TikTok on the Clock — Time is Running Out for the Chinese-Owned Social Media App

Continuing the trend of grilling tech company executives in highly publicized hearings, on September 14th, 2022, U.S. lawmakers questioned Vanessa Pappas, the Chief Operating Officer of TikTok. Much of the hearing was undoubtedly political theater — as public sentiment towards large technology companies has soured, many U.S. politicians are positioning themselves as anti-tech crusaders. However, the lawmakers’ underlying concern is valid: Can TikTok, the world’s most popular social media site, be weaponized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?

As TikTok, which Beijing-based Bytedance owns, has exploded to over one billion users, this concern is being raised in democracies worldwide. Former President Trump pushed for a ban in the United States in 2019, while India banned TikTok in 2020. TikTok has long sought to distance itself from Bytedance but finds itself in an unworkable situation: proving that the CCP has not, will not, and could not abuse the platform. Negatives are incredibly difficult to prove, and there is a growing body of evidence that TikTok is ripe for exploitation by the CCP. Given the nature and influence of TikTok along with the past actions and stated ambitions of the CCP, the United States should force Bytedance to sell TikTok’s U.S. operations.

Modern Social Media

TikTok is a video-based social networking platform where users create and share short videos. It is among the world’s most popular social media sites and has immense cultural power, making songs overnight hits and transforming popular content creators into international celebrities. The brilliance of TikTok is its recommendation algorithm which matches users with videos they enjoy with incredible precision. This contrasts with other popular social media platforms, which serve users content based on accounts they intentionally follow. TikTok’s immense popularity and its opaque content delivery method lead to two specific security concerns: The CCP’s ability to access the data of U.S. citizens and their ability to influence the content-delivery algorithm. 

Motivation Proclamation

These two concerns are not unfounded, as there is ample evidence demonstrating the CCP’s desire for the data of U.S. citizens and to control information online. The Chinese government has stolen the personal data of millions of Americans by hacking companies such as Marriott, Anthem, and Equifax, as well as the U.S. government. The FBI alleges that China conducts more cyber intrusions than all other nations combined. The CCP has a prodigious appetite for the data of U.S. citizens, which shows no signs of abating.

Further, the CCP fully understands the power of information and ideas and the Internet’s role in propagating them. Ideas are central to the CCP’s self-preservation strategy  — a leaked 2013 internal party directive described the party as amid an intense ideological struggle against the West for survival. With stakes this high, information control becomes imperative. The CCP employs teams of censors to monitor online communication and has spent decades investing in the “Great Firewall,” which grants it control over which websites Chinese citizens can access. 

Outside China, the CCP leverages the Chinese app WeChat to spread misinformation and surveil the Chinese diaspora. It is no great leap to think the CCP would go further and use the Internet to influence foreign populations.

Wake Up in the Morning Feeling Like Xi Jinping 

The CCP has a clear desire for the capabilities TikTok would grant it — data and information control — and the power to seize them. While the CCP does not directly control Bytedance as a state-owned enterprise, Bytedance has no choice but to yield to its demands. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law compels all Chinese Internet companies to relinquish any data the government requests, including data outside China’s borders. 

Beyond this law, the CCP has shown no hesitation in brandishing its authority to control the Chinese tech sector. In 2021 the CCP began a widely reported crackdown on domestic tech companies by levying multi-billion-dollar fines, ordering certain apps removed from app stores, and targeting high-profile company leaders who are critical of the regime. As the CCP asserts its central authority within China, its message is clear: cooperate or else.

Self-Regulation

TikTok is acutely aware of these concerns and is taking several steps to alleviate U.S. regulators. The platform increased the scope of its regular transparency reports and gave researchers unprecedented access to its content-recommendation algorithm and content moderation practices. 

Further, TikTok has entered into a wide-ranging business relationship with Oracle, a U.S. technology company, which includes allowing Oracle to monitor the algorithm. However, the most notable aspect of this relationship is Project Texas, an initiative to move U.S. user data to servers hosted by Oracle. Ostensibly, this is so that U.S. user data would be out of reach of the CCP. 

However, while these efforts are worthwhile, they do not completely mitigate the concerns. Engineers do not always understand their algorithms, let alone researchers. What’s more, TikTok employees in China have repeatedly accessed data stored in the U.S and will retain access to this data. The physical location of data is irrelevant if individuals in China can still access it.

SecurityTok 

The Biden Administration is engaged in security talks with TikTok to find an amicable solution to this predicament but finds itself hampered by a continuous stream of revelations that cast doubt on TikTok’s true independence. A recent New York Times exposé on TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew revealed the limitations of his power within TikTok and that many teams report directly to Bytedance leaders in Beijing. Forbes reported that U.S. executives are leaving the company in droves due to the lack of influence U.S. employees have. Technology companies have repeatedly shown they do not deserve the benefit of the doubt when it comes to making decisions in the best interest of society. TikTok is in an even more dubious position as it is beholden not to shareholders but to the CCP, a self-identified adversary of the United States.

Several known instances of the CCP exploring TikTok and other Bytedance products to carry out its self-described ideological battle with the West already exist. The CCP utilizes Douyin, Bytedance’s TikTok equivalent in China, to distribute propaganda. Former employees of TopBuzz, a now-defunct news site owned by Bytedance, claim the company instructed them to promote pro-China news stories. The CCP reportedly approached Bytedance to discuss running a propaganda account. Evidence suggests that TikTok censored content in the past per instruction from the CCP, such as videos regarding the Tiananmen Square massacre. Given its tremendous popularity, TikTok is an exceptionally alluring weapon for the CCP to deploy in their “ideological struggle.”

TikTok on the Clock

The United States should compel Bytedance to sell TikTok’s U.S. operations. It is too powerful of a tool to be left in the hands of the CCP, who have demonstrated their authority over Chinese tech companies and their belief that they are engaged in an ideological struggle for survival with the West. 

Critics of a forced sale point to the legal challenges that would undoubtedly emerge and the damaging precedent it may set. However, not only is there an existing legal precedent, this ignores that China has been playing this game for decades. Many U.S. tech companies, such as Google and Meta, are banned from operating in China, while those allowed in often must surrender their intellectual property. The United States’ primary consideration in the sale should be preserving competition within the social media industry — a poorly handled deal would be a significant boon to tech giants such as Meta, who view TikTok as an existential threat. TikTok should remain a powerful player in the tech industry, just not one for the CCP.

Author: Christopher Borges

Managing Editor: Sebastian Reyes

Web Editor: Anusha Tamhane

Chris Borges, Staff Writer

Chris Borges is an M.A. candidate at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs with a concentration in International Science and Technology Policy. He holds a B.A. in Psychology from the University of Wisconsin and has worked in data privacy in the healthcare and financial technology industries. He can be reached at cborges@gwu.edu.

Previous
Previous

Podcast Review: “Wind of Change”

Next
Next

Protecting Female Refugees from Gender-Based Violence in Camps