.16
MUSLIMS, REFUGEES, AND POPULAR OPINION
During the continent-wide refugee crisis in 2015, Sputnik and RT have unceasingly stoked xenophobia by insinuating that a large proportion of the Syrian refugees are actually ISIL fighters in disguise. Fear and/or hatred of Muslims and Islam is an already established phenomenon in Hungary. In a spring 2016 poll conducted by Pew across ten European nations, Hungary was found to have the highest degree of prejudice against Muslims (72%),17 the highest degree of fear of Iraqi and Syrian refugees (73%), and the highest level of confidence that the influx of refugees will increase domestic terrorism (76%). 18
During the period analyzed, Sputnik repeatedly echoed the calls of Jobbik to close Hungary’s borders entirely in order to completely stop the tide of refugees, including those with fellow EU members. An article from the Fall of 2015 quotes Jobbik MP Bana Tibor as stating that the proposed policy is intended to stop terrorism and economic migrants as “80% of those who arrive are economic migrants and not qualified for asylum status.” Tibor offers no evidence for his claim that the majority of refugees are economic migrants and erroneously expounds on the threat of “terrorism and extremism” from the flow of migrants, many of whom, “…reportedly have a connection with the Islamic State.”19
In late 2016, Hungary held a largely symbolic and potentially illegal national referendum that asked voters if they approved of allowing the EU to set migrant quotas within Hungary with or without the approval of the National Assembly. While 98% of voters responded “No,” turnout was far below the 50% threshold required for the successful passage of the vote. Sputnik spun the result as a victory nonetheless, and interviewed government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs who proclaimed the results constituted “a very clear articulation of the Hungarian people’s will” against an EU quota system that is “simply wrong” and “…against the interests of the European Union.”20 In the same month, Sputnik continued to paint Orban’s defeat as a moral victory. It later praised his subsequent efforts to impose the result of the failed referendum by changing the country’s constitution. This proposal would categorically ban foreigners from settling in Hungary “unless they abide by the laws on obtaining residency.”21
RT further highlighted the alleged disconnect between the EU and Hungary by running a long story about a small, obscure German NGO founded by two college students called “Let’s Fly 2 Europe.” The organization, which was only recently registered at the time of writing, sought to “raise money for plane tickets and amend an EU directive that fines airlines for ferrying migrants.” The organization also attempts to avoid the trafficker middlemen and to “fly migrants from the war-torn regions in North Africa and the Middle East, directly to Europe,” even though this objective is not attainable without directly lobbying seven EU nations, Hungary being one of them.22
#2: THE LOSS OF NATIONAL FREE WILL
GEORGE SOROS
There is no element of Sputnik or RT’s programming that is more narrow, personalized, and vicious than the constant attacks on Hungarian-born financier George Soros. While Soros has encouraged the growth of civil society through both his Open Society Foundation and funding for think tanks and NGOs in the former Warsaw Pact, Sputnik has depicted him as the personification of everything malevolent about the West.
While Russian propaganda targeting Soros is not new, there has been an extreme uptick in anti-Soros conspiracy stories spread over the past year. A February Sputnik article entitled, “Soros’ Ideology Exposed: A Post Modern, Post-Family, Post-Border New World Order” details a conversation with Igor Pshenichnikov, an advisor from the Russian government backed Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Pshenichnikov presents Soros as a man intolerant of so-called traditional European values whose goal is to ensure “the interests of all minorities, especially sexual ones, are not only secured through legislation, but prevail over the interests of the majority.” Pshenichnikov cites a 2016 Open Society leak from DC Leaks, another Russian government connected organization, which argues that “Soros’ fingerprints… [are] all over efforts to affect Western societies in ways disturbing to conservatives,” particularly through “the de-pathologization of sexual and gender identities... strategies to decriminalize prostitution and legally recognize transsexualism as a psychiatric norm.” Pshenichnikov goes further to state that Soros’ “financing of NGOs meant to destabilize countries which don’t meet [his] value system is no secret to anyone,” and that he plans to spend a further $900 million dollars in 2017 across Europe, Eurasia, and the United States to promote abortion and “perverse” sexual education for children.23 This fulmination against minority rights, humorously enough, stands in opposition to Russian propaganda that Hungarian minorities in neighboring states have no political rights or representation within Hungary. Indeed, majority rule and customs are presented as the only legitimate forces in Hungary, thereby reinforcing the illiberalism of Orban’s government.
In early Spring 2017, Orban’s government began a campaign to force a shutdown of Central European University, a university established in Budapest shortly after the fall of Communism in Hungary that Soros helped to finance. Orban justified this decision based on two factors: 1) CEU was based in the United States but only issued degrees in Hungary; and 2) George Soros was supposedly a malign influence on the nation.24 Orban charged CEU’s academic model of awarding both Hungarian and American degrees as unfair and found it “inexplicable why we should put our own universities at a disadvantage… while securing an unfair advantage for the foreign university.” He further characterized Soros as “an enemy of the Euro” who has “destroyed lives of millions of Europeans through his financial speculations.” In addition, Sputnik quotes an op-ed from an alleged political pundit, Anatoly Vasserman, asserting that Soros’ NGOs and political theories poison minds and make “these people…predictable and unable to protect their own interests from propaganda fantasies,” which serves as a feedback loop to serve Soros’ investment strategies and allows him to make even more money.25 Using Soros as the main antagonist in propaganda serves multiple purposes: it stokes anger among loyal or potential Jobbik voters, allows Orban to actively campaign against a man and his work in a way that distracts from the absence of a strong center or center-left party, and enables Soros to be used as the personification of the allegedly subversive EU and liberal institutions.
ECONOMIC CONCERNS
In addition to socio-political concerns, RT and Sputnik have targeted insecurity in the Hungarian economy and energy sector as potential instruments to challenge neoliberalism and Western institutions. In the weeks leading up to and after a high-profile meeting between Putin and Orban last February, RT and Sputnik continuously hyped the alleged 6.5 billion Euros lost by Hungarian exporters due to the sanctions.When RT asked government spokesman Szijjarto why Hungary didn’t simply vote against the sanctions, he claimed “we are not able to shake European unity on this issues” and later that “…we did not want to shatter the unity of the EU…we found ourselves alone.” 26 Szijjarto later tells RT that his government is currently investing in food processing and feed additives in Tula and suburban Moscow, and that the upcoming meeting with Putin on the second of February would be about economic ties and investments. 27
Several weeks later, Orban called for the creation of “tissue between Russia and the European Union” in the form of a free trade agreement between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union [EEU].” Furthermore, he declared that he did not “want to live in a Europe that…wastes a fantastic opportunity to unite Russian energy and the tremendous economic opportunities with European technological knowledge and culture,” simultaneously blaming the EU for creating the environment for “a new Cold War.”28 In addition to challenging the EU consensus on sanctions, the Russians have targeted the fact that Hungarian people are worried sanctions hurt their already low wages, as well as the fact that various industry leaders across Europe are wary of the effects of sanctions on Russia, which is one of their largest markets. Seen through the lens of Eastern European resentment of the EU, Hungary is faced with a dangling, pernicious carrot of EU-EEU ties that offers new markets, and EU enforced austerity via sanctions.
The Russian-financed South Stream pipeline, which was scrapped in late 2014 following EU concerns that it was a geopolitical tool rather than an economically viable project, was frequently cited in 2014 as an example of a project that was singularly beneficial to Hungary. In late 2014, RT ran a story that claimed the US exerted heavy pressure on Hungary to help kill the South Stream project. Orban claimed that while the project would not diversify energy sources, it was important to “ensure Hungary gas supplies by eliminating risks posed by the situation in Ukraine” through diversifying delivery routes as “cheap energy is the key in strengthening Hungary’s competitiveness.” RT gave credence to Orban’s claim that the “only possible means” to diversify Hungary’s domestic energy sources was the expansion of nuclear power, which is also Russian-built and financed. According to a Russia-sympathetic journalist Neil Clark, who was interviewed for the article, the attacks on Orban “demonstrate that…if you don’t do exactly what Uncle Sam and the Euro-elite tell you to do…you will come under great pressure to conform…in the name of freedom and democracy.”29 However, Hungary, which is already dependent on Russian energy for more than 80% of its needs30 would still be subject to direct Russian pressure on its foreign policy with the creation of South Stream lines, which demonstrates the preposterousness of his arguments. In reality, the controversies surrounding South Stream are meant to drive a wedge between Eastern and Western Europe, particularly because the countries of Western Europe would suffer less from supply disruptions on the Ukrainian route than those in Eastern Europe. In other words, this issue is meant to stoke embittered feelings of Central and Eastern Europe against Western Europe, which can ultimately impact the EU’s common position on the Ukrainian conflict.
MEDDLING FROM NATO AND THE EU
In Russian propaganda, the institutions of NATO and the EU are frequently painted as large, monolithic villains engulfed in groupthink that impose their will on smaller nations like Hungary without regard to their particular political and economic needs. According to the propagandists, the largest and most burdensome problem that the EU has saddled Hungary with, aside from the sanctions, is migrant quotas.
In early April, RT erroneously reported that the European Commission was prepared to use “all powers” to force Hungary and Poland into accepting migrant quotas, despite the fact that Orban pleaded his nation was “being attacked” by hordes of migrants.31 Citing diplomatic sources from the West, RT predicted a nightmare scenario where Hungary could be ejected from the bloc, or be subject to some form of intra-EU sanctions over its refusal to comply.32
The same article promotes Orban’s “Let’s Stop Brussels!” campaign, which asks Hungarians to respond to a questionnaire asking if “illegal immigration should be kept under supervision until the authorities decide in their cases,” or if “we should allow illegal immigrants to move freely in Hungary,”33 which undermines the normative legitimacy of the EU through appeals to illiberalism and xenophobia.
In October of the year prior, Sputnik and RT promoted a remarkably ironic speech delivered by Orban on the 60th anniversary of the Hungarian Uprising that compared EU steadfastness on migrant quotas to the behavior of the Soviet Union in 1956. He called for “people who love their freedom,” to save “Brussels from Sovietization,” and that the current climate would create a Europe “…without nation states and thousands of years of wisdom from Christianity.” He used the occasion of the anniversary to again declare that Hungary must “close [its] border to stop the mass migration that flows from the south,” and to reinforce his concept of an illiberal bulwark holding the line against “tyranny.” 34
In an RT piece published in May on the occasion of the Victory Day celebration against the Nazis, the “award winning” writer and blogger, Neil Clark, condemned the fact that “there has never been a time since WWII when Western double standards regarding the fight against fascism…have been so glaring, or so obscene.”35 He also takes issue with the apparently constant portrayals of “the dangers of the far-right Jobbik party—and indeed…the conservative nationalist government…of Viktor Orban,” while lamenting that the Western media does not ever attack “the anti-Semitic far right in neighboring Ukraine, and the fierce clampdown of free speech and political association there.” The difference, according to him, is that “Jobbik— and Orban’s administration—want better relations with Moscow,” while the Ukrainians do not. He further accuses the West of “[rewriting] the history of WWII and [casting] the country which suffered the most in the conflict— the Soviet Union—as being its co-instigator,” and finally accuses the West of only having zero-tolerance for fascism if the government happened to also be Russophilic.36
WHY THEY SAY IT
MOTIVE #1: DEMONSTRATE THE ILLIBERAL HUNGARIAN MODEL WORKS
Laruelle writes that Putin’s regime began creating an ideology of “Russian conservatism” in the mid-2000s in response to the global “Color Revolutions,” particularly those in the former Soviet orbit.37 The exact definition of Russian conservatism is murky, but it entails “opposing both forms of extremism— [including] liberalism and communism—,” while “…lambasting the principle of revolution.”38 After Putin’s return following widespread protests in Russia in 2012 and the concurrent Arab Spring, Russian conservatism was fleshed out further to allow for “explicit…anti-Westernism, anti-liberalism, and the promotion of so-called traditional moral values,” as well as an “implicit ideological diversity available for collective consumption.” In Viktor Orban’s seminal Balvanyos speech, he declared, “liberal values today embody corruption, sex and violence…” and praises the “stars of the international analysts today… Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey” who have found “the state... is most capable of making a nation and a community internationally competitive.”39 He reiterated the completely ridiculous idea that “just because a state is not liberal, it can still be a democracy,” and called for the creation of a “work-based society not liberal in character” and the creation of a state composed not of individuals, “but a community that must be organized, reinforced, and in fact constructed…,” which favors a “special, national approach” rather than a state that prioritizes liberal values of freedom.40
If Putin’s Russia seeks to create a convincing alternative to Western liberalism, Viktor Orban’s illiberal state is a prominent example of what a new world system can offer. It is vital that Orban’s government is successful, for if it is, it offers a sense of legitimacy to Putin himself, and provides an organizing principle that is flexible at both the domestic and international level for other illiberal European groups to adopt.
MOTIVE #2: MAINTAIN ENERGY DOMINANCE AND INCREASE RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Hungary is also a model for Russia’s desire to maintain and increase its energy stranglehold over Europe. While the EU’s Third Energy Package calls for an Energy Union amongst all member states in order to obtain more favorable energy contracts and to integrate their pipeline networks, Orban’s government is actively encouraging its defeat. Orban eagerly supported the South Stream pipeline, and is now courting Putin for the Turkish Stream pipeline to deliver more gas to Central Europe, a move that threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the Southern Gas Corridor project. The Southern Corridor, which is already under construction and will bring Azeri and potentially Turkmen gas to Southern and Eastern Europe, will greatly help to increase the supply of non-Russian energy. Orban’s focus on diversifying the route as opposed to the destination is an important distinction. About half of Russia’s gas to Europe flows through Ukraine,41 and there remain constant fears in Europe about Gazprom shutoffs. Changing the route of gas flows in favor of the Turkish Stream Pipeline would ensure continued and reliable Russian gas flow into Europe and simultaneously starve Ukraine of energy and transit fees, which may have an impact on the Ukraine crisis.
Additionally, if Russia’s nuclear energy deal with Hungary could be successfully completed, it would give Rosatom a model by which to expand further into Europe. Indeed, the EU’s climate change goals will require the use of nuclear energy for electricity production, which provides Russia with a new window of opportunity to influence EU energy policy. As the EU starts to move away from fossil fuels and towards renewables, Rosatom will be able to keep a foothold in Europe’s energy portfolio and continue to exert leverage over the EU’s Russia-related foreign policy.
Moreover, the Russian government’s scarecrow argument that they offer a chance for increased trade and investment actually hinder the foreign policy potential of the EU and undermine its moral credibility to respond to current and future Russian provocations. In 2015, the European Parliament estimated that various EU firms held between $147 and $165 billion in Russian debt with France, Italy, Germany, and the UK owning the lion’s share.42 The possibility of Russia defaulting on that debt because of EU sanctions may act as a hedge against increasing or expanding sanctions in the future, particularly because such a default could reverberate across the entirety of the EU. The alternative of relaxing sanctions on dual-use technology, as well as products and services related to oil and gas exploration, or ending sanctions entirely43 further ensures that Russian energy will continue to dominate European markets for the foreseeable future.
ROMANIA: WAYWARD SON OF THE BALKANS FOUNDATIONS OF INFLUENCE
The approach of the Russian government and its media towards Romania is different than the approach taken regarding Hungary. Russia does not have a high degree of economic influence in Romania given that it comprises less than 3% of imports to Romania and constitutes only 1% of Romania’s total exports.44 Indeed, in terms of energy, Romania relies on Russia for less than 20% of its natural gas needs and produces a significant amount of natural gas and oil itself,45 which limits the amount of economic influence Russia has on this state.
Politically, Russia does not have a significant amount of influence in Romania. There are no major political parties with pro-Russian leanings and the fever of right-wing populism in Hungary, Poland, and parts of Western Europe has not yet caught on in the country. In addition, Romania is the host to part of NATO’s missile defense shield and is the subject of a NATO initiative to develop a “tailored forward presence in the Black Sea region,”46 which demonstrates the limited Russian influence in this state. It should be no surprise then, that Russian propaganda is more interested in scaring Romania’s neighbors than trying to influence the state’s actions directly.
WHAT THEY SAY
ROMANIA AS A DIRECT SECURITY RISK
Since 2016, RT and Sputnik have launched an aggressive campaign decrying the buildup of NATO forces in the Black Sea, the procurement of armaments from the Romanian government, and the series of training exercises conducted between Romania and other NATO members. In February, RT sounded the alarm on the danger posed by an increased NATO presence in Romania by highlighting comments from Russian Foreign Ministry officials who feared the “…Romanian leadership has turned the country into a NATO outpost…”47 Referring to Romania’s hosting of an anti-ballistic missile site at Deveselu, RT claims the site “compromises [Russian] national security” because the site can “be secretly retrofitted to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles” instead of the claimed interceptor missiles. In addition, the head of the Fourth European Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Bucharest has exhibited “a defiantly anti-Russian, even Russophobic line during their inspired implementation of the sanctions or in their anti-Russian rhetoric” for the past several years, which demonstrates their efforts to associate Romania with aggression.48
After the announcement that the British RAF would deploy four Typhoon aircraft in May to patrol the Black Sea, RT declared that NATO was “encircling Russia,” for “alleged Russian aggression”49 because NATO had also deployed forces to the Baltics and Poland. In an article from the same day, Sputnik drew attention to a Lockheed Martin press release that stated the company “will deliver a tailored simulation-based F-16 training environment for the Romanian Air Force” following the purchase of several of the planes in the months prior50 to bolster their image of an aggressive Romania.
RT frequently denounced the “military force projection” buildup in the Black Sea area in late 2016, questioning the purpose of the operation, as it had “no anti-terrorism value whatsoever.” In addition, Russian propaganda decried that the allegedly “biggest military buildup along Russia’s borders since the Cold War” was supposedly “creating additional obvious risks” for European security.51 They even went so far as to declare NATO to be in violation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act and contended that NATO was “actively reclaiming the aquatorium of the Black Sea,” while “intimidating the public with movements of Russian ships in the international waters.”52 RT claims the Russian Northern Fleet’s cruise through the Black Sea had “caused an unprecedented hysteria in NATO military circles and sent media into a spin,” despite the fact that the Russian Navy is merely “travelling for the eastern Mediterranean to ‘ensure naval presence,’…as well as respond to new types of modern threats such as piracy and international terrorism.”53
In March of this year, Sputnik ran a series on the Russian Black Sea fleet’s missile drills in Crimea, which it described as “a response that Russia has to deliver to the NATO buildup in the Black Sea region.”54 In a statement from a member of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences, the representative claimed that the “only explanation behind the Russian drills… is the rising tensions in the Black Sea,” and that the NATO deployment is “offensive rather than defensive.”55 The expert pointed out that the Black Sea contained a number of threats to Russian national security, including the “Ukrainian conflict [which] remains unsolved. [and] the southwestern flank [which] is crucial… [because] Georgia has unresolved territorial problems… the Nagorno Karabakh region is also close…”56 By characterizing NATO activities in the Black Sea as offensive in nature, the Kremlin is able to amplify its narrative of being besieged and surrounded by “hostile” European and American forces, which justifies to both foreign and domestic audiences its military buildup and actions in both Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
ANNEXATION OF MOLDOVA
The potential of a Romanian annexation of Moldova has been an intermittent source of tension between Russia and Romania since both the end of the Cold War and Moldova’s independence. Moldova was once part of the Kingdom of Romania, the majority of Moldovans are ethnically Romanian, and the Moldovan language is mutually intelligible. Aside from the potential of losing another ally in Eastern Europe, Russia is heavily involved in the defense of Transnistria, an industrial breakaway region in the northeast of Moldova with a large Russian population. In addition, Russia risks losing its influence over Gagauzia, which is a pro-Russian, Turkic Christian autonomous region in Eastern Moldova. While Romanian and Moldovan politicians alike have entertained the possibility of an annexation, the issue has never seriously been voted upon or negotiated and remains a murky, nationalist dream.
In late 2014, RT excoriated presidential candidate Victor Ponta who “pledged to make the unification of Romania and Moldova his main objective.”57 RT includes selected quotes from the Russian Foreign Ministry that demanded “Chisinau authorities…give an adequate appraisal of these words” that “a reaction must follow from Brussels and other European capitals,” and that multiple authorities in Moscow were becoming concerned about the future of “sovereignty and neutrality” in Moldova. The article claims that Romanian nationalists were plotting a long-term annexation that would “violate the basic rights of the residents of the Russian speaking…Republic of Transdniester,” as evidenced by the “introduc[tion] of simplified citizenship procedures” and the Romanian government sponsored census that was “interested in the number of Moldovans who spoke Romanian and considered themselves Romanian.” Russia pledged “full support to the region” in the event of Ponta’s victory and insistence on annexation.58
Two years later, during Moldova’s fall presidential election, Sputnik released a series of articles on the implications of a potential loss by Russian favorite Igor Dodon. One article entitled “Moldova: Fate of Southeastern Europe Being Decided in Contentious Elections” not only framed the election as a solemn choice between Russia and the EU, but also as a battle for “whether Moldova remains an independent country” being waged by “Romanian-financed forces looking to annex Moldova… .”59 The article cast dire warnings regarding the future of Moldova should Dodon win, reminding readers that “in spite of the country’s political drift toward EU and Romania” that up to “a quarter of the country’s GDP” is produced by Moldovans working in Russia. In addition, they blamed the Moldova-EU Association Agreement of 2014 for “worsen(ing) the situation” of the country’s economy, perpetuating a stagnant economy and massive inflation, and precipitating a drop in currency value.60
Ten days later, after Dodon won the election, Sputnik ran a column that illustrated his thoughts about the election. Sputnik claims that if his opponent Maia Sandu had won, “the Moldovan state would have disappeared from the map of Europe and been absorbed by Romania.”61 “My opponent Maia Sandu has acknowledged she has Romanian citizenship,” Dodon laments and wonders how anyone can “…vote for a person who openly runs for the presidency of a country in order to destroy it, to eliminate it?”62 By personalizing Romania and the EU in candidate Maia Sandu, Russian propaganda taps into the anger of citizens whose lifestyles have not improved from closer economic ties to the EU and presents the complicit, corrupt pro-Russian politicians as saviors intent on saving Moldova from national destruction and the lies of the EU.
WHY THEY SAY IT
MOTIVE #1: JUSTIFY MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE BLACK SEA
From the tone and character of stories about Romania over the last three years, it is clear that Russia does not believe Romania can be dragged into its orbit, unlike Bulgaria or Hungary. Romania’s large domestic supply of natural gas and oil effectively insulates the nation from Russian political, economic, and energy related blackmail strategies. It is obvious that given Romania’s strategic position in the Black Sea, its firm support for NATO, and the steps taken by NATO to secure its position in Russia’s southern flank, Russia sees the country’s foreign policy as hostile and a security risk. Despite half-hearted attempts to portray Romania as a country in the midst of a Western NGO backed Color Revolution, Russia does not have the political or economic clout to affect any of its desired outcomes. However, in lieu of direct influence, Russia will use NATO naval, air, and land exercises and Romanian arms purchases as a justification to ramp up its own activities in the region and to build up countering alliance partners in the Black Sea region.
MOTIVE #2: SURROUND AND CONTAIN THE ROMANIAN-NATO THREAT
Russia does not have the clout to significantly change the political climate in Romania at present, and does not seemingly even try to direct its propaganda at Romanians themselves. What Russia does do is use propaganda to depict Romania as a perpetual bogeyman for pro-Russian, Ukrainian, and Gaugauzians in Moldova. By presenting a constant threat of annexation to pro-Russian elements in Moldova, Russia can help to stave off the EU and NATO advancement into this state while simultaneously maintaining their political and economic influence in Moldova.
Another harrowing possibility is that Russia could use their propaganda machine to influence nations surrounding Romania, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey in order to isolate it and reduce its strategic importance in the Black Sea region.
CONCLUSION
The differences in subject matter, character, tone, and frequency of stories lay bare Russia’s relative strengths and weakness in using propaganda against Romania and Hungary. This paper has demonstrated how Hungary’s political climate, individual leaders, and dependence on Russian gas have made it uniquely susceptible to Russian propaganda. Two or three smaller, localized topics dealing with Muslims, terrorism, resentment of the EU, and perceptions of Western meddling are big enough pressure points that Russia need not even provide direct encouragement or support to leaders in order to convince them to move East or accept illiberal forms of government, because this task has already been accomplished indirectly through Russia’s stoking of populist anger. Facing a currently immovable political and economic situation in Romania, Russian propaganda has concentrated on actively trying to isolate and present the country as a security threat to Russian interests in the Black Sea and the Balkans. Given the volatility of NATO ally Turkey and the mixed sentiments regarding Russia in Bulgaria, the firmly pro-Western Romania arguably remains one of the most reliable bases for all NATO operations against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and its projection into the Mediterranean. Because Romania is NATO’s most reliable ally in the region, it is vital that Russian propaganda in Romania is countered and neutralized.
RT and Sputnik are only two of Russia’s propaganda tools, but the messages they send are arguably more effective than the rigidly ideological, global propaganda of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, the differences between current Russian propaganda and that of the Marxist past, besides ideology, is that today it is more focused, decoupled from larger political events, and tailored to suit known contemporary and historical pressure points regarding the target in question, such as Eastern European resentment of the EU and suspected Romanian irredentism against Moldova. Thanks to the widespread usage of various forms of social media, the narratives Russian propaganda present can be mass delivered to a variety of mediums by individual users or algorithms. In the most vulnerable nations targeted, Russian propaganda does not need to mention the word “Russia” at all. By cynically exploiting prejudice, fear, rumor, and pressing social and economic problems, Russia fosters an environment of distrust, bitterness, and anger, all of which can be easily turned against individuals, perceived “others,” or Western institutions, such as the EU and NATO. It is irrelevant whether or not people believe the entire story. All that is needed is for Russian propaganda to simply reach the greatest number of eyes, provide jarring headlines, and plant seeds of doubt. The weaponization of the internet, as well as both traditional and new media, is a remarkably cost effective mechanism to influence public opinion around the world without any military or government action, and it serendipitously falls under the protection of American and European free speech laws.
RECOMMENDATIONS
HUNGARY
Russia enjoys a great deal of economic and political leverage through its companies’ near monopoly of Hungary’s energy supply. The most meaningful action the EU can take in order to alter the current Hungarian political climate is to provide real energy source diversification. The EU-funded Trans-Anatolian Pipeline is scheduled to start deliveries in 2018 and the EU must provide ample funding for the creation of northbound routes through Central Europe to deliver the Azeri gas. While Slovakia and Hungary have signed a memorandum of understanding on the “Eastring” pipeline, the EU, in keeping with the promise of its Third Energy Package, must provide adequate funding and support to ensure Eastring is built as quickly as possible.63 A second pipeline, BRUA, will connect Romania’s gas fields to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria by 2019. This source of gas in the Black Sea, which is called the Neptun block, was once estimated to hold 80-100 billion cubic meters of reserves;64 however, deep-sea drilling only began in 2016 and five remaining fields in the block have yet to be tapped. In order to better access this energy reserve, the EU should provide greater investments in both drilling capacity and transmission infrastructure in the Black Sea, which will provide greater supply to Hungary via the BRUA pipeline. In addition, this will make it more reasonable for Hungary to reject an agreement signed earlier this year to bring gas to the country via Russia’s upcoming Turkish Stream pipeline.65
An easily exploitable grievance in Hungarian society is the perception that the EU and Western Europe see Central and Eastern Europe as junior partners. The EU needs to commit to redressing these grievances through a set of concrete steps to narrow the gulf between East and West. The food product quality scandal of early 2017 provides an opportunity for the EU to close legal loopholes that effectively allow the dumping of inferior quality foodstuffs on Eastern countries.66 The EU should very publically denounce the practice, thoroughly investigate the claims in all nations, and enact a series of regulations that show it is serious about providing all member states with equal consumer protections. Further, Hungary’s relatively low standards of living and wages are a continuous source of tension that help to maintain the gap between East and West. While the European Investment Bank spent approximately €700 million in Hungary in 2016 on various transportation, telecommunications, and other projects,67 more attention should be paid to the development of rural and small town areas in Hungary, particularly in the regions where Jobbik finds its greatest support. In addition, the EU should support local industry and small-to-medium sized enterprises in order to increase wages, stop brain drain, and narrow the gap in East/West living standards, which will improve perceptions of the EU amongst those living in areas where the Western model has potentially not lived up to its promises for a better quality of life.
ROMANIA
The hostile nature of Russian propaganda suggests that there are few viable pro-Russian, anti-EU political parties or movements in Romania at present.68 However, a 2017 study of Russian propaganda in Romania’s online media found that while Romania as a whole was “one of the most anti-Russian states in the region,” approximately 18% of the surveyed population could be called “pro Russian.”69 Of that 18%, most were younger, had no memory of Communist Romania, relied on social media in order to obtain most of their news, and were “more predisposed to civic participation.”70 NATO and the EU need to ensure that this number of “pro-Russians” does not grow. In order to do this, NATO and the EU need to remind those who have taken the Western model for granted what they have to lose. The EU should begin by drawing Romania as close to the West as it possibly can by finally bringing Romania into the Schengen Area. Furthermore, the European Commission’s “Media Literacy” initiative may provide the best opportunity to fund education for younger Romanians about social media environments, how to differentiate journalism from propaganda, and how to properly evaluate newer forms of journalism.71
A 2017 Pew poll on religiosity in European nations found that 74% of Romanians believed that “being Orthodox is very or somewhat important to truly be a national of their country.” More alarmingly, 52% either completely or mostly agreed that “a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West.”72 In late 2017, Romania is due to hold a referendum concerning gay marriage,73 an issue on which the Orthodox Church and religious elements of society will play a large role. Russia has a long history of using the Orthodox Church as a tool for advancing its political interests, particularly by shoring up its image as the so-called defender of Christianity and traditional values.74 While the Orthodox Church of Romania is not particularly close to the Russian Orthodox Church, there is still opportunity for propagandists to co-opt Orthodox narratives and manipulate believers into unwittingly doing the political bidding of Russia. For the scope of this paper, the outcome of the referendum is less important than its service as a test for determining whether or not Russia can establish a political beachhead in an otherwise anti-Russian nation. The EU and NATO should closely monitor the narratives on the multitudes of Orthodox-themed websites and social media groups that peddle conspiracy theories, “equat[e] the Putin regime with Orthodox values,” and indicate him as being in a fight against the moral decay of the West.75 NATO’s Stratcom may benefit from outreach to the Romanian Orthodox Church and should make efforts to warn their leadership of existing anti-Western propaganda masquerading as religion, along with attempts by outside forces to exploit the values of its parishioners for political gains.
Many of the more local social fissures and tensions in these nations cannot simply be mended in the short term with EU funding or nudging. On larger issues, particularly involving energy security, the EU has the resources and the power to remove the greatest leverage Russia has over Central and Eastern Europe. With investment in the offshore reserves of Romania and Hungary no longer at the mercy of Russian energy companies, the incentives for current politicians to acquiesce to the wishes of the Kremlin vanish.
ENDNOTES
1 Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, "The Russian 'Firehose of Falsehood' Propaganda Model" (RAND Corporation, July 2016), 1-3.
2 International Energy Agency, "Hungary 2017 Review", 2017, 143-150. https://www.iea.org/ publications/freepublications/publication/EnergyPoliciesofIEACountriesHungary2017Review.pdf
3 Ibid.
4 International Energy Agency, Energy Supply Security 2014: Hungary, (Paris, 2014), 7.
5 Heather Conley, Ruslan Stefanov et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies/Rowman + Littlefield, October 2016), 38.
6 Viktor Orban, “Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Speech at the 25th Balvanyos Summer Free University and Student Camp” (speech, Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), Romania), Website of the Hungarian Government. http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.
7 Simeon Djankov, Hungary Under Orban: Can Central Planning Revive Its Economy? (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute of International Economics, July, 2015).
8 Susi Dennison & Dina Pardijs, "The World According to Europe’s Insurgent Parties: Putin, Migration and People Power," (London, UK: European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016), 21-22.
9 Djankov, 2015.
10 Ambrus Kiss, Hungary: Working Poor, Minimum Wage and Minimum Income, (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2015).
11 “East Europeans decry ‘double standard’ for food, seek changes in EU law,” Reuters, 1 Mar 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/centraleurope-food/east-europeans-decry-double-standards-for food-seek-change-to-eu-law-idUSL5N1GD4N4
12 Sherrill Stroschein, Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
13 “West Ukraine Minorities Launch Transcarpathia Assembly,” RT, 10 Apr 2015, https://www.rt.com/ news/248781-ukraine-transcarpathia-minorities-autonomy/
14 “Kiev Hypocritical About Tatar Rights in Crimea While Ignoring Hungarians,” Sputniknews.com, 21 Jul 2015. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201507211024896722/
15 “One for All, All for One: Hungarians Want to Protect Their Kin in Ukraine,” Sputniknews.com, 2 Feb 2015, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201502041017767818/
16 “Budapest Stands by Ukraine’s Ethnic Hungarians,” Sputniknews.com (Moscow, Russia) 15 July 2015, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201507151024640810/
17 Michael Lipka, "Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the US and Around the World," Pew Research Center, January 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/
18 Jacob Poushter, "European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts," Pew Research Center, December 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/
19 “Hungary Must Close Borders to Stop Terrorists Getting into EU With Migrants,” Sputniknews.com 9 Sep 2017. https://sputniknews.com/europe/201509171027117484/
20 “Hungarian Migrant Quota Referendum is ‘Clear Articulation of the People’s Will,” Sputniknews.com, 3 Oct 2016, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201610031045963047-hungarian-referendum-people will/
21 “Hungarian PM Proposes Constitutional Ban on Migrants in Latest Row with Brussels,” Sputnik news.com, 11 Oct 2016, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201610111046216831-orban-hungary migrant-relocation/
22 “Fly to Europe: German NGO Wants to Help Refugees Reach EU by Plane,” RT, 28 Aug 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/357458-fly-migrants-europe-ngo/
23 “Soros’ Ideology Exposed: A Post-Modern, Post-Family, Post-Border New World Order,” Sputniknews. com 20 Feb 2017, https://sputniknews.com/politics/201702201050878788-soros-ideology-explained/
24 “Why Brussels Teamed Up with Soros to Bring Hungary to Its Knees,” Sputniknews.com, 29 Apr 2017, https://sputniknews.com/politics/201704291053138088-eu-soros-hungary/
25 Ibid.
26 “Hungary Losing Billions from Russian Counter-Sanctions,” RT, 24 Jan 2017, https://www.rt.com/ business/374883-russia-food-embargo-hungary-sanctions/
27 Ibid.
28 “EU and Moscow—led Economic Bloc Should Develop Free Trade—Hungarian PM,” RT, Feb 2015, https://www.rt.com/business/234111-hungary-russia-eu-cooperation/
29 “Hungary Under ‘Great Pressure’ From US Over its Energy Deals with Russia,” RT, 8 Nov 2014, https://www.rt.com/business/203415-us-hungary-pressure-russia/
30 Chi-Kong Chyong & Vessela Tcherneva, “Europe’s vulnerability on Russian gas,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 17 March 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_ on_russian_gas
31 “Hungary & Poland Must Take in Refugees or Face Brussels’ Action—EU Commission,” RT, 12 Apr 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/384508-eu-refugee-quotas-hungary/
32 “’Ultimatum’: EU Paints Hungary as ‘villain’ in Migrant Dispute, Trying to Pressure Court—Minister,” RT, 6 Apr 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/383649-hungary-eu-report-migrants-ultimatum/
33 Ibid.
34 “Hungary: Orban Accuses EU of ‘Sovietization,’ Calls for Stronger Borders,” Sputniknews.com, 24 Oct 2016, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201610241046673329-hungary-eu-sovietization-europe/
35 Neil Clark, “A Victory Day Primer on ‘Good Fascists’ vs. “Bad Fascists,’” RT, 9 May 2017, https://www. rt.com/op-ed/387728-victory-day-primer-fascists/
36 Ibid.
37 Marlene Laruelle, "Putin’s Regime and the Ideological Market: A Difficult Balancing Game", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2016, 2-4. https://carnegieendowment.org/ files/3-10-17_Laruelle_Putins_Regime.pdf
38 Ibid.
39 Orban, 4.
40 Ibid.
41 Dennison & Pardjis, 24.
42 “Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict.” European Parliament, October 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_ EN.pdf
43 “EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis.” European Union Newsroom, 16 Mar 2017, https:// europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en
44 Romania 2015 (Cambridge, MA: The Observatory for Economic Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015). http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/hun/#Destinations.
45 Rob Wile, “Here Are the Countries That Would be Most Affected By a Russia Gas Disruption,” Business Insider, 20 Jul 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/europe-country-dependence-on russian-gas-2014-7
46 NATO, “Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast,” Press Release, 15 Mar 2017, http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en.
47 “Romania Turned into ‘NATO Outpost,’ Poses ‘Outright Threat’ to Russia—Senior Diplomat,” RT, 9 Feb 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/376806-romania-nato-outpost-threat/
48 Ibid.
49 “Encircling Russia? RAF Typhoon Fighters Will Deploy to Romania in May,” RT , 28 Mar 2017, https://www.rt.com/uk/382587-typhoons-romania-russia-threat/
50 “Romanian Air Force to Receive F-16 Fighter Jet Training System—Lockheed Martin,” Sputniknews. com, 8 May 2017, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201705081053388296-us-romania-f16-training/
51 “NATO’s ‘Force Projection’ on Russia’s Doorstep Undermines European Security—Moscow,” RT, 28 Oct, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/364486-nato-russia-black-sea/
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 “Crimean Frontier: Reasons Behind Russia Boosting Black Sea Defense Capacities,” Sputniknews.com, 31 Mar 2017, https://sputniknews.com/russia/201703311052156050-russia-crimea-drills/
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 “Foreign Ministry Criticizes Romanian PM Over Moldova Annexation Statement,” RT (Moscow, Russia), 16 Sep 2014, https://www.rt.com/politics/188172-russian-romanian-moldovan-unification/
58 Ibid.
59 “Moldova: Fate of Southeastern Europe Being Decided in Contentious Elections,” Sputniknews.com, 8 Nov 2016, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201611081047183557-moldova-elections-analysis geopolitics-economy-politics/
60 Ibid.
61 “Moldova’s President-Elect Says if Opponent Won, Country Would be Erased From Map,” Sputniknews.com, 18 Nov 2016, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201611181047581036-dodon reveals-plan-to-liquidate-moldova/
62 Ibid.
63 “Slovakia, Hungary sign memorandum of understanding on Eastring gas pipeline.” Reuters, 20 Oct 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/slovakia-hungary-energy-idAFL8N1N56EF
64 Andrew Byrne, “Pipeline setback squeezes Romania gas export ambitions.” Financial Times, 18 Sep 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/bc38b79e-6331-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1
65 Gabriella Lovas & Zoltan Simon, “Hungary Commits to Russia Gas Route as Poland Looks to U.S.” Bloomberg, 7 July 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-07/hungary-doubles down-on-russia-gas-route-as-poland-looks-to-u-s
66 “East Europeans decry ‘double standard’ for food, seek changes in EU law.” Reuters, March 1, 2017.
67 “The EIB in Hungary,” European Investment Bank, http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/eib_on_ the_ground_en.pdf
68 Gustav Gressel, “Fellow travellers: Russia, anti-Westernism, and Europe’s Political Parties.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 14 July 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR225_-_FELLOW_ TRAVELLERS1.pdf
69 “Anti-Western propaganda in Romania: Security issues in online media, 2017,” Center for Civic Participation and Democracy, October 1, 2017.
70 Ibid.
71 European Commission, “Media Literacy,” https://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/audiovisual-policies/ literacy_en.
72 “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.” Pew Research Center, 10 May 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in central-and-eastern-europe/
73 Claudia Ciobanu, “Romania ‘turns illiberal’ with moves against gay marriage.” Politico EU, 6 Oct 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/romania-gay-marriage-turns-illiberal-with-moves-against/
74 Corina Rebegea, “Kremlin Plays the Religion Card.” Center for European Policy Analysis, October 26, 2017.
75 Ibid.