Treatment of U.S. deportees worsened since Donald Trump’s return to office, with his administration deporting vulnerable — and often innocent — immigrants to countries with which they have no ties. The treatment of Haitian immigrants in particular has been widely propagandized with cynically-edited, short-form social media content. Now, civil and immigrants’ rights groups in the U.S. and Haiti are pushing the Haitian government to respond. Although the U.S. supports the Haitian government in its efforts to re-establish domestic security amidst its violent gang crisis and looming elections, the diplomatic relationship is woefully one-sided, leaving Haiti’s Fils-Aimé administration with little room to challenge the harm. To combat this, the Haitian government should coordinate with the U.S. on a post-deportation reintegration program for returnees that would not only meet American policy goals, but move towards resolving the Haitian crisis.
The Limits of Advocates’ Strategies
Advocates’ demands for litigation or diplomatic strong-arming are far-fetched at best. There are no applicable jurisdictions through which the Haitian government may challenge the U.S. treatment of its nationals. The U.S. has not signed and likely will not sign onto the Original or Appellate Jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which previously ruled on migrant or traveler mistreatment. Nor has the U.S. recognized the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which is similarly set to consider a high-profile challenge to international migrant abuse. Domestic courts, too, are blocked after the Supreme Court's June 2026 ruling in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, which found that the Alien Tort Statute, which provided a means for foreigners to seek civil accountability for human rights abuses committed by American entities, functionally overstepped the executive branch’s foreign policymaking authority. Finally, President Trump’s insistence on debunked claims that Haitians are consuming household pets, and his use of this claim among others as a rationale for targeted deportations, does little to suggest a moral appeal from the Fils-Aimé administration would beget policy change.
American engagement with Haiti historically revolves around security, development, and humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian assistance has significantly decreased since the start of the second Trump administration, with the 2024 watermark of $590 million in programming whittled down to $77 million in 2026. Nonetheless, the political impetus for the American government to prioritize the Haitian state and economy remains. The second Trump administration’s announcement of its “Donroe Doctrine” necessitates engagement with the crisis in Haiti lest it risks hindering progress toward American goals to stem immigration pressures and project soft power throughout the region. These are angles that Fils-Aimé may exploit. To that end, the U.S. has remained committed to supporting the UN’s Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and similar security deployments through its leadership in and strategic direction of the Standing Group of Partners, a group of UN Member States overseeing the GSF. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent meeting with Prime Minister Fils-Aimé also recommitted the U.S. to supporting Haitian trade, economic development, and security and elections administration. Analyses of the crisis find that trade and security are inter-connected, least of all because gangs commandeer, halt, or extort vital trade routes to Port-au-Prince. The Fils-Aimé administration can use this link and the U.S.’s strategic interest in Haitian stability to negotiate mutually beneficial solutions.
Aligning Migration Management with American Strategy
The return of migrants to their home countries is linked to the spread of gangs and transnational crime networks, violent crime, and increased unemployment, as deportees face difficulty re-joining and remaining in communities they left. Social ostracization, employment discrimination, and local and state governments’ lack of accommodations result in many returnees becoming homeless, vulnerable, and unemployed upon arrival. This leads to ransom, gang recruitment, and often deadly interpersonal disputes. These deteriorating social conditions further entrench gang control, deepen election uncertainty, and stymie the return of displaced Haitians. Consequently, it is in the Haitian government’s interest to slow immigration flows or work to establish robust reintegration programs for returnees to ensure they are properly supported upon arriving back in Haiti. Only the latter may be possible.
While phased moratoria would relieve pressure on receiving communities and deprive gangs of recruitment and extortion opportunities, current U.S. immigration policy is recalcitrant. Joint U.S.-Haiti or internationally-supported reintegration strategies are of most interest here because of the potential for the U.S. to provide strategic leadership and minimal financial commitment, as it does with the GSF, and for Haiti to leverage the U.S.-Haiti relationship for support from U.S.-based international organizations in materially aiding its nationals. Trump’s 2026 National Defense Strategy prioritizes meeting American foreign policy goals without binding commitments and by offloading the burden to regional partners. This pathway, an NGO-supported, Haitian-led reintegration program, meets both nations’ goals.
Reintegration programs include pre-deportation coordination with integration services, issuance of identification documents, and referral to shelters and employment opportunities. The U.S. and Haiti may look to Central American countries for examples of strong reintegration programs, such as Mexico’s National Institute for Migration’s Repatriation Program. This program provides returnees with food, medical treatment, hygiene kits, temporary identification, and referrals to education and employment opportunities that take advantage of learned skills from their time abroad. Honduras and El Salvador’s cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Organization for Migration provide potential partners through which the Haitian state may rely and the U.S. may delegate responsibility.
The success of these programs are dependent on a Haitian government with limited governing capacity. Though the Haitian government is actively working to issue identification documents ahead of its elections, millions remain without them, which may complicate efforts to assist returnees. This requires transparent governance and a practiced communications strategy that informs domestic residents and diaspora communities, a non-negotiable for a government with a reputation for corruption. However, as I’ve argued before, partnering public agencies with civil society organizations or international nonprofits must also occur to provide a means for the government to develop the infrastructure for self-administration, rather than watch as a bystander.
Conclusion
The recent outcry of advocates calling for Haiti to intervene on behalf of mistreated deportees provides an opportunity for the government to finally support its people. Standing up reintegration programs softens the blow of mass deportation and diverts returnees from gang recruitment or extortion while demonstrating the state’s ability to organize beneficial initiatives. Seeking American leadership without financial commitment also dovetails with other elements of the U.S.’s hemispheric strategy, providing a unique opening for meaningful action and a renewed sense of hope amongst Haitians.
Staff Editor: Leah Hollar
Managing Editor: Emma Hopp