

Frontier Urbanization:

Potential for Development or Violence on the Periphery?

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ABSTRACT

Sub Saharan Africa faces a multitude of security issues, and frontier urbanization is the latest emerging threat. Frontier urbanization is the rapid development of rural environments into densely populated areas due to the resource extraction in the region. This phenomenon is creating several security threats such as environmental degradation, human rights violations, private security forces, public protests, and negligent government intervention. There is little being done to address these many security threats at the moment, leaving much room for improvement. The best policy options to pursue would be ones that regulate foreign control, rebuild government institutions, and facilitate dialogue between the local communities and the governments, as these will address several of the problems that arise from frontier urbanization.

INTRODUCTION

The world is rapidly urbanizing and creating many new benefits, but it is also creating just as many threats. Urbanization can provide greater economic opportunities for individuals, as well as national economic growth, greater access to medical care, lower child mortality rates, and greater educational opportunities.¹ But urbanization is not necessarily a tide that raises all boats, as it leads to greater inequality within the population, leaving many out on the periphery. This is without mentioning the harmful environmental impacts of urbanization.² Moreover, rapid urbanization poses additional threats by

straining a locality's resources, infrastructure, and health services, hence creating a hotspot for social instability.³ Frontier urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa encapsulates these issues as the rapid urbanization of certain regions for resource extraction leads to environmental degradation and human rights abuses, which can exacerbate three types of violence, described as protection and predation; poverty and protest; and boom after bust. This paper aims to explain this urbanization trend, analyze how this contributes to additional violence and threats, identify what is being done to combat these issues, and develop suggestions for what policies and actions can be implemented to address these shortcomings.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living in urban areas, currently at 472 million, is expected to double in the next 35 years, with larger cities growing up to 4 percent annually. As one of the least developed and urbanized regions in the world, rapid urbanization raises concerns for stability and security.⁴ Frontier urbanization is “the rapid growth of previously marginalized, underdeveloped regions and hinterlands into urban areas that service resource extraction, particularly of oil, gas, and minerals.”⁵ Sub-Saharan Africa is ripe with these valuable natural resources like oil, diamonds, and copper, yet the exploitative practices of extractive industries and poor governance have plagued it since colonialism. The result is the following process: when a new resource is found in an area, workers will flock to the new region, searching for the economic opportunities afforded by multinational corporations (MNCs). The MNCs will extract this valuable resource until it can no longer derive any value and then leave in search of another resource or location.⁶ The timelines of these boom and bust cycles vary depending on the resource and its quantity; however, the migration of laborers creates a demand for services needed to live in this new area, such as lodging and dining establishments.

The scarcity of economic opportunities throughout Africa is well documented, and the discovery of natural resources leads to the migration of workers to the region with limited prospects elsewhere.⁷ These resource discoveries are usually outside of already established urbanized cities with distinct cultures; thus, the term ‘frontier’ is used to denote both its distance from the urban areas and as a point of convergence for other cultures and societies, which has potential for future conflict among new and existing workers.⁸ Cultural contestation takes place between these migrants and the people who are living here, which leads to the bust after the boom conflict discussed later. Another major issue is the fact that the wealth from resource extraction is rarely invested back into the community from which it was extracted. Amin Kamete studied Zimbabwe's mining economy and found that much of the mines' wealth is

transferred to other parts of the country, thus adding wealth elsewhere, either in already established cities or exported out of the country altogether.⁹ The mining communities themselves do not receive the full extent of the benefits of the mining revenues, which deprives local governments of the funding to provide adequate services for its residents; essentially, this structure allows MNCs to thrive but discards the lives of the public. These services include welfare and medical care, but also the most basic function of the state: providing security. Max Weber's famous assessment of the state as a "human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory"¹⁰ means that the state is the only source of lawful violence because it is responsible for protecting its citizens and providing security. Yet, in these frontier settlements, the government cannot ensure security, leading to a dependence on alternative security options, like private security companies (PSCs). The rapid urbanization of a previously scarcely populated area strains a government's ability to support new inhabitants; therefore, MNCs outsource the security of the resources and property to PSCs.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Frontier urbanization also entails environmental degradation due to both the nature of the extractive industry and of the urbanization process itself. The extractive industry practices are centered around extracting and processing the resource as quickly and as economically efficiently as possible, often disregarding the environmental impact it causes unless governments ensure compliance with environmental laws. The practices through which these resources are harvested can be extremely damaging to the earth, like deforestation; land, air, and water pollution; acid drainage from mines; and the loss of biodiversity.¹¹ The United Nations Environmental Program's 2011 report on Ogoniland, located at the Niger Delta and the epicenter of petroleum extraction in Nigeria, outlines the contamination of the region's air, land, soil, and water; as well as public health issues that were a result of the decades of irresponsible extraction practices.¹² The region's urbanization was centered around oil extraction, had minimal governance and left out any consideration of the workers. Therefore, the poor extraction practices of the petroleum industry led to major environmental destruction. Additionally, these damages further exacerbated the abysmal situation of the workers in the region as they were made to bear the environmental costs while being left out of the economic benefits of this process.¹³ This same situation is found across Sub-Saharan Africa and worldwide, where rapid urbanization under poor governance worsens the damage of the extractive industry on the natural environment in poor societies.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Another problem that arises from frontier urbanization is the violation of human rights. The working conditions of the extractive industry are not only poor for the environment but are also harmful to the people. The major potential for human rights abuses in the extractive industry stems from hazardous working conditions, limits on workers' unionization, and mistreatment at the hands of the PSCs hired.¹⁴ In 2016, Amnesty International investigated the claims of child laborers working in cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Not only did they find that there were around 40,000 children employed, but that there were also major health risks from inhaling cobalt dust and very little protective equipment such as gloves, boots, masks, or helmets for the employees.¹⁵ The employment of children violates the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Article 10.3 and the hazardous working conditions and health risks are in violation of "just and favorable conditions of work" outlined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 23.1.¹⁶ These flagrant human rights violations are common practices at the mines and are part of the supply chain of products from major companies such as Apple, Samsung, and Sony—most of whom deny this connection.¹⁷

Like the abuse of the Pinkerton detective agency in the United States, PSCs are a major front for human rights violations on workers in the global south. The United Nations Working Group on 'the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination' examined the human rights abuses by PSCs in the extractive industry. They found that, in some cases, extractive companies are more likely to rely on their PSC rather than state security forces because it allows the companies to maintain greater control over workers' contracts and the company's policies and regulations.¹⁸ Additionally, PSCs "have been known to directly commit human rights abuses, as well as to facilitate abuses and violations committed by others, working under contract from extractive companies, and sometimes alongside state security forces."¹⁹

The Barrick Gold Corporation has been embroiled in numerous private security abuses around the world. At the North Mara mines in Tanzania, security forces captured local women, locked them in holding cells, and if they refused to have sex with the guards, they were threatened with imprisonment.²⁰ Women were also brutally beaten and disposed of at the hospital; if they were raped, later some found they were infected with HIV.²¹ In another instance at the North Mara mines, private security ran over and killed a nine-year-old girl on July 19, 2018, and when her family tried to recover the body, private security forces "fired on them without warning."²² This is a global problem for the Barrick Gold Corp. specifically because, at one of their mines in Papua New Guinea, the private security guards for the Canadian company raped, gang-

raped, and violently molested over 200 local women and children.²³ Nevsun Resources is still facing a complicated set of lawsuits in which forced labor, of both not consenting Eritrean soldiers and locals, was used for the construction of their Bisha mines in Eritrea.²⁴

Workers being mistreated by the PSCs can potentially lead to workers uprisings, which contributes to the poverty and protest violence discussed later. Environmental degradation and human rights abuses contribute to destabilizing urbanization and security issues, further worsening the situation in the frontier. The convergence of PSCs, MNCs, migrant workers, and the local population in a remote area produces a powder-keg of instability. This instability will be focused on in the next section by discussing the typologies of violence that arise, outlined in the 2015 Small Arms Survey: protection and predation, poverty and protest, and bust after the boom.²⁵

PROTECTION AND PREDATION

The first type of violence is created from MNCs' desire to protect resources and to maintain their predatory practices. The allure of these resources' profits attracts a wide variety of actors, such as MNCs, rebel groups, armed thieves, and non-state militias who hope to profit from this extraction. This leads to an extremely volatile security arena, as explained by Michael Ross, a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles best known for his research on the ways resource wealth impacts individuals' security and freedom. He has explained the paradoxical conclusion that resources are a curse instead of a blessing for development by studying many different types of resources like oil, timber, and minerals.²⁶ Moreover, Ross found that "resource wealth has made conflict more likely to occur, last longer, and produce more casualties when it does occur."²⁷ MNCs are in competition with other non-state actors and must defend what they deem is their resources.

The introduction of PSCs to the area is due to MNCs avoiding the use of governments' limited security forces. These security guards are supposed to play a passive role by guarding MNCs' personnel and infrastructure against theft or violence. However, problems arise "when PSCs pre-emptively use an armed response or act as force multipliers providing security training."²⁸ These instances are similar to the cases investigated by the UN Human Rights Council, where PSCs abused workers, as mentioned earlier. In the case of Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company, seven security guards killed a man who entered the premises on December, 29th 2017,²⁹ using excessive force, just as in 2019, when other security guards allowed dogs to maul illegal miners.³⁰ The PSCs act with relative impunity because governments fail to implement transparency policies or monitoring systems to check for abuses by the PSCs.³¹ The MNCs are able to continue their predatory practices and extraction of

resources for as long as necessary because of the lack of government oversight and the PSC presence.

PSCs are hired to reduce interruptions by other actors to the MNCs' resource extraction processes since MNCs derive the most profit from efficiently extracting the resource using whatever means necessary practices. Therefore, the PSCs extend MNCs' lifetimes by granting them a monopoly over the resource. PSCs' vast influence and power in these frontier settlements are apparent in their ability to completely close off an area, creating a secure enclave. One such example is the Botswana mining towns owned by DeBeers, who provide security to the entire town by simply closing it off from outsiders.³² This preserves MNCs' predatory business and leads to violence when others try to challenge the PSCs. Moreover, these PSC arrivals contribute to the urbanization of the area demonstrated by the conversion of South Lokichar, Kenya, "from a remote, dusty community into a buzzing oil town, with new bars and guesthouses."³³

The influx of poor laborers and better paid PSCs contributes to the rapid urbanization to accommodate their needs. The previously sparsely populated area is now flooded by new inhabitants, so the community constructs new infrastructure, such as lodging and dining establishments. However, this infrastructure is often unstable, and the constructions for the poor laborers are often makeshift and informal housing structures with poor living conditions.³⁴ While the economic disparity between the workers leads to the second typology of violence discussed next, poverty and protest, this component highlights the rapid urbanization is unsustainable and poorly done, leading to future infrastructural issues. The violence here is composed of the competition for the newfound natural resources, the MNCs' use of security to monopolize the resource, the aforementioned abuses by the private security forces, and the unstable urbanization to service the variety of new actors.

The lack of opportunities for individual economic stability in Sub-Saharan Africa is a significant problem in the region that impacts both security and development. Therefore, it could be argued that MNCs are beneficial to the region because they provide employment and a livelihood when there are no other options. However, these benefits are often unrealized and undermined by the costs that come from MNC participation. The extraordinary wealth from the extractive industry is not adequately distributed throughout the extraction process. The workers receive low wages while the MNCs export the profits out of the area and often the country. Not only does this rob the individual workers of proper livelihoods with meager wages compared to the profit they produce, but it also robs the governments of these resource-rich nations of proper revenue to implement necessary development policies and programs.³⁵

Moreover, there are high costs to individual human security through various human rights violations that are created by the MNCs extraction process, as

previously discussed.³⁶ Economic prosperity or stability is meaningless to an individual if they do not also have other measures of stability, demonstrated in the creation of the UN's Human Development Index, which focuses on the growth of people's capabilities, not just economic growth.³⁷ While these economic opportunities had the potential to improve health, living standards, and education of the people involved, ultimately MNCs brought additional violence and hardships.

POVERTY AND PROTEST

The second type of violence that occurs from frontier urbanization is when the poor protest the presence of the MNCs in the area but are squashed by PSCs and state forces. The mass arrival of the MNCs, PSCs, and workers to the region displaces the preexisting local communities and creates conflict between the newcomers and the natives. Additionally, the rapid urbanization paired with the limited government resources leads to the construction of informal settlements and shanty towns that are security risks on their own with theft, poor sanitation, and organized crime.³⁸ These towns clearly demonstrate how the wealth of the natural resources is being exported elsewhere and not being reinvested into the communities, thus intensifying tensions between the poor and the MNCs. The hired hands of the MNCs, the laborers at the extraction sites, are being paid low wages, and they are not getting rich by any means. Instead, MNCs and the local elite are retaining the wealth, and contrary to the MNCs' claims of improving local living standards, they are simply not, as demonstrated in a recent study of the Congolese mining industry.³⁹ As discussed previously, the workers are also subjected to poor working conditions and wages, which leads to an increased desire for change and revolt. PSCs' orders to disrupt the protests and calm the social tensions sometimes entail violent measures to complete the job.⁴⁰

Even more concerning is the close relationship between the state security forces and the PSCs. In Kenya, partnerships between the PSCs and the Kenyan police forces are commonplace due to its mutually beneficial nature by sharing resources, intelligence, payments, and creating a more efficient community policing system,⁴¹ but this causes problems in worker protest suppression when government police forces produce bloodshed. Kamga and Ajoku studied the instances of public uprisings in response to Nigerian oil companies. They observed that the workers and indigenous host communities' protests "leads to torture, cruel and inhumane treatment by the Nigerian police and military under the pretense of protecting the oil facilities from the protesters."⁴² The workers' inadequate living standards and the MNC's invasion of native communities' property contributes to social unrest. While security forces', both private and government/police, orders to disrupt the protests and calm the social tensions

entails additional violence. The issue of state-level suppression and violence is critical here. One of the worst cases was the Marikana, South Africa uprising in August 2012, in which 34 protesters were killed and 78 injured by the South African Police Services.⁴³ Miners held a week-long strike to address their poor living and work conditions as well as a pay raise, and on the 7th day, a militant group of strikers and the police began shooting at each other.⁴⁴ This is not unique to this one incident as this has occurred worldwide, at the Rio Tinto Mine in South Africa in 2019,⁴⁵ Colombian oil facilities in 2011,⁴⁶ and in the Niger Delta in the 1990s.⁴⁷ Social unrest was built up between the workers and the MNCs over the poor socio-economic conditions. Poor government oversight of the actions of the security forces and the lack of worker agency in employment negotiations escalated the unrest and led to the violent standoff between state security forces and the public.

THE BUST AFTER THE BOOM

The final type of violence occurs from a bust after the boom when there are no more extractable resources and minimal economic opportunities. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions still exist between the original inhabitants of the area and the migrant workers who have now relocated there. Violence erupts when governments facilitate clean-up and rejuvenation plans. As mentioned earlier, the position of the frontier means that it allows for a convergence of different cultures and ethnicities and the possibility of contestation over the rights of the land. Büscher argues that East Congo's mining boomtowns engage a variety of stakeholders whose struggles for power and control are determined along ethnic lines: "in ethnic struggles for access to political and economic resources, these political and military alliances are easily mobilized."⁴⁸ The unstable urbanization process is partially due to the history of ethnic territorial protection as well as the actors' violent capabilities. The limited resources governments provide to local municipalities to erect sustainable urban centers paired with the dwindling or nonexistent revenues from the extractable resource intensifies social tensions and ethnic conflict. These conflicts arise because the migrant workers bring from their home region/state their own cultural and ethnic traditions, which can often cause community tensions between various ethnicities. These tensions are then further exacerbated by resource competition within a poor community. Xenophobia has been rising throughout South Africa, as Black South Africans violently attack migrants and refugees, who are seen as taking away South African livelihoods in already poor economic and living conditions.⁴⁹ Specific xenophobic attacks targeted at Nigerian businesses in Johannesburg have led to retaliatory attacks in Nigeria where Nigerians are attacking South African-owned brands.⁵⁰ This is an example of an international problem as it impacts the security and safety of the individuals within the local

communities and those thousands of miles away.

Another situation of violence after the boom is centered around government intervention in urban renewal programs. As governments aim to revive and spruce up the major cities, they often violently displace a large portion of their urban population who have nowhere else to go except to return to the informal accommodations of the mining towns that were previously deserted. As demonstrated in Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order, governments incite violence when they mishandle these situations. Amin Kamete outlines the national clean-up campaign during May to July 2005 in which the Zimbabwean army, police, and youth militia demolished many of the informal settlements and low-income residential areas and violently arrested, detained, or forcibly relocated poor urban residents. As a result, 700,000 urban dwellers lost their homes and livelihoods.⁵¹ These residents had to return to the mining towns and reconstruct informal settlements that "became one large informal cesspool of everything."⁵² The violence of the slums returned once again, but this time it also includes state violence on the people. The three typologies of violence discussed are interconnected and reliant upon each other, leading to a complicated and intricate problem rife with security threats.

Although this article focused on the Sub-Saharan region, specifically, frontier urbanization and the typologies of violence it entails are found throughout the world. One example is in Colombian mining towns of Segovia and Remedios; natural resource attraction drew guerilla, paramilitary, and armed criminal groups who were anticipating far greater profits from gold than from narcotrafficking.⁵³ As expected, this collection of dangerous actors brought with them a constant state of unrest and security threats for the local inhabitants, and the introduction of MNCs and foreign investments such as the Gran Colombia Gold Company did not enhance the security. Instead, they made it worse by settling legal disputes over land titles with gun violence, resulting in numerous massacres.⁵⁴ The violence, destabilization, and security risks associated with frontier urbanization can be found at oil refineries in Syria,⁵⁵ sand mines in India,⁵⁶ and in the Brazilian Amazon.⁵⁷ This article aimed to outline the central themes of violence associated with frontier urbanization that can then be applied to other international situations.

WHAT IS BEING DONE?

So far, not much has been accomplished or initiated to combat the many security threats of frontier urbanization. When governments try to get involved, like in Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina, their efforts are counterproductive, simply relocating the poor from one community to the next. Another instance of poor government intervention is in Port Harcourt in southern Nigeria when the government tried to use state police to improve the security in the city

and reduce gang violence; however, the police's violent measures against the residents undermined the public's trust in the government. Port Harcourt is in the heart of the oil-rich Niger Delta and arose in response to the oil industry growth, yet around 600,000 inhabitants live in slums, primarily along the waterfront. When the Nigerian authorities tried to revitalize the city through urban development plans centered on luxury real estate, they forcibly evicted and displaced thousands.⁵⁸ More distressing are the events of October 6, 2009, at the Bundu Waterfront in Port Harcourt: in response to the current residents' protests against the forced evictions, the Nigerian Army dispatched 300 soldiers who shot and killed five people, leaving nine people critically wounded including a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl.⁵⁹ The government was not properly informed as to what was needed to enhance the city, and the community members were denied a voice in policy options, which could have prevented these deaths. In failed resettlement plans, one key issue is the lack of communication between the government and the local communities that leads to lethal standoffs, as demonstrated in the miscommunication issues in the Port Harcourt example.

The extractive industry has received greater attention for its human rights violations and uses of PSCs and has led to initiatives and programs by the United Nations, European Commission, African Union Commission, and other international organizations to regulate their practices and require greater transparency.⁶⁰ One such example when in 2010 the U.S. Congress introduced the Dodd-Frank Act with Section 1502, which requires American businesses to disclose if their supply chains use minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and exercise due diligence to not contribute to human rights abuses or armed groups that stems from this mineral sourcing.⁶¹ Nevertheless, there is little desire for the extractive industries to change their practices because of the freedom they experience and the profit schedules which provide them with substantial revenues.⁶² More importantly, the governments of these nations must change, shift their priorities, and refocus on helping all of their constituents by addressing the problems of frontier urbanization. These issues receive little attention in the international arena because they are on society's frontier, which does not directly involve the Global North. The limited political power of those subjected to frontier urbanization means that there is little momentum to enact change.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The end goal for ameliorating frontier urbanization is ensuring sustainable and secure development through the expansion of policies that address the various actors' roles in natural resource extraction. The United States, European Union, African Union, and United Nations, as well as other international

organizations, should work with the targeted nations to encourage, develop, and implement these policy options through legislation at home or through multilateral agreements. Achieving this goal would also include other benefits such as reduced violence, adequate working conditions for laborers in the extractive industries, environmentally sustainable extractive practices, protection of indigenous property rights, housing infrastructure, and frequent communication between the government and local communities.

One suggested policy option would be to devise greater regulations for MNCs in the extractives industry. An example of this would be the expansion of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the creation of similar legislation in other UN member nations' home legislatures. The dearth of government regulation and enforcement of such policies provides MNCs with the opportunity to exploit these situations of resource extraction. Moreover, individual states may not have enough power themselves to institute these regulations, as MNCs have threatened to relocate their operations to other nations with looser regulations and less government interference.⁶³ Thus, regional coalitions of states can provide greater collective bargaining power for these governments. Internationally binding commitments between the MNCs and regional coalitions can address the role of MNCs in nations by outlining environmental standards and acceptable working conditions. Regulations on PSCs, while clearly defining their roles when hired by MNCs and the permissible extent of their use of force, would also address the additional security problems that they cause.

Another policy option to address the lack of proper governance, which allows these MNCs to undermine the government's authority, is to facilitate institution-building through international organizations. Rooting out corruption in African governments has been a key issue in the development field, and a primary concern of several international organizations like the UN and the World Bank.⁶⁴ Corruption erodes not only public trust in government but also economic growth, which scares away sustainable local businesses that would reinvest in the communities instead of MNCs. The combination of top-down and bottom-up accountability systems could be an effective mechanism to counter this, as it would involve official auditing and the local community reporting that aims to rebuild government trust.⁶⁵ Developing strong institutions are essential for governments to be able to provide the necessary services to its citizenry, a key missing factor in frontier urbanization.

Further, addressing the absence of constituent and government communications is crucial to ensuring that the government knows what is needed in these communities, even if they do not have all of the resources to provide them. Preventing ill-informed government decisions on urban renewal programs could diminish violence between government security forces and the local communities. Local communities are often denied agency in

these situations, which contributes to social unrest that can erupt in violence. International institutions should work within these communities to build the infrastructure and networks that are needed to allow proper policy-making. By facilitating these communication networks, it can reduce community tensions between the government and the public, bolster public trust in the government, and allow individuals to take a greater role in addressing their community's needs. Strengthening the civil society of these nations will facilitate better long-term and sustainable growth through public-government partnerships that are crucial to the development and improvement of these nations' current socio-economic status. Support by international organizations and nation-states can encourage the multilateral cooperation of all parties to generate the best solutions for local problems.

Moreover, a framework for urbanization and the role that governments can play in creating and providing the necessary infrastructure for sustainable urbanization would be extremely helpful in avoiding the construction of informal housing and slums. It is not possible to completely avoid informal settlements, as construction does not happen overnight, but having the right tools available to quickly provide physical infrastructure and social services will alleviate the massive strains on governments that create issues. If a nation is able to eradicate, or at least minimize, corruption in governance, enforce regulations on MNCs so that the resource wealth is redistributed to the workers who are generating this wealth, and build infrastructure to generate the resources for government usage in providing essential services to frontier settlements, then many of the problems can be resolved or reduced. The issue here is not that these nations are poor; the issue is that their wealth is exported out of the areas that need the resources the most. This is not to say that simply providing cash infusions will solve the issue. Still, these resources are necessary to rebuild the crucial infrastructure, both physical and institutional, that can address frontier urbanization problems.

CONCLUSION

Frontier urbanization is a major emerging threat in Sub-Saharan Africa. The rapidly urbanizing environment creates security risks for workers in extractive industries and for native inhabitants of newly urbanized areas. This process of resource extraction with MNC stakeholders engenders environmental destruction and human rights violations. Furthermore, the involvement of PSCs exacerbates the violence in these territories and contributes to social unrest. When state security forces become involved, either to quell worker protestation or to rejuvenate informal shantytowns created during frontier urbanization, they further contribute to the violence of the area. The best policy options to pursue would be those that regulate foreign control, rebuild

government institutions, and facilitate dialogue between the local communities and their governments, as these will address several of the problems that arise from frontier urbanization.

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