Protective Measures are Necessary for Mercenary Involvement in Haiti

Author’s Note: This article was written two days before Human Rights Watch reported that police drone strikes, which Vectus Global allegedly supported, have killed 43 innocent adults and 17 children, and injured 49 other non-combatants. These drone operations were extrajudicial and, HRW alleges, in violation of international law, further underscoring the need for a regulatory framework from the Haitian government to oversee the mercenaries.

In May of 2025, news broke that Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, a private military contractor, was recruiting mercenaries and American veterans to participate in anti-gang missions in Haiti. These mercenaries purportedly supplemented the drone surveillance and strike operations currently underway. In the following months, officials offered little elaboration until they revealed in the fall that a 10-year deal had been signed with Prince’s Vectus Global to provide security assistance. Finally, in January of this year, Haitian officials confirmed that Prince’s mercenaries were on the ground and cooperating with Haitian police in anti-gang operations. 

After five years of harrowing global headlines describing the deteriorating social fabric of Haiti’s capital, many Haitians welcome any additional efforts to clamp down on the violence. However, given the history of foreign interventions in Haiti and their historic lack of accountability, it is imperative that there are mechanisms in place to hold accountable those who do wrong. The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, and the accompanying Montreux Document provide the means for oversight. The Haitian state ought to hasten its implementation of these reforms for its own sake and that of the Haitian people. 

Erik Prince and the Legacy of Unaccountable Modern Interventions in Haiti 

Erik Prince is an American businessman most well known for founding the military contracting firm Blackwater, now named Constellis. Blackwater sought to recruit civilians and American veterans to participate in high-level, dangerous security crises around the world. Prince succeeded by contracting with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and more to provide security for American military bases, embassies, and to assist in natural disaster rescue operations. Prince resigned as CEO in March of 2009. From 2009 to 2014, the company changed names and missions twice, from Xe to Academi and security contracting to logistics and training assistance. Blackwater originally gained its infamy, however, in 2007, when it was implicated in a massacre and accused of human rights violations in Iraq. In Nisour Square, Baghdad, Blackwater forces opened fire on civilians, killing twenty. 

While Blackwater maintained that they were attacked first, others reported that they shot at a car who blocked the convoy in an unjustified escalation. Four security guards were convicted in 2015, then pardoned by first-term President Trump in 2020, but the public spotlight highlighted the growing legitimization of the private military contracting industry. Prince played a crucial role with his high-profile public defenses of his company’s role overseas, and by organizing additional private military forces in the U.A.E., Somalia, and Libya in the following years. Most recently, Prince was accused by the United Nations and its monitors of violating an arms embargo with an $80 million weapons and mercenary deployment in Libya. This could be followed by U.N. sanctions and the freezing of Prince’s assets, but these punishments are subject to review by the U.N. Security Council and President Trump has given no indication that he will accept the condemnation of an ally and campaign donor. Once again, Prince may evade accountability. 

Simply put, Prince’s involvement in Haiti is troubling. The complicated history of foreign forces in Haiti worsens this outlook. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) operated from 2004 to 2017 and was faulted for the outbreak of a lethal cholera epidemic across the country. The U.N. refused accountability for years until it apologized for contributing to the spread of the disease in 2016, without accepting responsibility, and leading a fundraising effort for the victims and their families. The image of progress was undermined by the U.N. claiming diplomatic immunity and denying demands for legal accountability. Members of the U.N. peacekeeping force have also been accused of sexually exploiting women, and fathering and abandoning children, with Haitian courts demanding child support be paid to victims. Coupling this with the pre-21st century abuses of foreigners in the country, including the U.S. occupation of Haiti and allegations of facilitating a coup against President Aristide, it is no surprise, then, that the Haitian public is deeply skeptical of foreign agents operating in the country. 

Mechanisms for Accountability Should Disaster Strike 

The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, first proposed in 1979 and implemented in 2001, has been criticized for enacting an “unworkable” definition of mercenaries, but nonetheless provides a framework for signatory states to facilitate the detainment, prosecution, and extradition of foreign mercenaries employed by the state. Signatories are also accountable for their transparency in reporting Convention activities to the U.N. Secretary-General, providing an avenue for the U.N. to assist Haiti in areas where it may be incapable of establishing justice. Haiti is not a signatory to the Convention, but has the opportunity to ratify after the upcoming 2026 elections reestablish the parliament. Wherever this Convention may not apply, the Haitian state may also adopt the Montreux Document as a baseline for its oversight of private military or security contractors within its borders. The Montreux Document, authored by the Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, is a non-binding document outlining states’ obligations toward the use and oversight of private military and security companies under international law and best practices in regulating them. Its provisions include employing quality criteria for the contractors to qualify for state funds, monitoring and compliance requirements, and requiring training in humanitarian law compliance. Each of these are necessary for controlling the operations of a controversial party like that of Prince’s firm. 

These reforms are imperfect and depend on the Prime Minister’s administration’s willingness and capacity to enforce national law, which may be difficult given their recurring legitimacy crises and the struggle to restore peace in the capital. Concurrently, the overwhelmed court system must make room for potential prosecutions and proactively participate in the governance process, which may be easier said than done. 

The enlistment of Prince’s Vectus Global is complete; we can only suggest measures to reign them in and enforce rules of engagement. Doing so will protect Haitian citizens, effectuate the gang suppression efforts without embroiling the operations in scandal, and build public trust in the Haitian government’s ability to protect its constituents. However, without taking the steps to establish oversight over Vectus Global, the Haitian government will continue a legacy of fecklessness. The state, in its effort to reestablish order, must not undermine itself by employing a rogue, unaccountable mercenary force.

Edited by Jerry Browne