Six Decades Later, France's Suspicions About U.S. Reliability Have Been Vindicated

Many European officials were taken aback after the February 2025 Oval Office meeting between American President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, wondering why an American president would seemingly side with Russia over Ukraine. However, France foresaw this situation six decades ago and has used this uncertainty to position itself as the leader of a strategically independent Europe. Nevertheless, the challenge for France is to reconcile its desire for a global France with that of a global Europe.

Gaullism

Henry Kissinger once said, “It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal.” The meeting between American President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demonstrated the acuteness of Kissinger’s remarks. While many European leaders and officials were shocked by these events, France anticipated this very moment, albeit six decades ago, under Charles de Gaulle’s nascent political ideology: Gaullism. 

De Gaulle, the first president of the 5th French Republic, developed Gaullism during the Cold War. The ideology viewed the United States as a fundamentally unreliable ally and led to three key French policy decisions: developing nuclear weapons, leaving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military command, and expanding diplomatic ties with non-aligned/communist bloc countries. 

French Views on Nuclear Weapons and NATO

From the late 1940s until the early 1960s, de Gaulle’s frustrations over Washington and London’s refusal to share nuclear technology with Paris grew. As such, de Gaulle became convinced that France needed an independent nuclear deterrent. Eventually, on July 1, 1963, France tested its first plutonium bomb in the Sahara Desert, making it the fourth country to obtain nuclear capabilities. Currently, France has about 300 nuclear warheads that can be fired from an aircraft or a nuclear submarine. 

The second policy decision was to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command structure. At the time, de Gaulle believed that since France had developed nuclear weapons, it did not need to rely on American security assistance. As such, France ordered the withdrawal of all its forces from NATO command and did not permit any NATO forces in France without direct French control by April 1, 1967.

Even though France rejoined in 2009, it did not join NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group to ensure its nuclear arsenal's independence. Even today, there is no American military base in France. 

France’s “Non-Alignment” 

The third policy decision France implemented was opening up diplomatic relations with various non-aligned and communist bloc countries. By doing so, Paris hoped to present itself as a power that offered a ‘third way’ in the bipolar international system during the Cold War. For example, Paris recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1964, while the United States did not do so until 1979. 

France’s outreach to non-aligned countries and opposition to American policy continued into the post-Cold War era, championing the idea of a multipolar world. One example of France acting independently of the United States is the response to India’s nuclear weapons program. In 1998, after India tested its nuclear weapon, the United States imposed sanctions on India. By contrast, France did not, and in the same year, French President Jacques Chirac went to New Delhi and became the first country to sign a strategic partnership agreement. 

Macron’s Reinvigoration of Strategic Autonomy 

Since President Emmanuel Macron took office in 2017, he has emphasized the need for Europeans to lessen their dependence on the United States. In his 2017 speech to Sorbonne University, Macron insisted that the Europeans needed to build up their sovereignty, especially in the defense sector, arguing that “we are seeing a…gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States.” 

While initially resistant, a greater number of European countries have started to adopt Macron’s vision, especially in light of the second Trump term. For example, on February 24, 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said, “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” The Dutch Foreign Minister, Caspar Veldkamp, said, “We have all turned into Gaullists.” 

In this environment, France has taken up the mantle of leading an independent Europe.

In early March 2025, Macron opened the possibility of France extending its nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe, arguing that the United States may not be on Europe’s side. In April 2025, the Polish President Andrzej Duda revealed during an interview with Bloomberg that Poland is open to hosting French nuclear weapons. The Poles being open to hosting French nuclear weapons is a crucial shift, considering that they have historically been one of the most pro-American countries on the continent. 

In July 2025, France and the United Kingdom signed a joint nuclear agreement during Macron’s state visit. During his speech to the British parliament, Macron insisted that London and Paris have a “special responsibility” to protect Europe, reflecting the Europeans’ broader desire to mend ties with the British post-Brexit. Recently, in September 2025, Macron co-chaired the Coalition of the Willing summit with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Paris. During the summit, the French indicated that the other participants were willing to provide NATO-style security guarantees to Ukraine. 

On the one hand, France’s actions are a positive sign that it is willing to take the lead in helping Europeans become more independent from the Americans. However, on the other hand, France’s biggest challenge is to what extent it truly desires a sovereign Europe or whether France is using the idea of a sovereign Europe to advance French interests. 

For example, France cannot announce a collective European retaliation to American tariffs while also undermining EU unity by opposing the EU-Mercosur trade deal, insisting that it harms its agricultural sector. Likewise, it cannot advocate sending European troops without consulting other EU members, as the Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto pointed out.

How France Can Help

For France to reduce these contradictions, it should do two things. First, France should actively support the EU’s ongoing free trade negotiations with Mercosur. By supporting these initiatives, French companies can benefit from accessing new markets and, over time, play a role in the EU to lessen dependency from the American market in light of tariffs. 

Second, in light of the ongoing tensions between the United States and India, France should take the lead in leveraging its close relationship with India to facilitate stronger EU-India relations, such as assisting with the ongoing free trade talks. By doing so, France can ensure that India continues to view the Europeans as a viable partner and prevent it from drifting even further toward Russia and China.

In 2025, the biggest geopolitical shock for many European capitals is the realization that the United States is becoming increasingly unreliable. In these tumultuous times, France is well-placed to lead the transition to a more independent Europe.

Managing Editor: Olivia Parker