Satellite-Based ISR Capabilities and the Balance of Power in the Taiwan Strait
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasingly expansive network of high-tech satellites provide it with a strategic advantage in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the event of a cross-strait conflict with Taiwan. Further, the PRC’s superiority in anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities gives it the ability to target Taiwan’s satellite networks, which would seriously impair its ISR capabilities, and by extension, its ability to mount a coordinated, islandwide defense. The ability to use satellites to direct conventional missile strikes against key targets in Taiwan and provide high-quality ISR information will be central to any invasion of Taiwan. At present, Taiwan’s satellite network is relatively underdeveloped and is vulnerable to the PRC’s ASAT capabilities, while having limited ASAT systems itself. However, Taiwan does have the ability to develop ASAT capabilities, like jamming equipment, and the United States can support Taiwan by committing to provide satellite ISR data to Taiwan if it is attacked.
This has vital implications for the ability of Taiwan and its partners to deter potential PRC aggression. If the PRC believes its space-based ISR capabilities are unchallengeable and it has the ability to destroy Taiwan’s space-based ISR capabilities, it would be more confident in launching an invasion of Taiwan. With ISR-guided precision conventional weapons strikes on key targets, the PRC could seriously damage Taiwan’s ability to fight back against an invading force.
The PRC’s Current Satellite-Based ISR Capabilities
ISR data is key to the ability of any nation to defend against conventional attacks and to direct their own. As such, the PRC has significantly developed its satellite ISR capabilities in the past decade. The PRC’s in-orbit presence grew by 927 percent since 2015, and it now has more than 510 ISR-capable satellites that are equipped with optical, multispectral, radar, and radiofrequency sensors. By 2030, it plans to establish two massive satellite networks, amounting to 28,000 satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). Recently, the PRC has proved that it can use such ISR satellites for both civilian and military purposes. In October 2025, the Journal of Radars in the PRC published a report that claimed a Jilin-1 satellite had been successfully used to track an F-22 (a stealth fighter aircraft) through cloud cover. The PRC also has satellites in geostationary orbit, like the Yaogan-41, which can track car-sized objects throughout the Indo-Pacific from an orbit of 36,000 kilometers. In this capacity, it can accurately direct the PRC’s vast arsenal of conventional weapons at enemy aircraft originally considered to possess “stealth” capabilities, while remaining out of the reach of many anti-satellite missiles the United States could deploy. Moreover, the PRC is focusing on developing satellite networks with quantum key distribution (QKD), a technology that would essentially make the PRC’s satellite networks invulnerable to most forms of cyberattack. Put together, the PRC could develop satellites that are capable of providing vast quantities of accurate ISR data while being invulnerable to counterattack.
The PRC’s ASAT Capabilities
The PRC has significant destructive and non-destructive ASAT capabilities. Its destructive ASAT capabilities include at least three direct-ascent missile systems that can target and destroy LEO satellites in a span of 5 to 15 minutes. It is also possible that the PRC has co-orbital ASAT capabilities in the form of satellite-based missiles, although the PRC’s abilities in this capacity are unclear.
In terms of non-destructive ASAT capabilities, the PRC likely has significant satellite jamming capabilities. One potential source is from satellites currently in geostationary orbit (22,236 miles above the Earth’s equator), which are less vulnerable to destructive forms of ASAT.
Taiwan’s Satellite-Based ISR Capabilities
Taiwan is currently developing multiple satellite programs and has several satellites in orbit, but its space program is relatively underdeveloped. The Taiwan Space Agency is working on the Beyond 5G LEO Satellite Program, a public-private partnership project with Taiwanese telecommunications companies to develop six LEO satellites for Taiwan’s domestic satellite communications systems by 2029. Taiwan also has three FORMOSAT satellites currently in orbit and plans to launch two new FORMOSAT-9 satellites in 2027 and 2029. These satellites currently provide data that informs disaster relief efforts, but could be repurposed for ISR missions, in which capacity they would be crucial in providing accurate ISR data on the battlefield.
However, Taiwan suffers from a similar issue to the United States in its satellite networks. Both countries rely on “exquisite” satellites, or high-quality individual satellites rather than larger networks of less sophisticated satellites. This represents a significant security issue that simply comes down to numbers: if Taiwan only has a handful of LEO satellites, the PRC could use a slightly larger handful of its ASAT systems to destroy or disable them.
Taiwan’s ASAT Capabilities
Taiwan currently has no equipment that is specifically for ASAT purposes and has not devoted significant resources for its development. This is likely because it perceives the development of ASAT technology as a less urgent issue than current focuses like missile defense. If a war were to start tomorrow, it would be reliant on the United States for ASAT support, and it is not clear if the United States would provide such support because of how escalatory such an action would be. This runs into the fundamental issue of U.S. deterrence credibility: is the United States willing to escalate and put itself at risk to defend its regional partners in the Indo-Pacific?
Policy Recommendations
Taiwan should develop non-destructive ASAT capabilities, particularly jamming. Satellite jamming equipment is used to sever communications between a nation and its satellites, and is significantly less escalatory than ASAT missiles, as its effects can be easily reversed. Jamming equipment is also relatively inexpensive and could be mass-produced islandwide.
The United States and Taiwan should publicly agree, perhaps indirectly through private companies, to share satellite ISR data in the event of military conflict with the PRC. Both public and private partnerships have been proven successful and not significantly escalatory in Ukraine. This would help deter the PRC’s confidence in eliminating Taiwan’s relatively small network of satellites and the effect such an elimination would have.
Taiwan should continue to decentralize its military command structure. In the event of a successful PRC conventional weapons attack on Taiwan’s leadership guided by its advanced ISR capabilities, individual units would still have the authority to operate and mount an effective defense.
If the PRC is able to develop its satellite ISR capabilities uncontested, it will have a significant and possibly unassailable tactical advantage over Taiwan. Policymakers in Taiwan and the United States should take steps including those outlined above to address this advantage before it irrevocably alters the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
Written by Jonathan Geyer, Staff Writer
Jonathan Geyer is a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, specializing in Chinese, Taiwanese, and ASEAN foreign and domestic policy with a focus on space and technology policy. He is currently Assistant Director of ASEAN Affairs at the Organization for Asian Studies, Staff Writer for the International Affairs Review, and a Graduate Student Assistant.
For more information about his work, please visit his LinkedIn page at https://www.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-j-geyer/
Edited by Zhengjun Xu
Managing Editor: Kyle Rutter