

IAR

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- Arctic Energy Development: Preventing Transnational Insecurity
- An Analysis of Qatari Connections to Illicit Terror Financing
- Cyber-Trafficking in Mexico
- Stray from the Course: Preventing Right-Wing Extremism in the United States
- Climate Change-Induced International Migration as a Security Concern
- Book Review of *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*



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EDITORS' NOTE

The world of international affairs is constantly at a vital crossroads. Climate change, radical extremism, human rights, and competing great powers are the emerging issues of the second decade of the twenty-first century. As Master's students at the Elliott School of International Affairs, we spend each day working to contribute and enhance our knowledge of the world at large. In the International Affairs Review's (IAR) Winter 2020 issue, students have the opportunity to critically examine current affairs, expose their writing to peer-review, and publish their work in a graduate student-run journal. The issues that our authors and editors examine are difficult, and require objectivity, focus, and passion.

At IAR, we work tirelessly to ensure that each student has the freedom to submit their work for publication, regardless of their political affiliation or personal beliefs. Without this objectivity, our ability to expand our self-awareness for both ourselves and our readers would not be possible. At this critical juncture, we politely ask that you read the following issue with an open mind and enjoy the prescient essays shared by current and former Elliott School students. We have striven to present, at the very least, a well-composed, poignant series of articles that examines some of the greatest challenges of our decade.

We would like to thank the IAR faculty advisors and the Elliott School of International Affairs for their unwavering support. Additionally, we are immensely grateful for our brilliant editorial staff whose indispensable commitment, diligence, and hard work laid the foundation for IAR's ongoing success. Thank you to all who made this issue possible!

Rebecca Giovannozzi, *Editor-in-Chief*
Jacqueline Schultz, *Managing Editor*
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Arctic Energy Development:

Preventing Transnational Insecurity

Zach Simon

Zach Simon is an M.A. Candidate at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, majoring in Security Policy Studies. He just finished a semester at Sciences Po, is now interning at the German Marshall Fund. He will then go on to intern at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels the following semester. His interests include energy and maritime security, the transatlantic relationship, and European politics. He holds a B.A. in political science from Vanderbilt University, Tennessee.

ABSTRACT

Climate change warms the Arctic twice as fast as anywhere else on Earth.¹ This, in turn, causes ice to melt faster, exposing energy deposits and making shipping routes accessible for longer periods of the year. Scientists believe there are significant reserves of untapped hydrocarbons in the Arctic: in 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic contains 90 billion barrels of oil - 13% of undiscovered global stores - and 47.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas - 30% of undiscovered natural gas.² Arctic littoral nations, other sovereign states, and private companies are taking notice of this opportunity and are experimenting with drilling in the region. But increased exploration and extraction in the Arctic pose risks to environmental and human security. Currently, the loose body of international law governing energy development in the Arctic is insufficient to mitigate these risks. The existing framework needs to be strengthened – not overhauled – in order to reduce the severity of threats that energy development in the Arctic poses to human and environmental security. At the same time, the United States needs to play a greater role in safeguarding this fragile region.

INTRODUCTION

Two years before the end of the Cold War, prominent Arctic scholars announced that the world had entered the “Age of the Arctic.”³ What once was a harsh global backwater, the Arctic has now emerged as a strategic region for security and economic interests. As global temperatures rise and polar ice recedes, new platforms, energy deposits, minerals, resources, and perennial transit routes

become exposed. Scientists believe there are significant reserves of untapped hydrocarbons in the Arctic: in 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic contains 90 billion barrels of oil - 13% of undiscovered global stores - and 47.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas - 30% of undiscovered natural gas.⁴ Revisionist great powers Russia and China look to the Arctic as an economic savior, and therefore consider it a vital strategic area to control. In the West, governments look to private companies to strike 'black gold' and extract precious hydrocarbons in the High North. For now, energy extraction in the Arctic is dangerous and economically irrational. But eventually, under the right geophysical and economic circumstances, energy extraction in the Arctic will become economically viable for the prescient actors who claim an early stake.

Energy extraction in the Arctic lacks comprehensive international oversight. While there is a shared sense of diplomatic cooperation among the eight states of the intergovernmental forum, the Arctic Council (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) on matters such as search and rescue, and emergency preparedness and response, there is no unitary international legal standard regarding onshore or offshore hydrocarbon extraction.⁵ With previously inaccessible energy-rich areas becoming accessible, and no international framework to govern extraction, many questions remain.

This paper argues that the gravity of the threats to human and environmental security posed by increased energy extraction and exploration in the Arctic necessitates the development of stronger oversight frameworks. First, I will outline how the impacts of climate change on the Arctic land and sea-scape has opened up access to previously inaccessible hydrocarbon resources. Second, I will highlight the scale of the potential energy resources in the Arctic, and the motivations of Arctic and near-Arctic states to explore extraction. Third, I will explore the heightened risks of exploration and extraction specific to the Arctic. Fourth, I will consider the transnational threats to environmental and human security that are caused by energy exploration and extraction. These are the threats that transcend borders in the Arctic. They have implications far beyond the great power conflict taking place in the Arctic now and in the future. There has been significant study on the great power contest in the Arctic region, but little research on what this contest will mean for environmental and human security.⁶ I will then outline the existing treaties and norms that regulate extraction and exploration in the Arctic, and highlight the gaps. Finally, I will offer recommendations on how to fill these gaps, to ensure the expansion of energy extraction and exploration in the Arctic does not jeopardize environmental and human security in the region.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ARCTIC SEASCAPE

Climate change is causing Arctic ice to melt, which in turn is opening up access to the energy resources in the Arctic. In 2013, *Geophysical Research Letters* showed that Arctic temperatures now are as high as they were 44,000 years ago.⁷ As ice melts it no longer reflects light. In its place the dark ocean absorbs light. This amplifies the warming trend because it lowers the ratio of outgoing solar radiation reflection to the incoming solar radiation incident.

With this phenomenon, the Arctic is experiencing unprecedented sea ice recession. This year, wintertime sea ice extent tied with 2007 levels as the seventh smallest extent in NASA satellite record.⁸ The 2019 ice extent reached a maximum of 5.71 million square miles, 332,000 square miles less than the 1981 to 2010 level.⁹ More astounding figures like these exist, and the general consensus is that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free around the year 2030.¹⁰ This phenomenon of ice melting is increasing access to the Arctic perennially. This enables actors to move into these areas without incurring the cost of expensive icebreakers, avoid navigational obstacles, and establish staying power through permanent infrastructure. Less sea ice over longer periods of time also means that the window for Arctic energy development is larger, increasing the chances of discovering new resource banks of hydrocarbons.¹¹

ARCTIC ENERGY: EXTRACTION POTENTIAL AND INTERESTED STAKEHOLDERS

There is thought to be a lot of untapped energy in the Arctic. We have seen energy exploration and extraction increasing in the Arctic and we can expect it to continue. The Arctic states - and other interested states and private companies - are competing to have a stake in Arctic energy. Geologists believe that the Arctic “may be the last significant oil and gas frontier left” in the world.¹² According to a report from the Brookings Institution, interest in Arctic oil and gas increased around the turn of the twenty-first century for four primary reasons. First, as previously outlined, ice melt in the Arctic caused by climate change has made exploration and extraction possible. Second, the report points to the scale of energy potential in the Arctic. As outlined in the 2008 United States Geological Survey (USGS), Arctic energy potential is an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil, or 13% of undiscovered global stores, as well as 47.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which is 30% of undiscovered natural gas globally.¹³ Third, the report states that high energy prices around the world is causing countries to look for alternative sources of energy. Fourth, it

posits the Arctic as a politically stable region with nation states that adhere to international law and uphold oil and gas contracts.¹⁴

Multiple state and private sector actors are pursuing dominance in the Arctic. The Arctic littoral states, along with near-Arctic China, have motivations for energy extraction. For Russia, the only non-NATO state with Arctic oil, achieving energy dominance in the High North is of vital geopolitical strategic importance. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he has tried to make Russia a great power, and to be recognized as one. Russia has sought to leverage its position as the main supplier of energy to the European Union (EU) in a series of negotiations. Russian energy dominance provides a high degree of relevance and power to the would-be fledgling state on the world stage. Exploitation of Arctic energy sources and Arctic hegemony would allow Putin to sustain Russia's global position and point of leverage with the EU for years to come.¹⁵ Turning to the Arctic for energy is the logical and necessary next step for Russian energy development.

China is interested in utilizing the Northern Sea Route for easier trade access with Atlantic countries and moving resources in and out of the Arctic region. Using the Northern Sea Route as a primary trade route not only decreases the time and cost of shipping, but circumvents potentially hostile bottlenecks such as the Strait of Malacca, the Sea of Hormuz, and the Suez and Panama canals. China considers itself a “near-Arctic state” and has become an observer on the Arctic Council.¹⁶ As Russia turns to China for capital to develop its Arctic energy capabilities, China not only gains favorable conditions when the Northern Sea Route become perennially accessible, but gains a political voice in Arctic affairs. China believes that development of Arctic oil capabilities is tantamount to the development of the Northern Sea Route. It currently has a 20% stake in Russian Yamal liquid natural gas (LNG) and receives three million tons of LNG per year.¹⁷

Like Russia, the United States has large reserves of oil and gas in its Arctic sovereign zone. According to the USGS, the total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the Arctic is estimated to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.¹⁸ Canada has a significant stake in the Arctic because it covers 40 percent of its territory, it has a 162,000-kilometer Arctic coastline, and it has stewardship of the Northwest Passage. The Canadian government has begun to make offshore oil and gas regulation a priority.¹⁹

Finally, Norway maintains its status as an energy superpower because it has offshore sources in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, and parts of the Barents Sea - Norway's Arctic body of water. In 2009, USGS estimated the Barents Sea Shelf contains 11 billion barrels of oil, 380 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and two billion barrels of liquid natural gas (LNG).²⁰ Though not part of the EU, Norway receives heavy funding from the EU to develop its offshore capabilities

to diversify the EU's energy market and move away from Russian dependency.

Although each state has different economic, domestic, or geopolitical reasons for developing extraction capabilities in the Arctic, there is one factor that each has in common. It is the idea that each Arctic littoral country has a legitimate sovereign right to extract energy from its territory. Every state can “utilize and benefit from their own natural resources as they see fit,” and this has “become embedded in international customary law in the post-colonial period.”²¹ The challenge here is that while these countries may perceive that they would individually benefit from exercising sovereignty without having to abide by international regulations on energy extraction, transnational threats will only be mitigated if these countries can create policies through international bodies that curtail energy extraction to protect the fragile environment in the Arctic.

Furthermore, comprehensive and universal regulations are needed as a backstop, should energy politics escalate and threaten the Arctic environment. The great power struggle for economic dominance in the world drives revisionist powers, China and Russia, to invest in each other's efforts to make the Arctic economically viable.²² Conversely, private investment drives Arctic energy exploration in the West. As discussed earlier, climate change has a spiraling effect in the Arctic. In the same way that climate change multiplies the rate at which the Arctic environment changes, mishaps in energy extraction aggravate climate change. Increased presence and human activity in this delicate region will threaten both environmental and human security.

RISKS OF INCREASED EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION

Increased energy exploration and extraction poses risks to environmental and human security. The dangers of energy development in the Arctic are particularly consequential compared to anywhere else in the world due to several reasons: the physical makeup of the Arctic makes it extremely difficult for a rapid response to an oil spill; the lack of infrastructure in the Arctic - few permanent structures, runways, and roads - makes the Arctic hard to access; and thawing permafrost poses challenges to the stable ground.

The main danger posed by increased energy exploration and extraction in the Arctic is the chance of an oil spill. Most people today remember the environmental catastrophe caused by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which released an estimated 4 million barrels (over 168 million gallons) of oil into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.²³ The accident had a spill-over effect into Arctic policy discussions: it prompted the National Commission for reviewing the Deepwater spill to reassess the implications of deep-water drilling in other sensitive environments, looking specifically to the Alaskan Arctic coast.²⁴ U.S. government authorities estimate that an oil spill off of Alaska's Arctic coast is about 30 - 50 percent likely: the question is not if an oil spill will occur in the

Arctic, but when it will occur.²⁵ The estimated maximum blowout volume of a spill in the Arctic is 1.3 million barrels of oil (58 million gallons).²⁶ The largest spill to date in U.S. Arctic waters is the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska which released 11 million gallons of crude oil.²⁷

Both the Exxon Valdez spill and the Deepwater Horizon spill can help predict what an oil spill in the Arctic might look like. However, the potential scale of a spill is estimated to be far larger than the Exxon Valdez spill. The key difference with Deepwater Horizon is the environment: the Deepwater Horizon Commission's report explicitly stated that the clean-up techniques used to remedy the Deepwater Horizon spill would not work in Arctic conditions.²⁸ Compared to other regions, the 'response gap,' a "period of time in which oil spill response activities would be unsafe or infeasible," is thought to be significantly higher in the Arctic.²⁹ This is primarily due to the remoteness of the Arctic, the lack of infrastructure (the closest Coast Guard airstrip is 1,000 miles from the northernmost point of Alaska, and the closest major port is 1,300 miles), lack of weather prediction capabilities, and lack of available vessels for proper spillage procedures.³⁰ Data on minor oil spills in Alaska's Aleutian Islands over the past 20 years present evidence that, "no oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the responsible parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other conditions have prevented any response at all."³¹

Other factors also increase the chances of a major oil spill and will complicate clean-up, in addition to the difficulties of implementing a rapid response. Thawing permafrost in the Arctic poses challenges to the stability of the ground, and therefore destabilizes the extraction infrastructure on it.³² Because the Arctic Ocean does not experience the same circulation as other bodies of water, oil sitting atop the water's surface tends to travel less. The Arctic Ocean is also far shallower than other oceans, which slows down dissipation.³³ In addition, the physical makeup of the Arctic Ocean provides spaces for oil to become trapped, either under the ice sheet itself or within the jagged landscape. Another factor that would make clean-up difficult is the lack of daylight hours for work to take place during the winter parts of the year. Practically speaking, in case of a major oil spill, it is unlikely that any oil will be removed from the Arctic Ocean.

Geopolitical concerns also increase the risks of Arctic energy extraction and exploration. When Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, Western powers, including the United States, Canada, and the EU, enacted heavy sanctions against Putin's government. The new sanctions regime that arose out of this conflict forced Western private energy companies to cut joint-investments with Russian state-controlled energy gas companies, most notably Gazprom and Rosneft. This reduced Russian companies' access to Western drilling technologies that enable safer energy extraction.³⁴ Russia has a long history in

the Arctic and considers itself the vanguard of Arctic exploration.³⁵ Realizing this Arctic dream by circumventing Western-imposed sanctions would not only be a major economic boost for Russia but would also be a domestic victory for Putin's political grasp on the country. In response to the sanctions, Russian officials stated they would "Russify" drilling services technology to use in the Arctic.³⁶ Another concern is that while Russia turns to China for investment, it may seek to partner up to develop energy extraction and exploration technology.³⁷ But with little Arctic experience, it could be argued that China may not be able to fully produce the same safe equipment that the West has. Geopolitical conflicts could lead to unsafe energy development methods in the Arctic. An event happening elsewhere, as in the case of the annexation of Crimea, can have a spill-over effect into the way geopolitical actors approach the Arctic.³⁸

THE TRANSNATIONAL THREATS OF ARCTIC ENERGY EXTRACTION AND EXPLORATION

There are two types of transnational threats that Arctic energy development poses: to the environment and to humans in the region. These transnational threats are woven through the immediate effects of climate change. Climate change enables energy development, which only further exacerbates the threat that climate change poses on the region. In some cases, energy activities do directly threaten environmental and human security on their own, but in most cases, increased activity and climate change interact constantly, aggravating each other. For example, the thawing of onshore permafrost not only releases carbon itself, but undermines extraction infrastructure. This could lead to cracked pipelines or other complications.

THREATS TO ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Energy extraction and exploration have the potential to worsen the effects of climate change on the Arctic environment. There are unavoidable impacts on the environment at each phase of energy development, including seismic explorations, exploratory drilling, pipelines, offshore and onshore terminals, and tankers. First, the acoustic disturbance to marine mammals such as seals, whales, and walrus as a product of seismic exploration would negatively affect the mammals' migration patterns, feeding, mating, and communication. But this is just the beginning. In the likely case of an oil spill, this spill would "undoubtedly cause extensive acute mortality in plankton, fish, birds, and marine mammals ... [and] there would also be significant ... physiological damage, altered feeding behavior and reproduction, and genetic injury that would reduce the overall viability of populations."³⁹ Because oil persists in the Arctic for longer periods of time, there is no telling how long an oil spill would

cause damage in this fragile environment. It is also known that Arctic flora and fauna do not quickly adapt to a changing environment, making recovery of species nearly impossible.⁴⁰ With the increase in global population, food demand will increase. An oil spill in Arctic waters would not only disrupt fish stock sustainability, but would have second and third order effects on global demand for food, especially for China, which has the world's largest population of people, and is the world's top fish consumer.⁴¹ On a more local level, an oil spill in the Arctic would seriously harm the Arctic natives' food sources and lifestyle.

THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY

Out of the eight Arctic countries, seven have surviving indigenous people. Their cultures are highly diverse, but all depend on the natural Arctic environment for their sustenance. The Arctic wildlife and environments form the foundation of the Arctic natives' survival and cultures.⁴² An oil spill in the Arctic would certainly change the way that these people operate every day. The presence of energy infrastructure also contributes to the loss of pasture lands for reindeer herds, pollution of lakes, pollution of groundwater, and to a disruption of animal migratory patterns. One serious concern caused by both climate change and an increase in energy development infrastructure is a threat to water security in the Arctic. Persistent organic pollutants created by the energy industry also threaten Arctic communities, because they now exist



*Map 1: Circumpolar coastal human population distribution.*⁴³

in the tissues of marine mammals which these communities hunt. Oil leaks also pose a perennial threat. Thawing permafrost destabilizes the ground, which not only threatens Arctic communities' infrastructure, but also threatens the stability of energy industry infrastructure which sits close to Arctic communities.

Other hazards include deadly diseases that can resurface after hundreds of years under permafrost. For example, in 2016, a deadly outbreak of anthrax spontaneously broke out among a community of local Yamal Siberians.⁴³ Furthermore, the attitude of the pilots contracted by CMS greatly contributed to the mission creep. Pressure on pilots to deliver results was constant because of the CMS practice of obfuscating contract lengths.⁴⁴ The cause was thought to be a rotting reindeer carcass underground that transmitted the disease to

grazing herds. There are many other organisms buried under permafrost close to the surface. The hazards that could be unearthed due to continually thawing permafrost are unknown, but have the potential to threaten human security across the globe.⁴⁵

GAPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGULATIONS

With environmental and human security at risk from these Arctic energy interests, it is essential that there are comprehensive laws in place to mitigate these risks. However, international law is currently insufficient to regulate Arctic energy and mitigate damage. As mentioned before, “there is no law that pertains solely to hydrocarbon extraction or solely to the Arctic. There are no dedicated international legal standards on hydrocarbon development, either on or offshore.”⁴⁶ Instead, energy development is governed by a mosaic of hard and soft law principles and the rights and obligations of states. The Arctic is a region where sovereignty rights and cooperation to mitigate the risks of energy development must be delicately balanced.

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON ARCTIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

There are three main hard law treaties that address Arctic energy development, but they have no impact on prevention of oil spills. These are, in chronological order, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (ORPC), and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA).

UNCLOS (1982) is “the most comprehensive treaty regulating maritime areas.”⁴⁷ It is the guarantor of sovereignty for the Arctic states and provides the basis for freedom of energy development. It provides a general framework for environmental protection and provisions that demand each state uphold the duties to protect and preserve the marine environment. But these are just guidelines - UNCLOS falls short of enforcement and instead relies on Arctic states cooperation to figure out regulations on their own.⁴⁸

ORPC (1990) and MOSPA (2013) are similar treaties. Both were created by the Arctic Council, and they regulate offshore oil installations in the Arctic. These treaties mandate that Arctic states prepare for and cooperate on readiness for oil spills. But yet again, these treaties do not have enforcement mechanisms. In sum, although these treaties are crucial for protecting Arctic waters, they do not address prevention, only cooperation post-spill. This is further complicated by the response-gap in the Arctic as previously mentioned.

SOFT LAW AND NORMS

The most comprehensive set of non-binding soft law principles is the Arctic Council's Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (2009).⁴⁹ These guidelines are the soft law complement to the hard law body. They address spill prevention, preparedness, and response. Although these guidelines are well respected and commonly used by the Arctic states' as Arctic strategies, they have no enforcement mechanisms and do not provide regular evaluation procedures to assess the preparedness of Arctic states. Another soft law institution is the Arctic Council's working group, Protection of the Marine Environment (PAME), which also has non-binding guidelines called the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2015-2025 (AMSP), approved in 2015. These guidelines are designed to encourage Arctic states to find the highest standards available for environmental protection: they promote sustainability for the environment, and in the interests of indigenous communities. They also attempt to monitor operating practices of energy development.⁵⁰

Underlying all these hard and soft laws is the principle of 'no harm.' It is the idea that an activity in one country should not have a negative effect on another country.⁵¹ The lack of protective measures for energy development in the Arctic would surely violate the body of laws in place today. An oil spill or any mishap related to energy development in the Arctic could have effects on the environment and human security in more than one country. The Arctic environment is not well understood. While there has never been a significant energy development mishap in the Arctic, scenarios indicate that the effects would be transnationally devastating. Though the Arctic region appears to be a far-away frontier, climate change, compounded by an energy mishap, could speed up the rate that the entire world is warming. Without one comprehensive, international law in place, there is no guarantee that a mishap would be prevented. That is why serious policy reform is needed to ensure that proper enforcement mechanisms are in place to strike a balance between sovereignty and regulation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The most obvious solution to this problem is for countries to adopt stricter laws on climate change that would require the diversification of their energy resources away from hydrocarbons. Of course, this is highly unlikely and will take decades to achieve, if at all. The threat to the Arctic posed by exploration and extraction is too time-sensitive to wait for changes of that magnitude. Instead, the focus should be on strengthening frameworks to mitigate the risks of hydrocarbon extraction to environmental and human security. At the same time the United States needs to take greater individual responsibility for this

safeguarding, as it has the most leverage and financial resources.

There are two possible ways to approach the challenge of mitigating risk of energy disasters through regulatory means. The first is to create a new framework with a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to streamline regulation at the international level. The second is to build upon the existing framework in place. Given the critical time restraints in the Arctic, a completely new organization of legal instrument "could take time and resources to establish, thus undermining the goal of ensuring that such a vital area as offshore oil and gas exploration is addressed in a timely and comprehensive way."⁵² Arctic specialists laud the work that the Arctic Council has done since its inception in 1996, despite their outputs being non-binding. They also state that the rush for Arctic resources predicted in the past twenty years has not materialized, citing international cooperation as the reason why. Scott Borgerson, an Arctic specialist, asserts that "none of this cooperation required a single new overarching legal framework. Instead, states have created a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral agreements, emanating from the Arctic Council and anchored firmly in UNCLOS."⁵³ From this consensus, it is wise to take the second option: to build a policy that specifically addresses mitigating energy disasters on top of existing Arctic laws and guidelines.

As seen previously, the patchwork of laws and guidelines that pertain to energy development in Arctic governance is largely focused on post-spill collective response. The patchwork provides standard procedure evaluation, but these evaluations are rarely performed. The major gap is in prevention and readiness in case of an oil spill. To remedy this gap, I propose that a new task force be included under the Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council. This would largely focus on increasing awareness on readiness in case of an oil spill, and would coordinate joint exercises between the coast guards of the Arctic littoral states, increasing interoperability within these coast guards to ensure that communication equipment works properly. It would also incorporate private energy companies into its exercises to ensure coordination with these key actors. The task force will develop standard procedures that will apply uniformly to all actors. As part of these efforts, it would be essential to incorporate the views of the Arctic indigenous communities. This task force will involve those communities in their exercises to understand where the most fragile areas are and how to best prevent an oil spill or similar disaster from impinging on their human security.

Perhaps the most imperative measure that can be taken is for the United States to take a greater leadership role in protecting the Arctic environment and inhabitants from unregulated hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. Out of all the Arctic littoral states, it has the most leverage and coin to do something about putting preventative measures in place in case of an oil spill. It could start by signing on to UNCLOS to show this initiative. In sum,

enhanced cooperation through the creation of an oil-spill readiness task force could lead to striking the balance between respecting Arctic states' sovereignty and improving regulation of this transnational issue.

CONCLUSION

The Arctic region is undergoing unprecedented changes due to climate change, giving state and private industry actors greater access to hydrocarbon energy resources in the High North. But increased exploration and extraction in the Arctic are high risk, and could pose significant threats to human and environmental security. Currently, there is no comprehensive international standard in place to mitigate the risks of expanded energy development. The current framework regulating the Arctic needs to be built upon by adding a task force to the Arctic Council that will coordinate oil-spill response regulation among all stakeholders. The United States can also take a more assertive role in this region, to ensure that the Arctic remains a safe and prosperous region.

ENDNOTES

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An Analysis of Qatari Connections to Illicit Terror Financing and the Resulting Foreign Policy Implications

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ABSTRACT

Studying Qatar's relationship with illicit financing of terror, this paper seeks to understand the complicated relationship between Qatar's counterterrorism efforts and the resulting implications for United States foreign policy. The author argues that Qatar maintains a worryingly close relationship with terror financiers, demonstrated by a permissive legal jurisdiction that allows financiers to operate in the state and the close connections Qatar has historically held with such illicit channeling of funds. The implications of Qatar's relationship with terror are noted, with a focus on the 2017 Gulf crisis and changes in U.S. foreign policy towards the Gulf. Finally, policy recommendations for the U.S. government are provided that aim to encourage cooperation while mitigating risks of alienation and regional instability.

INTRODUCTION

On June 6, 2017, President Donald Trump released three tweets that dealt with a thorny topic in U.S. foreign relations: Qatar's financial ties to extremist groups. Qatar's alleged support of regional terrorist networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood have long been problematic to U.S.-Gulf relations. President Trump's tweets broke with then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's cautious stance just a day prior, encouraging "Gulf countries to mend ties."¹ By stating that "there can no longer be funding of radical ideology" and that "all reference was pointing to Qatar," President Trump simultaneously supported the Saudi claims that Qatar harbors terrorist financiers and denounced the

claims as an element of instability in the Gulf region.² When it comes to illicit terror support the United States and Qatar have a complicated relationship. As some U.S. agencies speak in cooperative terms others point to Qatar's "permissive jurisdiction" which has allowed operatives to channel illicit funds to terrorist organizations.³

Exploring these accusations against Qatar and America's response is vital to understanding bilateral relations and charting a trajectory for future U.S. foreign policy towards Qatar.

In 2003 Congress was alerted to several charities in Qatar supporting al-Qaeda. Since then, Qatar has been accused of not only providing refuge to terrorism financiers but also of directly funding terrorist groups.⁴ Such allegations are difficult to corroborate due to the secrecy of financial operations that are being tracked by the Qatari government. Apart from think tank analyses, news reports, and publicized findings by U.S. agencies, a lack of information obscures Qatar's financial connection to terrorism. Nevertheless, Qatar's role can be analyzed with countless sources — especially the State and Treasury Department records on terrorist convictions, frozen funds, and suspect cooperation with the U.S. government — and existing international law on terrorism financing and support.

This analysis looks at two simple questions: is Qatar supporting illicit funding of terror? If so, how should the United States respond? The best answer comes from three parts: history, implications of behavior and policy recommendations. With this, we can start to better understand Qatar's historical connection to illicit terror finance (a key aspect contextually) and the current scope of counterterror operations in Qatar while offering a conceptual analysis of the broader concerns facing the region. Finally, policy recommendations will be provided for how the United States should address the findings generated in this report with the best steps moving forward.

CASE STUDY

First, the nature and history of Qatar's connection to terror must be understood. The problem of terror financing is neither new nor unique to the small Gulf state. According to Gulf expert Dr. David Weinberg, "Qatar's historical legacy of negligence against terror finance stretches back two decades."⁵ That Qatari authorities are willfully negligent in permanently ending terror financing has resulted in a suboptimal legal framework as evidenced by the small number of overall convictions.⁶

Neighboring states have often criticized Qatar for its open support of organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Regional tensions came to a head in 2014 when several Gulf states fought with Qatar over allegations of harboring terrorists but the issue did not move to an international stage until

three years later when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (the UAE) clashed with Qatar during the 2017 Gulf Crisis.⁷

In 2017, a coalition of states called the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ) – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain – presented Qatar with a list of individuals and entities they wanted sanctioned for terrorist activities or financing. The list named fifty-nine individuals of varying nationalities under the jurisdiction of Qatar that were deemed key actors in regional terrorist networks. In 2018, Qatar released their own list of fifty-two actors, but only ten corresponded to the ATQ list. Further, ATQ's list included twelve entities, none of which corresponded with Qatar's list of fourteen entities.

Qatar has taken steps to counter terror financing. They have also increased initiatives with the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council and coalitions against ISIS.⁸ Further, its membership in the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and its cooperation with the United States has led to reforms in the central banking system targeting terrorist financiers. Pressure on Qatar in 2017 has led to a reworking of the legal structure necessary to apprehend and prosecute terrorist financiers. New legislation with a focus on countering illicit interstate flows of financial and material support have gained momentum since 2014 and culminated with cooperative efforts with the United States through 2017. Nevertheless, as the State Department notes “despite these efforts, entities and individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups, particularly regional al-Qaeda affiliates.”⁹ This is possible in large part because financiers within Qatar continue to have access to informal financial systems.¹⁰ Stopping terrorist financing requires more than legislation and cooperation; any counterterrorism efforts must be concentrated on dismantling the structures that allow Qatari financiers to operate with relative ease.

In addition to questions about the overall effectiveness of counterterrorism legislation, it also does not address a significant source of illicit financing: private donations. Donors have given to al-Qaeda senior leadership and regional offshoots such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, al-Qaeda operatives in Iran, and al-Qaeda in Iraq¹¹ Terrorist organizations, like al-Qaeda are largely funded through donations, a significant amount are derived from wealthy, Qataris.¹² Though these donations are prohibited under laws passed in 2014 and 2017 currently no individuals have been prosecuted.

The banking and charity sectors have loopholes which terrorist financiers use to their advantage. The 2015 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report details that banking continues to be an effective way to both move funds and finance terrorism.¹³ Terrorist financing is an international phenomenon used by both individuals and networks. Groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have sourced and transferred funds for their respective organizations, in addition to using the banking system to receive funds from donors and financiers.¹⁴

The Council on Foreign Relations notes that from the 1990s to early 2000s, “donations were once the largest source of terrorist funding, coming mostly from charities and wealthy individuals.”¹⁵ The Qatari government has taken recent action to counter this approach with sweeping legislation to channel all funds through two Qatari charities.¹⁶ With no funds frozen or charities shut down under this 2017 legislation, however, the results have been lacking.¹⁷ The charity landscape remains an easy campground for channeling funds with organizations remaining tied to illicit financing.¹⁸

The lack of permanent disruption for major financiers is one of the greatest indicators of Qatar’s ineffective legal framework and implementation. This can be attributed in large part with the struggle to implement anti-terror legislation in the first place. During his time serving as Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing under the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daniel Glaser testified before Congress that “Qatar is making progress, but [they have] a lot of work to do in implementing its terrorist financing laws.”¹⁹ The laws have been criticized for their vaguely defined parameters, which have allowed financiers to operate with relative ease.²⁰ Five financiers in total have been prosecuted by Qatar, with only one serving prison time and none deterred from illegal activity.²¹ More disturbingly, these five individuals have undeniably supported a variety of regional terrorist networks, channeling millions of dollars to al-Qaeda and facilitating training for terrorist cells.²² Implementation of these laws have been inconsistent and ineffective.²³

Qatar’s connection to terrorist financiers has been noted post-9/11, particularly in connection to regional terrorist organizations. One report by the Center for Security Policy in September 2017 deems evidence for Qatar’s support to be “exhaustive”.²⁴ The Qatari state provided financial support to four terrorist organizations in 2001, Ahrar al-Sham, a Syrian Jihadist group, the Hamas branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Ennahda party.²⁵ Support has not been exclusively financial; weapons were provided to the Islamic group Libyan Dawn in 2014 and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and funding for weapons surges were made available in West African countries such as Mali.²⁶ The State Department noted in the annual *Country Report on Terrorism* that Qatar’s implementation of new legislation and action taken against financiers was insufficient in combatting terror financing.²⁷ As the report reads, “Despite these efforts, entities and individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups, particularly regional al-Qaeda affiliates such as the Nusrah Front,” the report notes²⁸ Qatar has tried to convince the world otherwise. *The New York Times* has alleged that Qatar sought to improve its global image while simultaneously funding al-Qaeda, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁹

The Qatari relationship with terrorist financiers is far from hidden. Such funding trends remain well-known in Washington policy circles. In 2003,

Congress was alerted to several charities sheltered by Qatar that were both fundraising for and directly financing terrorist organizations.³⁰ Even a decade later, in December 2014, U.S. Congressmen Peter Roskam and Brad Sherman requested that the U.S. place sanctions on Qatar and provide Congress a full report on their financing ties to Hamas, al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.³¹ While the academic literature may not be exhaustive, the U.S. government's demonstrated knowledge of the problem is notable. In May 2017, then- U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously said: "I don't know instances in which Qatar aggressively goes after the (terror finance) networks of Hamas, Taliban, or Al-Qaeda."³² Qatar faces unique issues when trying to counter terrorist financiers. Difficulty in reforming the banking sector and the adaptable nature of illicit finance make improvement strenuous.

IMPLICATIONS

Though Qatar's unsuccessful attempts to counter illicit finance have strained a relatively strong bilateral relationship that Washington built after the 1991 Gulf War, terror financing has always been a thorny issue between the nations. In testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Dr. Matthew Levitt, an expert on counterterrorism at the Washington Institute, said "Qatar has been a longtime ally of the United States . . . however, the U.S. has also long criticized the Qatari government for its lax counterterrorism policies, and in particular, shortcomings regarding efforts to combat terrorist financing."³³ This unique relationship has enabled the U.S. to host its largest Middle Eastern military base in Qatar while cooperating on trade and investment ventures despite disapproving of Qatari policy.³⁴

U.S. involvement has become more unpredictable with the Trump administration, with some members of the U.S. government interpreting the President's remarks in June 2017 as an escalatory push towards confrontation.³⁵ The involvement of the United States is not unprecedented, as calls to act against Qatar have occurred in the U.S. Congress from 2013 to 2016, but the administration's engagement with the issue has historically been marked by a two-pronged diplomatic strategy where the U.S. officially encourages Qatar to increase counterterrorism efforts without explicitly accusing the state of funding terror.³⁶ Despite allegations and calls to action, no concrete steps have been taken. Qatar has neither been sanctioned nor placed on the state-sponsor of terrorism list. This is partially due to the presence of two U.S. military bases in the region and the history of economic cooperation between the two nations. Recent statements by President Trump raise questions regarding the stability of this relationship, however, therefore, an analysis of the recent dispute with Qatar and its impact on the Gulf States is necessary.

In June 2017, Qatar was subject to an embargo by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. These nations cut diplomatic ties and issued a trade embargo until Qatar complied with a list of thirteen demands, including shutting down *Al Jazeera* and severing ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁷ According to the Institute for National Security Studies, the crisis was attributed to the Emir of Qatar's alleged inflammatory remarks and Doha's reported ransom payment to Iran-backed extremists, but the true causes behind the dispute are more complicated.³⁸

Rather than questions about support for *Al Jazeera* or connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, deeper issues about the regional balance of power underpin this dramatic face-off between Qatar and the four other Gulf nations. The conflict is derived from "profound differences between Qatar and the others about how to deal with Iran, political Islam, and issues of regional leadership."³⁹ This undercurrent predates the Emir's remarks and can be attributed to differences in opinion about regional governance. For example, while Saudi Arabia has shown opposition to Iran, Qatar has maintained affable, even friendly relations, in contrast.⁴⁰

A notable element that surfaced in the 2017 rift was the connection Qatar had with terror, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and financiers. These concerns have manifested since 2014 when Qatar faced a similar dispute with Gulf states, but the issue had been dealt with internally and did not share the same publicity that the 2017 conflict has come to know.⁴¹ In 2017, public opposition resulted in Saudi Arabia and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council closing sea and land routes, withdrawing diplomats, and expelling Qatari nationals.⁴² Experts note that of the thirteen demands presented to Qatar, three explicitly dealt with state connections to terror and another two dealt with state-sponsored organizations accused of supporting terror.⁴³ Qatar's connections to terror financiers were noted in the same document presented by Saudi Arabia, with demand number eight commanding Qatar to "stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organizations that have been designated as terrorists."⁴⁴ While the Gulf conflict could not be entirely attributed to Qatar's terrorist financing allegations, a significant portion of the public rationale behind the rift was Qatari connections with terror and its hesitancy to publicly condemn terror groups such as Hamas.⁴⁵

The Gulf crisis of 2017 has largely been alleviated, but important issues still simmer under a somewhat improved diplomatic relationships. One prevalent problem is the complicated position facing the U.S. due to its alliance with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. While the Council on Foreign Relations states that "U.S.-Saudi relations have never been in complete harmony," President Trump's statements were reported to include a "joint 'strategic vision' that included \$110 billion in American arms sales and other new investments."⁴⁶ Saudi Arabia and the United States are firm allies on economic issues, while the political and

diplomatic spheres are more prone to disagreement. In the same manner, Qatar is a key U.S. trading partner and military ally. Qatar emerged as an important U.S. ally during the Gulf War and has continued to be a vital player for U.S. military and diplomatic relations in the Middle East.⁴⁷ This close alliance, while not impervious to diplomatic problems and periods of tense relations, has lasted from the 1990 Gulf War until the present day.

The complementary relationship the United States shares with Qatar and the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia in particular, made it difficult for U.S. policymakers to take sides with either state without alienating and offending the other. The United States appeared to be taking a neutral stance, with Defense Secretary James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson calling for a peaceful resolution to the dispute.⁴⁸ The position of neutrality the United States appeared to take was upset when President Trump tweeted about Qatar supporting ideological extremists, appearing to drop impartiality and side with Saudi Arabia in the blockade of Qatar.⁴⁹ This made the U.S. position more precarious as it appeared far less objective to the international and regional audience.

The United States is caught in a web of relations that predates tensions, despite the improving ties between the United States and Qatar after the Gulf War.⁵⁰ The division between countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, represented by competing interests of regional hegemony and a favorable U.S. alliance, makes the U.S. a point of tension in Gulf relations. The difficulty facing the U.S. now is the regaining of authority that previous diplomatic relationships enjoyed, while maintaining positive, or at least beneficial, relationships with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab states. Ultimately, there is a chance that Gulf countries realize “the most Washington can offer is a neutral position that will not benefit them” and come to view the U.S. as nothing more than a voice of past-power.⁵¹ Nevertheless, the U.S. has several options available to rebuild both Gulf relationships and play a positive role in the region’s affairs.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The first step the United States should take should be to reaffirm the U.S. government’s willingness to work with Qatar on counterterrorism through shared initiatives and cooperative frameworks. As previously noted, this is a difficult task, not simply because the relationship between Gulf states is complicated, but because the U.S. response has been, at best, insufficient. Charles Dunne of the Arab Center in Washington DC notes that, “the U.S. response has been at various times inconsistent, neglectful, and diplomatically chaotic, as the White House initially undercut then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s efforts to resolve the confrontation.”⁵² The U.S. needs to create a more cohesive policy in its diplomatic relations with Qatar, one that should

consider Qatar's past cooperation with the U.S. and efforts to build a solid relationship between the two countries.

Evidence of this continued relationship was present throughout the Gulf conflict as demonstrated by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's efforts to relieve the conflict. Tillerson and Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani signed a memorandum of understanding that "laid out our mutual commitments for increasing information sharing, disrupting terrorism financing flows, and intensifying counterterrorism activities."⁵³ However, measures such as these do not reflect a perfect progression of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. has encountered several shifts in official policy during the Trump administration, and this instability has signaled to the Gulf states a lack of cohesive judgement and thinking on how to resolve Qatar's illicit terror financing problems.⁵⁴

Simultaneously, the United States should urge Qatar to review its current policies towards the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists and sponsors of terrorism within its borders, as well as any connection Qatar has to regional terrorist organizations. It should remind Qatar that it "will have to change its policies if it wants to get out of the box it is now in."⁵⁵ Qatar needs to prove that it can effectively halt financiers from continuing in their illicit activities and show that the government is dedicated to halting terror financing both rhetorically and legally. The political will of Qatar must be bent towards utilizing the legislative and cooperative forces already in place to end terror financing and provide proof of results. The United States should be careful not to provide Qatar with a list of demands, such as the one made by the ATQ. Rather, they should work to ensure that the cooperative measures already in place yield actual results. Five prosecuted financiers, two of whom were acquitted and all of whom have returned to their previous illicit activities, reflect poorly on Qatar's ability or willingness to counteract a systemic problem.⁵⁶

Finally, while Qatar has effectively won the standoff, relationships with other Gulf states have deteriorated significantly as compared to the early 2000s, in large part because of Qatar's independent foreign policy and connections to terror.⁵⁷ The United States should work to encourage Doha to increase levels of cooperation and diplomacy with other Gulf states by focusing on repairing relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The U.S. strategy in the Middle East, while not explicitly in support of a unified Gulf region, would be aided by a quartet of Gulf states that can cooperate on issues such as counterterrorism and trade. While fundamental differences regarding regional hegemony and policy have driven the countries apart, the possibility for a repaired relationship is not unforeseeable. What makes repairing this relationship difficult is the state of U.S. diplomacy, which is "not ready for a comprehensive dialogue" in its current state due to a lack of experienced diplomats and no central direction.⁵⁸ The United States must regain the experienced leadership

and authority necessary to encourage inter-Gulf cooperation and soothe tensions, particularly if it wants to see active progress made in counterterrorism efforts. Regardless of the U.S. stance towards a suboptimal counterterror environment in Qatar, acting with decisiveness is paramount. Past criticism has noted that the United States has shown “hesitation and confusion and refrained from giving sufficient support to U.S. institutions working to resolve the crisis.”⁵⁹ A clear, decisive foreign policy requires conscious goals and an administration-wide consensus on what the U.S. response must be towards conflicts of this nature. Without this consensus, the United States robs itself of tactful diplomacy and strategic pressure.

Several claims can be made in contention to this analysis, most notably, that Qatar is not linked to terrorist financiers. Dr. Matthew Levitt states that “some of the recent accusations made against Qatar are exaggerated, blown out of proportion, or simply not based on fact.”⁶⁰ There is a marked prevalence among the Arab States, especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, to accuse Qatar of egregious crimes related to terrorism that are simply not based in fact or are exaggerated. However, these false claims do not abrogate the overwhelming amount of evidence showing a multitude of instances where Qatar is directly and indirectly related to funding and harboring terrorists. The Center for Security Policy argues that “the allegations are credible and compelling that Qatar is a state sponsor of terrorism” and the nature of the evidence brought against Qatar supports this supposition.⁶¹ A legal framework that does not significantly counteract terrorist financiers, the connection of Qatari-based charities with regional terror support, and the U.S. statements and classification of Qatar as a haven for illicit finance are indicators that Qatar faces a much more serious problem than simple bias or dislike, no matter how prevalent those factors may be from Qatar’s fellow-Gulf states.

Another disputed claim is the exact role that the United States plays between Gulf states and Qatar, with some arguing that the Trump administration has not damaged relations with Qatar and the United States was a true mediator of the conflict and does not suffer any credibility issues today. Critics point back to President Trump’s interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network during July 2017 when he stated, “we are going to have a good relationship with Qatar and not going to have a problem with the military base.”⁶² President Trump appeared to be making amends for his earlier comments towards Qatar while in Saudi Arabia. Notwithstanding, the self-inflicted damage the United States caused to its credibility was in large part due to the ineffective and unclear stance the administration took. In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in June of 2017, Philip Gordon, the White House coordinator for the Middle East, argued that there was a “really confused and chaotic U.S. response” that exacerbated the crisis.⁶³ Dissonance between military communications and statements made by

the White House was partly to blame; Qatar's desire to only make "symbolic" concessions while countries such as Saudi Arabia demanded a "zero-sum game" were equally at fault.⁶⁴ At best, the United States was sending unclear signals regarding their role. At worst, it failed to act decisively in a conflict, resulting in further alienation amongst Gulf States, yet another negative in a region already facing terrorism and destabilization.

The Gulf crisis uncovered previously hidden problems, such as the Qatari involvement with terrorist financiers that is near undeniable. In addition, Qatar maintains a permissive jurisdiction in which financiers can operate, largely unimpeded. Further, as illustrated by the Gulf conflict, questions of regional hegemony and independent foreign policy have risen to the surface.

An effective U.S. response to the broader issue of terrorism and destabilization requires three steps: that the United States work with Qatar to continue its cooperative initiatives and encourage effective counterterrorism methods, that the United States be clear that Qatar needs to take more active steps in curbing illicit financing of terror and provide quantifiable proof of their effectiveness, and finally, work to improve the damaged relationship between Qatar and the GCC nations. Pursuing a stable Gulf region should be of significant concern to the United States, particularly as the Middle East works to develop and stabilize. To achieve these goals, the United States must demonstrate clear, cohesive policy and responses to issues such as Qatari connections to terrorist financiers or a breakdown in relations among GCC nations.

ENDNOTES

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Cyber-Trafficking in Mexico

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ABSTRACT

Cyber-trafficking is defined as the use of the internet and technology to move humans across borders for sexual or labor exploitation, a phenomenon that has emerged due to the rise of technology and ease of accessibility to the internet.¹ In Mexico, human traffickers exploit social media and Internet platforms to recruit and advertise victims for sexual exploitation. The purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions:

1. How are the Internet and its associated technologies facilitating the crime of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Mexico?
2. How do those conducting the crime of human trafficking for sexual exploitation increase their profitability through the usage of the internet and related technologies?

This paper presents policy recommendations to stakeholders in Mexico, the United States and the technology industry to help combat cyber-trafficking for sexual exploitation in Mexico. The Government of Mexico (GoM) should counter corruption by strengthening the judiciary and the rule of law in the country. To this end, the GoM should collaborate with local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop trainings for members of the judiciary, the Attorney General's office and public defenders in order to enhance their capabilities to identify, investigate and prosecute cyber-crime. The United States, in turn,

should curb the demand driving human trafficking by proposing a law inspired by the Nordic Model, which criminalizes the buyers, traffickers and facilitators of sex trafficking, rather than punishing the victims. The tech industry should work individually and with the GoM to create custom tools and resources that help combat cyber-trafficking in Mexico. By establishing a partnership between the public and private sectors, the anti-cyber-trafficking tools can be shaped around the existing policies and laws of the country.

INTRODUCTION

Mexico is a primary source, point of transit, and final destination for human trafficking. According to the 2018 U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report, Mexico does not meet the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. Since the country is rampant with corruption and impunity, it is challenging to fully eliminate human trafficking in the country, and cyber-trafficking in particular.² Cyber-trafficking is a transnational crime that can be difficult for some countries to combat due to challenges in the enforcement of, and compliance with, existing international protocols. Some of the difficulties that these states face include the failure to allocate adequate resources to combating cyber-trafficking, and the complexity of tracking transnational criminals. Moreover, due to the rapid changes in technology, law enforcement agencies are often unable to stay up-to-date with technological developments. These challenges are exacerbated by law enforcement's lack of knowledge, training and research on cyber-trafficking.³

The purpose of this paper is to present key findings and policy recommendations to stakeholders in Mexico and the United States that can help combat cyber-trafficking for sexual exploitation. The key questions for this paper are:

- 1. How are the Internet and its associated technologies facilitating the crime of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Mexico?*
- 2. How do those conducting the crime of human trafficking for sexual exploitation increase their profitability through the usage of the internet and related technologies?*

Research for this paper involved review and analysis of topic-related reports, government policies and reporting, and interviews with officials in Mexico and the United States regarding trafficking in persons (TIP) and cyber-trafficking.

FINDINGS ON CYBER-TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO

THE ROLE OF LOCAL CULTURE

Local culture indirectly contributes to human trafficking and the sexual exploitation of women in Mexico by placing them in a position of vulnerability. Gender stereotypes that depict women as weak and highly dependent on men to survive are deeply ingrained in the local culture.⁴ The general expectation that women should be submissive housewives and bear children creates an environment in which misogyny is heightened. Children grow up observing particular gender roles and very specific definitions of masculinity, which creates a cycle in which women remain repressed. This is further aggravated by the legality of prostitution. Men are permitted to experiment with their sexuality, and as a result normalize prostitution at an early age. These traditional behavioral patterns have led some anthropologists to theorize that there is a link between the perceptions of women and human trafficking in Mexico. On the one hand, the prevalence of sex trafficking in the country adds to these perceptions.⁵ On the other hand, human traffickers exploit these perceptions to meet the continuous demand for sex.⁶

Human trafficking has infiltrated Mexican society by creating extensive local networks of traffickers. Entire towns are engaged in the trade of sex trafficking.⁷ This is the case in Tenancingo, Tlaxcala. Tenancingo is a small municipality in southern Mexico that is often called the sexual exploitation capital of Mexico and the operations hub of human trafficking rings in the country. In this city of fewer than 12,000 people, almost 10% of the population works in the recruitment, sexual exploitation and sale of women.⁸ Human trafficking has become so embedded in the popular culture of the city that it has a holiday to celebrate the day of the “trafficker”.⁹ Human traffickers in Tenancingo run family-based rings where entire families are involved in trafficking. Many trafficking operations center on Tenancingo. Women travel there, sometimes because they have been manipulated with promises of a different lifestyle and luxurious possessions,¹⁰ and sometimes because they have been threatened with violence against themselves or their friends and family. Once the victims arrive, the traffickers send them to other women, often relatives of the trafficker, who will teach the victim how to become a prostitute.¹¹ Subsequently, traffickers take the victims to Mexico City to exploit them. Although the majority of exploitation occurs in Mexico City, victims are trafficked from other states, including Oaxaca, Baja California, Quintana Roo, Chiapas and Puebla.¹²

RECRUITMENT

The Internet and social media have made it easier for human traffickers to identify, recruit and access a larger pool of victims. However, the use of technology in sex trafficking is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1990s, innovative devices like pagers and mobile phones have been used for the recruitment, advertisement and sale of people for sexual exploitation. Traffickers began by using these devices to expand their escort and prostitution businesses and subsequently moved their illicit operations to the online platforms.¹³ According to the director of the Global Emancipation Network (GEN), recruitment mostly takes place on the open web and starts on social media websites and applications like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube.¹⁴ Afterward, the communication “moves to encrypted chat apps and tools like Tor” and mobile apps like Kik and WhatsApp¹⁵ to ensure the anonymity of the process.¹⁶

Although it is challenging to gather reliable data on the Internet regarding cyber-sex trafficking, experts from law enforcement, academia and international organizations concur that technology has increased the reach of human traffickers and assists them in their crimes. The process of finding, grooming, and marketing victims is complex and requires coordination between multiple people.¹⁷ The Internet and smartphone applications allow anonymity and plausible deniability to the criminals, making it easier to communicate and commit crimes without detection by law enforcement.¹⁸ Organized crime groups have utilized cyber-trafficking to generate vast profits while staying under the radar of law enforcement.¹⁹

Cyber-traffickers use public profiles and accounts on social media to prey on vulnerable women who are young, drug addicts, mentally unstable or disabled, or who do not have many friends or who have expressed discontent with their families.²⁰ There are two types of recruitment: voluntary and involuntary.²¹ Voluntary recruitment is often perceived as prostitution rather than trafficking, as women are lured into a romantic relationship or with promises of material possessions, luxuries, and/or wealth.²² In involuntary recruitment, a victim might be lured into sexual slavery with a job offer in another city or foreign country.²³ Online grooming and solicitation are profitable for criminals as it allows them to target and easily recruit more victims, especially when they are targeting minors.²⁴

In the case of Mexico, Facebook is the most commonly used platform for recruitment, followed by Instagram and WhatsApp. Facebook, which is used in 80-90% of cases for recruitment,²⁵ allows the traffickers to boast their luxurious lifestyles, attract susceptible women and build a false romantic relationship with them.²⁶ However, according to the FBI's Cyber Unit and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) in Mexico City, Facebook cooperates

with law enforcement and international organizations to develop policies to combat trafficking in person and to aid law enforcement in their investigations.

MARKETING

The Internet gives traffickers a larger pool of potential clients for marketing in Mexico since the majority of advertisements for sexual services exist online and are easily accessible for those looking to purchase these services. The anonymity of the Internet also helps traffickers evade law enforcement throughout the marketing process.²⁷

In an interview, Rosi Orozco, the president of the anti-trafficking NGO Comisión Unidos Contra La Trata, confirmed that traffickers are using social media applications, and Instagram in particular, to advertise sex services from women and underage girls.²⁸ Traffickers in Mexico also used ZonaDivas.com, a Mexican website that advertised women in classified ads targeting high-level executives, politicians and artists.²⁹ The advertisements on ZonaDivas.com included semi-naked photographs, along with the contact information, age and physical description of the victim. It is important to note that these advertisements might not have reflected the victim's true age, in particular in the case of underage girls.³⁰ The website further provided travel options and a description of the victim's personality and the services on offer. The page even offered a calendar detailing the schedule of escorts, as well as tours in Mexican cities, including Aguascalientes, Cancun, Guadalajara, Guanajuato, Pachuca and Puebla.³¹ However, not all advertisements involved sexual services, thus avoiding legal action against the website. Instead, other advertisements offered massages or companion services.³² They would list at least one phone number to call or text and code words to describe the services. For instance, "outcalls" implied that the woman was available to come to the customer's site, whereas "in-calls" indicated that the buyer would have to come to the woman's location. Although ZonaDivas.com was shut down after the arrest of its administrator in 2018, it was reactivated under the name "La Boutique VIP", a portal that operates similarly to its predecessor.³³

OPERATIONS

In Mexico, human traffickers do not resort to technology as much in the operational phase of trafficking. While recruitment and marketing processes are increasingly moving to online platforms, traffickers continue to use traditional cash-based methods for their operations and financial transactions. Interviews with illicit finance academics and experts revealed that the sale of victims is not occurring through online systems like PayPal, Venmo or BitCoin, but rather through cash-based transactions.³⁴

The operations phase is divided into three main stages, in each of which technology plays a different role: (1) establishing control, (2) transportation; and (3) exploitation.

1. Establishing Control

Once the traffickers have successfully lured the victim through an online platform, they use physical and psychological threats to control them. They employ manipulation techniques such as constant humiliation, torture, sleep deprivation, malnutrition, rape and forced consumption of drugs and alcohol.³⁵ The traffickers isolate the victims by taking them away from their support system and forcing them to avoid contact with their families and friends. They control the victims' schedules, take away and retain identification documents and eliminate forms of communication (such as a cell phones or access to social media).

Many sex trafficking victims do not identify themselves as victims, because, in a lot of cases, they are romantically involved with their captors. This makes it easier for the captor to control the victim. Since prostitution is not a crime in Mexico, these women may be manipulated to believe that they are selling their bodies to help their families.³⁶ It is interesting to note that once a victim has been exploited for many years and has risen in the trafficking ring's hierarchy, they may become perpetrators themselves, helping to exploit other women in exchange for benefits, such as compensation for each victim they engage, a smaller workload or gifts.³⁷

2. Transportation

According to Article 3 of the Palermo Convention, transportation is a fundamental part of the definition of human trafficking, which establishes that "human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer and harboring of persons..."³⁸ The victims are separated from their families, moved domestically or internationally and then transported to locations where they provide sexual services to the clients. Transportation is usually done by land, avoiding the need to present victims' personal identification to the authorities. When the victim is moved locally, the perpetrators can use Internet-based transportation applications, such as Uber or Cabify, to track the victim until they arrive at the location of the client. Other geolocation applications can also be used to track the location of the victim at all times, like Footprints, Find My Friends or Life 360.

3. Exploitation

Commonly, traffickers send descriptions of their victims to clients through social media applications or websites on which they made the business deal. Once they agree on the price, the location and the method of payment, the trafficker sends the victim to the buyer. The buyer can then transfer the money to the trafficker's account using online banking. However, according to an

expert in illicit financing, the human trafficking business mainly remains as a cash-based activity.³⁹ For traffickers, mobile phones and the Internet tend to serve as a means of communication with the potential buyer. Clients, in turn, use them to conduct the search for and ultimately the purchase of the service.⁴⁰ Perpetrators further exploit new technologies or applications to photograph or film victims. In some cases, the traffickers produce pornographic material of the victims at very little cost and eliminate the risk of detection by only sharing the content with their potential buyers online.⁴¹

POLICY OPTIONS

MEXICO POLICY OPTION #1: COMBAT CORRUPTION

Corruption in government institutions constitutes a significant obstacle to combating sex trafficking. Corrupt government officials do not flag situations where handlers are blatantly coercing women and children.⁴² In fact, they facilitate the transportation of victims within Mexico and across its borders.⁴³ Traffickers consistently rely on buying the silence of corrupt officials and bribing them to avoid arrest.⁴⁴ Transparency International ranks Mexico as a highly corrupt country, placing it at 138 out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (with 180 being the most corrupt).⁴⁵ Therefore, we propose an integrated strategy to combat the rampant corruption affecting cyber-related sex trafficking in the country by (a) strengthening Mexico's rule of law and judiciary by providing specialized training for judges, police forces and prosecutors to help them identify, investigate and prosecute cybercrime; and (b) granting investigative authority to the police.

a. Strengthen the Rule of Law and Judiciary

The lack of cyber-crime related training for state prosecutors, judges, and lawyers that are in charge of investigating, prosecuting and defending the victims is a limitation in the fight against cyber-trafficking in Mexico. The team proposes that the Government of Mexico (GoM) team up with other entities dedicated to combating human trafficking such as local and international non-governmental organizations, the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) and leading activists, lawyers and academics to plan and develop training for members of the judiciary, the Attorney General's Office and public defenders to enhance their ability to address cyber-crime. We propose that the GoM also allocate more resources to set up a larger cyber investigations section that includes a specialized anti-cyber-trafficking unit comprising the aforementioned trained personnel.

Advantages and Disadvantages: One of the main advantages of this proposed coordinated effort between the Mexican government and activists,

lawyers and academics is the expertise the latter bring to the fight against sex trafficking. They can advise law enforcement and state prosecutors on how to identify victims and traffickers, as well as on how to create an adequate support system for victims. Another benefit of having cyber-crime-related training for law enforcement and prosecutors is that investigations and prosecutions can be expedited if the personnel handling the procedures are better versed in the technicalities of cyber-crime. This proposal will also prevent human traffickers from taking advantage of the inability of law enforcement officials and prosecutors to act against them. A disadvantage of this option is that funding for such training might be challenging to come by since the government is now focusing its efforts on other security issues in the country, such as drug-related violence. Human trafficking is not a top priority of this new administration and uncertainty about the new functions of the Federal Police, which has been integrated into the newly formed National Guard, poses a major challenge to the creation of a specialized cyber-trafficking unit.⁴⁶ Another disadvantage is that key actors in anti-human trafficking efforts might be reluctant to cooperate with each other and to share information, which would be a limitation for the working groups proposed here.

b. Provide Investigative Authority to the Police

The Mexican police currently do not possess investigative authority. Mexico recently transitioned from an inquisitive system to an accusatory judicial system. The intention of this transition was to combat the outdatedness of the old system and to comply with the international treaties that Mexico had ratified, which require a strict enforcement of human rights legal frameworks.⁴⁷ Under this new system, judges will process all criminal cases in public trials. The federal or local public prosecutor's office (PPO) is the only entity authorized to exercise criminal action in representation of the state of Mexico. The PPO initiates and manages all criminal investigations and the police act as an assistant to those investigations.⁴⁸ As such, the Mexican police do not have the authority to act without instructions from the PPO. This cripples the police's ability to react when they find any signs of TIP online. While the police can send leads to the federal or local PPOs of suspicious online activity relating to TIP, it is the PPO's responsibility to open an investigation. This limits the ability of law enforcement to respond to cyber-trafficking, which demands a prompt response in order to apprehend the criminals and bring justice to the victims.

We propose giving investigative authority to the police, so they can immediately open an investigation when they find indications of human trafficking rings operating online, without the need for a report issued by the PPO. Once they gather enough evidence, they should deliver a detailed investigative report to the PPO, which should take swift administrative

action and issue a court order to arrest and prosecute the criminals concerned. However, the PPO only has limited human and financial resources to manage investigations, which results in many cases receiving insufficient attention. We recommend that once it grants the police investigative authority, the GoM should allocate more funding to fight cybercrime, expand the Federal Police's Cyber Investigation Unit and create a focused section of the Cyber Investigation Unit that identifies and investigates cyber-trafficking criminals. Such a section should partner with companies such as Microsoft (Digital Crimes Unit), Thorn (Spotlight), the Global Emancipation Network (GEN), TellFinder and Domain-specific Insight Graphs (DIG).

Advantages and Disadvantages: The commitment of President Lopez Obrador to fighting government corruption increases the potential for the creation of a specialized unit with the goal of strengthening the country's rule of law. In addition, the fact that the administration is restructuring the country's security forces means there is space to grant investigative authority to the police as a means of reducing crime across the country. One of the main challenges to this option is the legal obstacles that changing police authority might face. It would require a constitutional amendment, which may not be a priority for the current Congress. Although partnering with high-tech companies and employing their tools could be highly beneficial to the Government of Mexico in fighting human trafficking online, it is currently unknown whether Mexico's digital infrastructure would be able to fully utilize them.

MEXICO POLICY OPTION #2: UTILIZE TECHNOLOGY

Some of the best means of combating cyber-trafficking are the Internet and technology itself. The GoM should partner with social media giants and online companies, particularly those whose platforms are used for human trafficking. Uber, for example, has a working relation with the Mexican authorities to prevent women and girls from being transported via their platform, while also helping to build cases against drivers complicit in human trafficking.⁴⁹ Per the Fiscalía Especial para los Delitos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres y Trata de Personas (FEVIMTRA), Facebook also works with the Mexican government and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) to "strengthen their safety measures" and remove pornographic content, especially child pornography.⁵⁰ The company provides solutions for authorities to better fight cyber-trafficking that other online platforms could implement to combat cyber-trafficking and build closer relationships with law enforcement.

Advantages and Disadvantages: One of the advantages of the GoM's collaboration with social media applications and websites is that the government can take advantage of their platforms to conduct online anti-human trafficking campaigns. For instance, the pages could help warn young people about human

traffickers and their tactics, while educating them on signs that someone might be a victim. Since social media is the primary means of communication among youth as well as a prevalent recruitment tool, warnings about human trafficking would be an effective way to reach a younger audience. Another advantage of partnering with tech companies is that the GoM can learn other innovative ways to reach people through the Internet and employ targeted anti-trafficking campaigns.

This policy option might be difficult to implement due to taboos surrounding sex education. Social media users may be uncomfortable with anti-human trafficking campaigns lining their online feeds. Another challenge is that the government as well as the relevant companies might be reluctant to collaborate. Social media sites may be concerned with perceptions that they are giving personal data to the state, while the state may be worried about intervening in the private lives of the people of Mexico or engaging in censorship.

MEXICO POLICY OPTION #3: CONDUCT EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGNS

One of the first steps in preventing human trafficking should be conducting educational campaigns at the local level. The Mexican government should begin educational campaigns early, starting in elementary school, where young children should be taught about the dangers of human trafficking and sexual exploitation. School curricula should include teaching students about work options outside of the sex trade. This would work to ensure that human trafficking and sexual exploitation is not normalized. In addition, it is the responsibility of the GoM to put measures into place to alleviate poverty, which in turn would reduce dependence on illegitimate or dangerous sources of income.

The government should include sexual education in the public school curriculum, despite the likely pushback from conservative groups in Mexico, who believe that parents should teach their children about sex.⁵¹ Finally, educational campaigns should promote a system of reporting. In many communities, victims and bystanders may suffer or witness abuse and exploitation but feel that they should not and cannot report the crimes to the police. This is often because the abuser, trafficker or criminal is a friend or family member. However, the importance of recognizing a crime and flagging it with law enforcement should be encouraged by reinforcing the importance of reporting. Mexico may benefit from a campaign similar to the “if you see something, say something” campaigns conducted at major transportation hubs in the United States.

Advantages and Disadvantages: Education campaigns would reduce the susceptibility of women and girls to online recruitment and deception by human traffickers, since they would be better equipped to recognise attempts

at recruitment. Another benefit is that a comprehensive sex education program would be an effective way to reach a larger population, and of youth in particular. The onus is on the government to work with NGOs to promote and conduct campaigns in vulnerable communities to discuss and dispel taboos surrounding gender roles and sexuality. Finally, promoting a culture of reporting in the country could lead to more numerous arrests and more successful prosecutions of traffickers.

The main disadvantage of grassroots campaigns is that they only work if they are implemented in conjunction with other policies, such as the strengthening of the judiciary system. Another disadvantage is that vulnerable populations are difficult to reach since impoverished communities may be isolated and difficult to access. The GoM may have to allocate additional funding and resources to be able to reach these vulnerable populations, which could create resistance to such campaigns.

MEXICO POLICY RECOMMENDATION

The GoM should develop an integrated strategy to enhance Mexico's rule of law and strengthen its judiciary system. The strategy's main goal would be to provide specialized training to judges, police forces and prosecutors to enhance their capabilities to identify, investigate and prosecute cybercrime more efficiently. The government should team up with local and international NGOs and the private sector in order to shape a robust anti-cyber-trafficking policy that can eventually result in more prosecutions and fewer victims. This will help form skillful professionals who in turn are better equipped to face the challenges new technologies pose for anti-human trafficking institutions.

Implementation: The GoM should form partnerships with local and international NGOs as well as the private sector to develop training strategies for judges, police forces and prosecutors to enhance their capabilities to identify, investigate and prosecute cybercrime criminals more effectively. The government should also encourage universities that teach about human trafficking cases to include a technological component. This would enable future law enforcement agents and lawyers to have a better understanding of cyber-crime-related issues.

The GoM has to be consistent about providing training to law enforcement. Cyber-crime is an issue that is always changing. Law enforcement officials need to have current awareness about the best practices and tools to combat cyber-trafficking. The GoM should create a multi-level training program that is updated on a regular basis and which adapts to the specific needs of the police. This will make law enforcement personnel better prepared to assist the prosecutor's office with prosecutions and to decrease cyber-based human trafficking.

U.S. POLICY OPTION #1: TARGET DEMAND

One of the more effective solutions for tackling the problem of sex trafficking is the eradication of demand using the Nordic Model. This model was first introduced in Sweden in 1999, and involves legislation that criminalizes the purchase of sexual services and legalizes prostitution. A 2010 Swedish government report offers proof of the effectiveness of this model, indicating a 50% to 70% reduction in prostitution when the focus was on reducing the demand of sex services.⁵²

The sex trafficking market is driven by the increased demand for sex services, incentivizing the traffickers to continue supplying as long as there is demand. While the United States is continuously working to combat sex trafficking by criminalizing prostitution, the problem has proven to lie with the demand (buyers) and not the supply (victims of sex trafficking).⁵³

The laws concerning prostitution in the United States are mostly state-based. According to the 10th Amendment of the United States Constitution, it is the states' domain to permit, prohibit or regulate commercial sex. As for federal laws, Section 108 of the 2015 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act suggests equal prosecution of both buyers and traffickers.⁵⁴ In a small number of cases, buyers have been specifically targeted for purchasing sex services, such as in the case of child sex trafficking.⁵⁵ Therefore, the U.S. Federal Government should introduce a policy or law inspired by the Nordic Model that criminalizes the buyers, traffickers and facilitators of sex trafficking and other sex services, while decriminalizing the victims of prostitution.

Advantages and Disadvantages: Research shows that by criminalizing the buyers and traffickers, the demand for prostitution has decreased in some places like Florida and Utah. Financially, the implementation of this model will save the government significant funds allocated to combating sex exploitation, which instead could be used for victim recovery programs.⁵⁶

However, the implementation of this model may face certain challenges. Major opponents of this model, such as Amnesty International and sex workers, have called to ban the Nordic Model. They argue that the prohibition of sex purchasing has created social and economic problems, as many of the foreign sex workers in Sweden were displaced, deported or exposed to harassment and stigmatization.⁵⁷

U.S. POLICY OPTION #2: CREATE A NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT

The cooperation between the United States and Mexico has proven successful in tackling human trafficking as seen by the outcomes of the Bilateral Human Trafficking Enforcement Initiative. The United States has prosecuted over 170 and Mexico over 30 defendants, while together the two states have rescued 200

trafficked victims, including 20 minors.⁵⁸

However, since TIP has moved to online platforms, the United States should consider a new bilateral initiative that would include the cyber component. The U.S. government should help strengthen Mexican capabilities to fight cyber-crimes and boost the relationship between American and Mexican information and communication technology companies and government agencies.⁵⁹

Advantages and Disadvantages: A bilateral initiative to promote Mexico's cyber capabilities and National Cyber Security Strategy can help the United States reduce the rate of human trafficking crimes across the borders, as it will allow both countries to better track down traffickers and identify a larger number of victims. However, the U.S. Congress may be skeptical about establishing such initiatives, due to the funds and resources required and concerns regarding sovereignty.⁶⁰

U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATION

The most effective means of preventing and combating sex trafficking is adopting a policy that targets the demand of sex services, rather than those who supply them. While the Nordic Model suggests decriminalizing prostitution and penalizing the buyers and traffickers, the United States should selectively adopt this model, by creating an anti-trafficking policy that targets the demand.

Implementation: An effective anti-cyber trafficking policy that targets the demand for sex services can be achieved by: (1) developing technology and tools to identify frequent buyers and gather information on their behaviors, (2) expanding the capabilities of federal agencies to monitor international online sex trafficking, (3) investing in programs that will help victims of prostitution who are seeking a better lifestyle; and (4) establishing laws that address online sex trafficking, by penalizing the buyers and the administrators of the Internet platforms that publish sexual advertisements.

PRIVATE/TECH INDUSTRY POLICY OPTION #1: REPLICATE TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS

The private sector should work with federal governments where there is a need for cyber-trafficking technological tools that align with local laws, policies and customs. The private industry and tech companies have advanced technology and abilities to develop tools for the betterment of the society. However, sometimes these tools are only known or available in the United States. They should be made more readily available to countries where local legislation allows, such as Mexico.

Advantages and Disadvantages: This option is relatively straightforward, since it requires a simple replication of pre-existing tools in Mexico. The

cooperation between tech companies and the Mexican government will ensure that all technology used to combat cyber-trafficking adheres to Mexican legislation. As such, tech companies should not suffer from significant backlash or lawsuits from the Mexican people due to violations of rights or freedoms.

The main disadvantage of this policy option is that it requires political and financial support from both the tech industry and governments. If the issue of cyber-trafficking is not a priority issue for the GoM, it would not be in the interest of the private sector to commission this type of project.

PRIVATE/TECH INDUSTRY POLICY OPTION #2: COLLABORATE WITH THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The key to successful anti-human trafficking policies is cooperation between the public and private sectors and NGOs. Those private companies whose platforms are exploited for the purpose of human trafficking have an obligation to work with governments, as well as international organizations, to combat cyber-crimes. For example, they could sponsor informational sessions, workshops and trainings on cyber-crime and human trafficking in order to better educate individuals in the public sector who may not be familiar with the connection between cyberspace and human trafficking. In addition, tech and social media companies should work closely with law enforcement to bring them up to date on the latest developments in cyber-trafficking so that the latter are better equipped to combat it.

Advantages and Disadvantages: One big advantage to such initiatives is the potential for information-sharing across sectors. Currently, misinformation and unreliable data on cyber-trafficking is rife in Mexico. A closer partnership between NGOs and the public and private sectors would diminish this challenge. This would open up a forum for public discourse on cyber-trafficking and sexual exploitation in Mexico, which would contribute to projects intended to counter taboos surrounding sexual education.

A disadvantage of this policy option is that tech companies, NGOs and governments might have competing priorities, and as such struggle to reach a consensus on how to tackle cyber-trafficking. Due to competition among different tech companies, it is possible that they would be reluctant to share all the information and data at their disposal.

PRIVATE/TECH INDUSTRY POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Tech companies should work with the GoM to create custom tools and resources that align with the existing policies and laws of the country and that can be shaped to combat cyber-trafficking methods in Mexico specifically. This would also allow the private sector to assist law enforcement in updating the

technology currently used to counter cyber-crime while building a relationship with key stakeholders in Mexico.

Implementation: The private sector would need to hire or consult lawyers and law enforcement officials from all over Mexico. The technical development of the tools would not be a great burden since the software of interest, such as DIG and TellFinder, already exists. It would also be crucial for tech companies to build relationships of trust among each other in order to more confidently share information. Without the cooperation of local governments and NGOs, it would be difficult to implement this project. Thus, the tech industry should propose this project to the newly elected government as soon as possible in order to prime their interest and increase the chances of implementation.

CONCLUSION

The rise of the Internet and related technologies has increased the reach of human traffickers in Mexico by granting them access to larger numbers of potential victims and buyers. It has facilitated cyber-trafficking by making recruitment, marketing and operational processes easier and more readily available. Due to a culture that contributes to sex trafficking and a lack of technical expertise and capabilities on behalf of the government, online perpetrators remain mainly anonymous and out of the hands of the law. The GoM and the United States, alongside the non-governmental and private sectors, must make combating cyber-trafficking a priority and make policy changes to more efficiently and effectively apprehend and convict these criminals.

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Stray from the Course:

Preventing Right-Wing Extremism in the United States

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ABSTRACT

Right-wing populist violence has risen to the fore in the West, but U.S. policy is still predominantly focused on the threat of Islamist extremism. However, in 2018 alone, far-right extremists were connected to every extremist-related fatality in the United States. Violent extremists with right-wing convictions have always been present in the United States, but the past decade has seen a steep intensification in violence perpetrated by those attempting to promote far-right ideals. First, this paper will illustrate the actors and scope of the threat of far-right extremism, followed by an analysis of the current U.S. Prevention or Countering Violent Extremism policy. Finally, this paper will examine ways to strengthen the current U.S. policy on countering violent extremism.

INTRODUCTION

Right-wing populist-inspired violence has risen in prominence and frequency in the United States in recent years. Despite this rise, U.S. policy is still focused on the threat of Islamist extremism, only recently shifting to counter right-wing extremism. Since September 11, 2001 the United States government has passed multiple action plans with varying definitions of terrorism to mitigate the threat of extremist violence.¹ Terrorism, as defined by the U.S. Department of State, is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”²

However, the US Patriot Act defines a terrorist as someone who endangers human life in an act that “appears to be intended to: (i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the polity of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.”³ Though an exact definition remains ambiguous, the Oxford English Dictionary defines an extremist as “a person who holds extreme political or religious views, especially one who *advocates illegal, violent, or other extreme action*.”⁴ Directly after the attacks in 2001, the U.S. government utilized more militarized, kinetic, and “hard” methods under the label of “Counterterrorism” (CT), in an attempt to control the threat of politically motivated violence.⁵ These CT efforts often consisted of investigations, prosecutions, imprisonment, and even killing of radicalized individuals.⁶ In the past decade and a half, these methods -- while effective at quelling short-term violent Islamist threats -- have proven counterproductive as they serve to fuel more extremism.⁷ Violent Islamist extremist recruiters have used these harsh CT methods to their own advantage by framing these policies as evidence that the West is at war with Islam.⁸ As many scholarly studies have shown, suppressing violence with violence serves only to incite more violence.⁹

In the early 2010s, the U.S. government implemented a new approach called Preventing or Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE).¹⁰ Rather than focusing on acts of terror and preventing them through punishment and deterrents, P/CVE doctrine emphasizes the importance of reducing the immediacy of push and pull factors that drive individuals towards committing acts of violent extremism.¹¹ Push factors include poverty, limited opportunity for social advancement, and feelings of marginalization or unfair treatment by society or the government.¹² These conditions make individuals and communities particularly susceptible to the recruitment strategies of violent extremist or terrorist groups who offer a means to improve their circumstances.¹³ Conversely, pull factors entice individuals to join a violent extremist group, which can come in the form of a charismatic speaker, an ideological alignment, or a sense of belonging and purpose.¹⁴ Push factors are what make a community receptive to recruitment, whereas pull factors are what actually bring people to join a violent extremist group.

Radicalization is the term applied to the process of coming to believe in and eventually promoting extremist ideologies. However, the connection between radicalization and violent extremism is not as direct as many believe.¹⁵ Not all radicalized people commit acts of violence, and not all violent extremists commit violence because they are radicalized.¹⁶ In fact, recent scholarship has shown that many violent extremists radicalized only after joining a violent extremist group, and not before.¹⁷

In 2017 alone, far-right extremists were responsible for 59% of extremist-

related fatalities in the United States.¹⁸ “Far-right” thinking is motivated by fear that the individual or community’s way of life is under attack or already lost. 19 Violent extremism under this category, also sometimes referred to as White Supremacist or Right-Wing extremism²⁰, is often characterized by racism, nationalism, and a suspicion of centralized government authority.²¹ Individuals with these convictions have always been present in the United States, but the past decade has seen a steep intensification in violence perpetrated by those attempting to promote far-right ideals. Over the past decade, 73.3% of all extremist-related fatalities can be linked to domestic right-wing extremists.²²

In fact, since September 12th, 2001, more U.S. citizens have been killed by far-right extremist violence than by Islamist extremists.²³ U.S. P/CVE policy and scholarship must address the threat of far-right extremism. Increased involvement with the community and more local diversity among those planning and executing policy are the best places to start. Community members are the experts on the drivers which encourage their members to lean towards violent extremism. Not only is their input invaluable in diagnosing and addressing some of these drivers, but community members are also often best placed to implement any recommended changes or programs. Without local community support, no P/CVE program can succeed. Community members are only one part of the necessary diversity for a successful program. Relying exclusively on police experts is dangerous and short-sighted because they are removed from the situation on the ground. Many other experts in diverse fields, as well as practitioners and even former members of violent extremist groups themselves have knowledge and understanding essential to creating and implementing a successful P/CVE program.

REVAMP OR RENOVATE: CURRENT U.S. P/CVE POLICY

Islamist extremists have committed only 23.4% of domestic extremist-related killings in the U.S. since 2008.²⁴ In contrast, white supremacists and other far-right extremists committed 73.3% of extremist-related killings in the last decade, and the rate is increasing.²⁵ The number of far-right extremist attacks rose by 31% between 2016 and 2017, and right-wing groups were responsible for 98% of extremist-related deaths in 2018. 26 Statistics like these reveal that far-right extremism is by far the largest domestic terror-related threat to U.S. civilians. The U.S. government is the largest stakeholder in the fight to prevent violence by these actors. At every level, from local police and municipal governments to the various national security agencies, every governmental body has a role to play in countering right-wing extremism. Even non-security offices like the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services have responsibilities in this effort. Aside from the government, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not only stakeholders but

vital partners in designing and implementing P/CVE programs. Far-right extremists and their supporters should also be included in any P/CVE effort since they are central actors in the P/CVE process. Without their cooperation and buy-in, no P/CVE program will succeed.

The two main pillars of current U.S. P/CVE strategy focus on the community and alternative messaging. Though the third pillar of U.S. CVE policy advocates for addressing the push factors driving radicalization and violent extremism, the government provides little guidance and no metrics for how to achieve that goal.²⁷ For instance, in his 2018 counterterrorism strategy, U.S. President Donald Trump acknowledged the rise of racially motivated domestic extremism.²⁸ Despite this encouraging rhetoric, the U.S. government's strategy remained squarely focused on Islamist terrorism until late 2018.²⁹ Some NGOs, community groups, and local law enforcement agencies took sporadic action against the threat of far-right violent extremism, but there was no centralized, coordinated effort to deal with this rapidly increasing problem until recently.³⁰ In 2015, the White House reviewed its P/CVE programs and found four missing components in the nation's overall strategy: defined responsibilities, participation of offices and departments beyond the security sector, clear communication both internally and with the public, and assessment and prioritization metrics to determine the allocation of resources.³¹ In response, the U.S. government established a CVE taskforce to enact these measures, but a subsequent review by the Government Accountability Office in 2017 found that U.S. CVE efforts still lacked metrics for success and that offices continued to operate in silos, with little cooperation between them.³² Not only is the U.S. P/CVE strategy insufficient in scope, but the agencies and programs tasked with implementing it have proven incapable of autonomous coordination.

FOUNDATION BUILDING: THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY IN P/CVE

There are no quick fixes. Kinetic, government-driven efforts like CT offer tangible methods with measurable results, making them attractive to policymakers. Meanwhile, P/CVE is often termed “soft” or “too politically correct”.³³ Research has shown that, despite its less vigorous tone, P/CVE is effective in disincentivizing individuals from radicalizing in the first place, which reduces the overall likelihood of violence.³⁴ The most effective programs are designed and led by the community itself. However, community-driven programs take time to develop.³⁵ Violent extremist recruitment and radicalization among displaced youth has been an increasingly common concern among P/CVE professionals.³⁶ However, a study by the Dubai Initiative found that access to a well-rounded education is the most important factor in reducing radicalization

and recruitment.³⁷

A defining feature of far-right extremism is distrust of government and its bodies.³⁸ This sentiment makes community partnerships all the more important, as members of vulnerable populations are likely already primed to distrust anyone with connections to the government. Respected members of the community like religious or business leaders tend to command more respect than outsiders.³⁹ P/CVE programs may have allies beyond the public realm as well. Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of women in preventing radicalization and violence in their roles as mothers, sisters, daughters, and friends.⁴⁰ Though right-wing supporters often espouse misogynistic values, women have a unique perspective on recruitment and radicalization. As mothers, sisters, and friends, women are often overlooked in the role that they play. Female-centered programming emphasizes the role of mothers, sisters, and wives as a first-line defense against radicalization in the home because of their daily contact with family members.⁴¹ They are also frequently early receivers of right-wing violence and may have their own grievances and concerns about extreme views.⁴² Women are also active participants when involved in violent extremism.⁴³ While many of the push factors that drive women to join violent extremist groups or practice violent extremism are the same that drive men in their communities, P/CVE programs must also address the several factors which exclusively affect females.

Compared to the government, members of the public are better informed regarding push factors driving individuals in their community to radicalize and commit violence.⁴⁴ Studies have repeatedly shown that targeted, or context-specific, CVE programs are more successful than a one-size-fits-all approach.⁴⁵ Community members' local sensitivity and understanding makes them invaluable contributors to creating programs that actually address the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism. These local variations in push factors can span from issues related to poverty, feelings of helplessness about the future, resentment over the perceived impunity of elites, and more.

It is important to remember that these communities are not monolithic entities.⁴⁶ Diverse partnerships involving members of the religious, artistic, business, and other communities within the population are vital to reach all facets of the society.⁴⁷ This diversity of perspectives also encourages a richer P/CVE program. With their various backgrounds, these community members are able to create programs that not only appeal to the social groups they come from, but incorporate other perspectives for a more holistic, and well-rounded program.

Former extremists and their family members are important voices in P/CVE program design and execution. These individuals are better acquainted with the push and pull factors encouraging radicalization and violent extremism.⁴⁸ Not only are they familiar with the drivers, but they understand

how recruiters work. Having been recruited themselves, former members of extremist groups can identify recruitment tactics.⁴⁹ This expert knowledge can help families and other community members identify vulnerable individuals for monitoring and deterrence purposes, as well as for developing alternative narratives.⁵⁰ Alternative narratives outline possible future paths that address a person or community's push and pull factors in a non-violent way.⁵¹ For example, former extremists can offer their personal stories and perspectives for why they left their organization in order to convince vulnerable individuals not to make the same mistakes.⁵² Former extremists also lend credibility to programs and messages aimed at radicalized individuals.⁵³

Beyond former extremists and their families, other professionals offer skills and viewpoints that can be valuable to a P/CVE program. For example, criminologists focusing on reducing the drug trade, human trafficking, and gang violence offer a unique perspective on extremist violence.⁵⁴ Many extremist groups partake in illegal activities like peddling drugs to fund their organizations, which follows certain patterns a criminologist is trained to analyze.⁵⁵ Additionally, the structure, personalities, and recruiting techniques of some violent extremist groups share similarities with gangs and other criminal enterprises.⁵⁶ Many other disciplines have spent decades establishing bodies of work that could positively inform both the study of violent extremists, and how to de-escalate and eventually re-integrate them into society.⁵⁷ Incorporating these diverse perspectives into the study and development of P/CVE programs would encourage best practices and expand the understanding of violence and those who commit it across multiple disciplines, leading to an eventual reduction in violence overall.

Education is another essential element to any CVE program. Extremist narratives often provide a clear-cut, black and white vision of the world. ⁵⁸ A well-rounded education can problematize that view.⁵⁹ Right-wing extremists believe in the supremacy of one race, and often, one gender. Humanizing non-white individuals and encouraging empathy and a sense of shared citizenship interferes with recruiting tactics that attempt to simplify the world into good and evil.⁶⁰ Education can also teach critical thinking skills, enabling previously vulnerable populations to question and evaluate the legitimacy of extremist rhetoric and vision.⁶¹ This will reduce the likelihood and frequency with which vulnerable individuals blindly accept extremist rhetoric, and resort to violence.⁶² Finally, an ideal education would alleviate the severity of some grievances that can push individuals to a life of extremist violence.⁶³ One major driver is a lack of employment prospects, but a well-designed education program could both encourage critical thinking, and provide tangible skills the participants can use to find employment.⁶⁴ Many non-profit and community organizations already provide services and programs that help with CVE efforts.⁶⁵ An important contribution the government can make is to provide funding and support to

existing programs that have proven effective.

Community members and vulnerable populations are not the only stakeholders in need of education. An unfortunate trend among police and security forces is right-wing extremist tendencies, particularly white nationalist beliefs.⁶⁶ One report from 2006 identified 320 extremists at Fort Lewis in Washington State, but only two were ever removed.⁶⁷ Numerous examples of ex-military or police perpetrating right-wing extremist violence hit the news every year.⁶⁸ There are a number of theories as to why this trend exists, often citing similarities in recruitment tactics and push and pull factors, between those drawn to a life of military service and those drawn towards violent extremism.⁶⁹ Either way, the disturbing truth is that the U.S. military and local law enforcement both possess radicalized right-wing extremist elements, who occasionally display their extremism violently.⁷⁰ This trend not only encourages right-wing extremists to act with impunity and bolsters their convictions, but it also promotes a lack of accountability and attention to right-wing extremist crimes.⁷¹ Before addressing right wing extremism among civilians, it is crucial that the very governmental forces tasked with P/CVE are not sympathetic to extremists' cause.

Government bodies like the police continue to play an important role in P/CVE. Community policing generally involves a reorientation of the force to focus on two-way communication between police and their constituents.⁷² As the name implies, the community and its members are central to community policing initiatives. Civil society sets the priorities, and often executes programs to solve criminal problems on their own, with police support but not necessarily overt involvement.⁷³ Building trust between civilians and the police, and by extension the government, is a fundamental element of community policing efforts.⁷⁴ The Baltimore police department, for example, has mandated its officers spend at least half of their ten-hour shift outside of their cars, on foot.⁷⁵ Others, like the LAPD Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, the Loudon County Sheriff and the Montgomery County Police Department recommend their officers attend community events, in uniform. This visibility brings a human face to the uniform, and helps communities visualize the individual officer as a community member and neighbor.⁷⁶ Higher level programs can incorporate community training to recognize warning signs of radicalization that inform the community when to seek help, and from whom.⁷⁷ Not only do these methods create a rapport and level of trust between vulnerable communities and law enforcement, but that trust can then enable early detection and warning when community members feel comfortable enough to approach the police with their concerns.⁷⁸ This trust also reduces the salience of some push factors, such as social marginalization and perceptions of poor government representation.⁷⁹

In Canada, the small city of Lethbridge has been a hotbed of right-wing

extremism and racism in the past.⁸⁰ Though scholars researching P/CVE in Canada expected this town to be rife with right-wing extremists, they found the opposite.⁸¹ The community, including law enforcement, members of government and civilian activists, worked together to address grievances through education and public awareness.⁸² Norway also utilized community policing in reducing and even dispersing groups of racist violent extremists.⁸³ In 2003 the Vigrid organization was attracting young Norwegian followers in the name of Odin, an old Nordic god.⁸⁴ Norway's police summoned around 100 young people with known ties to the Vigrid organization to the local police station for a conversation on empowerment. After learning more about the organization and its goals, as well as the legal consequences of continued involvement, half of the participants left the organization immediately.⁸⁵ This success was predicated on Norway's commitment to community policing, including one to two 'prevention' officers in every small office, and up to ten in police offices covering up to 100,000 citizens.⁸⁶

Weaving together existing private, civilian and NGO programs will ensure that P/CVE efforts and more kinetic crime and terrorism prevention efforts do not work at cross-purposes.⁸⁷ One illustrative example of a successful P/CVE program implemented by an NGO took place in Yemen in 2011. A number of local and international NGOs worked to provide the youth in Yemeni refugee camps access to education.⁸⁸ Following implementation, studies found that incidents of recruitment by radicalized groups fell almost 100% in students who went through the program.⁸⁹ The education program responded to the wishes of the students themselves to be taught by a different organization than the Yemeni government.⁹⁰ It is important that these programs are community-directed. Community members are more familiar with the push and pull factors, and with the forms of communication and engagement that will work best. Diverse perspectives in planning and executing P/CVE policy are also important. A group with diverse backgrounds and skills will create a program that is more effective by bringing their multiple viewpoints and experiences to bear. With these principles as a guide, below are recommendations for the authors of U.S. P/CVE policy in the short and medium term.

HOW P/CVE CAN IMPACT THE CURRENT THREAT

Right-wing extremist violence is hurting and killing more Americans every year. The recent expansion of U.S. P/CVE agenda to include non-Islamist threats is a step in the right direction. This extension will enable scholars and practitioners to study and implement programs aimed at a wider range of threats to American security. Incorporating community guidance and ensuring diversity among policy planners and executioners at all levels will increase the number of successful, targeted programs. The United States needs to take

action.

An important element of the U.S. P/CVE strategy in need of amendment is the federal government-centered approach. Though the strategy highlights community engagement as a core principle, the organizations engaging in P/CVE often lack measurement and evaluation criteria, and have very few feedback mechanisms to allow the communities to vocalize their concerns.⁹¹ However, one of the most vital components of a successful P/CVE program is that it is shaped and led by the community. Rather than a top-down approach, the U.S. government must emphasize the importance of community guidance, and create internal structures that enforce that priority.

Another much-needed change in the short term is in regards to recruitment and training of police and military personnel. Federal, state and local government bodies should convene diverse groups of civilian and military or police experts to analyze what draws these right-wing extremists to the various police and military forces. This analysis should focus both on how to prevent radicalized individuals from joining the force and how to decrease their vulnerability to radicalization once on the force. Another important element of this initiative is to create training and other educational programs to convey the importance of preventing right-wing extremism.

Once policymakers expand the definition of violent extremism beyond Islamist threats and build diversity and community guidance into P/CVE structure, they must tackle the larger organization of the U.S. P/CVE strategy. One of the most important and frequently repeated critiques of the current system is that it lacks monitoring and success metrics.⁹² In the medium-term U.S. policymakers must address this blatant deficiency. Measurement is one of the largest hurdles for programs that do not deal in absolutes and numbers. It is difficult to state the number of terrorist attacks or incidents of violent extremism that have *not* occurred, let alone the number of American lives a program teaching computer literacy to members of vulnerable populations has saved.

Despite these difficulties, there are programs which have already started developing metrics for success. For instance, RAND researchers propose a violent extremism evaluation measurement (VEEM) framework comprised of methods to measure the levels and changes in violent extremism.⁹³ This framework identifies five attributes categorizing types of violent extremism, including anger, frustration, levels of connectedness or alienation with society, and a sense of grievance and distrust or rejection of the authorities and society.⁹⁴ Analysis of social surveys and other data under the VEEM framework would allow researchers to gauge relative levels of the aforementioned attributes before and during P/CVE program implementation. As a result, this measurement framework would enable researchers to track and better understand the effectiveness P/CVE programs throughout its implementation. Although.

metrics like this assume there is a link between experiencing grievances and turning to violent behavior, which is not yet well established.⁹⁵ However, further study of vulnerable populations will enhance the field's understanding of the link between push and pull factors and violence. Successful education, de-radicalization and reintegration programs boast reduced numbers of program participants returning to extremist groups in relation to their peers that did not participate.⁹⁶ The P/CVE community should exploit existing measurement and evaluation metrics that members of the community already use, as well as exploring how other related fields like healthcare and law enforcement employ metrics to measure success.⁹⁷

Nationally, all police should receive training in community policing. Though the entire force will not necessarily be tasked with those responsibilities, they should all be aware of the concept and what it entails to ensure that each member of the police force adheres to the overall mission of building trust and rapport with communities. Additionally, law enforcement should utilize information gathered in studies on right wing extremists in law enforcement. The federal, state and local governments should transform their recruitment and training techniques to discourage participation by right wing extremists, or any extremists, in law enforcement. The government should also fund or work with NGOs, libraries, and schools to implement work, training, or skills replacement programs in areas the communities report as grievances. Continued engagement with the community is vital. As P/CVE programs begin to take effect, community members will be able to provide feedback on what is working and why. The government and its partners should continue to study and gather data on vulnerable populations, as well as new and continuing programs. This ever-expanding body of scholarship will aid in the modification and development of more effective programs throughout this period.

Implementing training and community policing programs should reduce the salience of some push factors driving individuals to radicalize and commit violence. Increased trust and cooperation between the various stakeholders and the community will also encourage better reporting from the community. It is important to clarify that P/CVE is not under a security or intelligence mandate. Local reporting in this case merely means that community members should be encouraged to provide tips or information to other P/CVE framework stakeholders with concerns about individuals or groups whenever community efforts have proved insufficient.

This improved communication and interdependence between the community and police will also encourage vulnerable communities to open up more about what is making them vulnerable. When communities and law enforcement work together, they can address grievances and prevent violent extremism in both immediate and long-term cases. This opening and continued study will also generate new knowledge that everyone in the P/CVE field

can use. It will allow stakeholders to develop better, more effective programs, not only in the United States, but among our allies. Because every situation is different and requires a flexible and context-specific response, the more situations scholars can study, the better equipped P/CVE practitioners will be for the next situation.

AT THE THRESHOLD: LIMITS OF APPLYING P/CVE

With roots in peacebuilding, P/CVE scholarship calls upon such academic ancestors as anthropology, military history, and psychology.⁹⁸ Though relatively novel, over the past decade P/CVE has proven itself a viable and successful approach to reducing violence by extremists and creating a more peaceful world. One common complaint about P/CVE is that it is ponderous, whereas more kinetic efforts like CT work quickly, and produce obvious, measurable results.⁹⁹ This type of long-term commitment can make it difficult for even successful programs to secure funding when coupled with the difficulty of measuring P/CVE success. However, history has shown that CT may work in the short-run, but such violent and repressive policies only cause more problems and encourage more violence in the future. P/CVE may take a long time and its results might be difficult to measure, but over time reducing the salience of push factors through education and other aid programs will reduce the incidents of violent extremists.

It is important for practitioners to continue their studies. Applying findings from other, related disciplines like criminology or peacekeeping will help expand the P/CVE knowledge base without reinventing the wheel. This cross-discipline approach will encourage the development of diverse viewpoints and enable scholarship in all related fields to expand exponentially, building on existing studies and knowledge to eventually create success metrics even the most skeptical policymaker or donor will acknowledge. Increased community engagement and feedback will enable law enforcement to detect threats quickly and efficiently. It will also empower communities to address threats internally with a higher rate of success. This engagement not only makes defending against violent extremism easier, but also reduces grievances that lead to violent extremism, reducing the number of potential incidents and threats as well. Beyond community stakeholders, it is important for P/CVE efforts to involve diverse planners and implementers. This diversity introduces multiple viewpoints and areas of expertise, which produce valuable insights and a more complete P/CVE program. The United States has experienced a number of devastating incidents of violent extremism, but policymakers are taking steps in the right direction. Implementing the recommendations above will improve the U.S. P/CVE strategy even more, and reduce the incidents of violent extremism going forward.

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Climate Change-Induced International Migration as a Security Concern:

Associated Issues, Future Prospects, and Potential Solutions

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ABSTRACT

As the global impact of climate change becomes more pronounced, people will increasingly become displaced due to worsening sudden-onset (cyclones, wildfires, floods) and slow-onset (drought, desertification, sea level rise) natural disasters. If existing patterns are any indication, most of those affected will relocate within their home countries, but a growing number will likely migrate across international borders in search of relief. This latter group of individuals, here referred to as “climate refugees,” and many of whom will hail from some of the poorest parts of the globe, will present an attractive target for criminal enterprises. At the same time, the growing number of climate refugees will compound national and regional security concerns by threatening to overwhelm resources, foster unrest, and even spark conflict. The existing global refugee regime remains ill-equipped to deal with the problem, having thus far failed to extend legal recognition (and all of its associated guarantees and protections) to those migrating across international borders as a consequence of climatic factors. This paper contributes to an understanding of the nature and seriousness of climate

refugees' plight. It further identifies various policy options that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and its member states might pursue to better confront the issues posed by international climate migration.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2008, approximately 24 million people have been displaced by weather disasters around the globe every year—a figure that is roughly equivalent to 65,753 people a day or 45 people every minute and that is expected to rise even higher.¹ At the same time, millions of other people have become displaced as a result of longer term issues like prolonged drought and the rise of sea levels.² These displaced individuals frequently originate from the poorest communities and the most vulnerable parts of the world, and they are especially ill-suited to withstand the effects of climate change. Historically, these vulnerable groups have tended to relocate to other areas within their home countries with the hope of finding some measure of relief.³ However, they are increasingly seeking relief in neighboring and more far-flung countries, contributing to the growth of a class of people known as “climate refugees”.⁴

Climate refugees, also referred to as environmental migrants, climate migrants, ecological refugees, and disaster refugees among various other names, can be understood as those individuals or groups whose lives are adversely affected by and are driven to migrate abroad as a result of sudden or progressive climate-related change in their environments.⁵ Although climate refugees appear to already constitute a serious issue, state recognition of their plight has been anemic. Due in part to the recent rise in nationalism and anti-immigration sentiment in Europe and the United States, governments already chafing at their obligations under existing refugee protocol have seemingly been loath to consider expanding the term “refugee,” with all of its legal implications, to encompass climate refugees.⁶ Climate refugees consequently continue to be relegated to the sidelines where they occupy something of a legal “void” in which they are denied proper recognition and assistance.

In the interest of contributing to a greater understanding of the security issues posed by international climate migration, this paper first identifies two main categories of climate-related factors that might drive individuals to migrate across international borders: sudden-onset natural disasters and slow-onset natural disasters. It next discusses the difficulty of defining climate refugees and the corresponding legal ramifications. The paper then examines climate migration as a security issue, focusing on the vulnerability of climate refugees to human trafficking and the potential for increasing international climate migration to contribute to conflict as the effects of climate change worsen. Finally, this paper offers policy options aimed at the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees and its member states.

POTENTIAL CLIMATE-RELATED DRIVERS OF MIGRATION: TWO MAIN CATEGORIES

SUDDEN-ONSET NATURAL DISASTERS

In this context, sudden-onset natural disasters are dramatic events such as cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, forest fires, and volcanic eruptions.⁷ These events are sudden or rapid-onset in that they occur relatively suddenly and with little advance warning. They also tend to be fairly fleeting insofar as they last for just hours or days and certainly no more than a few months.⁸ However, as evidenced by a near tenfold increase in the average duration of a wildfire over the last few decades (from six days between 1973 and 1982 to 52 days between 2003 and 2012), worsening climate change may result in sudden-onset natural disasters lasting for longer periods of time in addition to being more intense.⁹ Sudden-onset natural disasters may also continue to markedly increase in frequency. In 1990, roughly 200 sudden-onset natural disasters were reported. By 2010, this number doubled about 400, impacting 200 million people each year.¹⁰ In 2018, there were perhaps as many as 850 such events in 2018, more than a few of which caused \$1 billion or more in damages.¹¹

The contribution that sudden-onset natural disasters make to climate migration is a result of their immediate impact and destructiveness. These disasters routinely demolish homes or at least render them uninhabitable, destroy crops that people rely on for food and livelihood, and leave affected areas unnavigable. To offer just one of many recent examples, when Hurricane Matthew hit Haiti in October 2016 it displaced 175,000 people, left 80,600 people in dire food insecurity, and altogether affected some 2.1 million people.¹² Human displacement caused by such disasters is often temporary, with people returning home to rebuild once conditions improve. However, this is not always the case. As the duration and frequency of sudden-onset natural disasters increases, temporary movement is more likely to become longer lasting or even permanent migration.¹³

SLOW-ONSET NATURAL DISASTERS

The second set of climate-related factors that might affect climate refugees consists of issues that occur comparatively more slowly or build up progressively over time. Examples include prolonged drought, desertification, sea level rise, increased temperatures, salinization, land degradation, and loss of biodiversity.¹⁴ These disasters are interrelated in a number of respects, and in many cases affected areas must therefore contend with more than one such disaster. For

instance, drought tends to precede desertification, which itself constitutes a loss of biodiversity insofar as it entails a loss of vegetation.¹⁵ Sea level rise begets salinization as saltwater inundates land and intrudes on freshwater sources. These disasters spur migration by diminishing people's economic opportunities and living conditions.

There are a number of differences and similarities between slow- and sudden-onset natural disasters. Both types of disasters can drive migration across international borders, but slow-onset disasters do so more than sudden-onset disasters, which are more likely to cause internal displacement. Additionally, slow-onset disasters are more likely to cause permanent migration due to their longer lasting and sometimes irreversible environmental effects that can leave affected areas uninhabitable. Since they build up over time, slow-onset disasters can also prompt voluntary migration in anticipation of impacts, resulting in individuals who may not technically qualify for consideration as refugees.¹⁶

One of the challenges with these climate-related factors, particularly in terms of data collection, is that they can have knock-on effects that disguise the fundamental reason for migration. A slow-onset natural disaster like prolonged drought can lead to conflict over water or other natural resources.¹⁷ If people then flee the affected area, are they climate refugees or refugees of conflict? Given the present lack of legal protections for the former, individuals would likely be better off recognized (and may seek to portray themselves) as the latter. By doing so, they distort their real reason for migration—drought—and potentially hinder efforts to obtain legal recognition for climate refugees.

THE TROUBLE WITH DEFINITIONS AND LEGAL RECOGNITION

While it is clear that sudden- and slow-onset climate-related factors can and do drive migration across international borders, a major roadblock to effectively dealing with this type of migration is the lack of a universally agreed-upon and legally binding definition as to who constitutes a “climate refugee” or “environmental migrant”. Governments, organizations, and individual advocates have largely been left to come up with their own working definitions, each presenting its own issues or limitations. As an example, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 1985 referred to “environmental refugees” as “people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.”

More recently, the International Organization for Migration (IOM, another UN organization) has adopted as its working definition of an “environmental migrant” as “persons or groups of persons who, predominantly

for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” This latter definition is problematic because it includes those who remain within their home countries and move voluntarily, neither of which are true of refugees.¹⁸ Perhaps more importantly, both IOM’s usage of the term “migrant” rather than “refugee” and UNHCR’s resistance to the 1985 UNEP definition are telling: they point to a continued reluctance on the part of bodies like the UN to use the term “refugee” to refer to those displaced by climate-related factors.

Disagreement over the usage of the term “refugee” may seem like mere quibbling, but it is actually significant. The issue boils down to the fact that, legally under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the term “refugee” has important implications and refers to a specific type of person: one who has left their home country due to a “well-founded fear of persecution” based on race, religion, nationality, political ideology, or membership in a particular social group. As climate-related factors alone do not amount to persecution, climate refugees do not necessarily fit into this definition.¹⁹ IOM contends that terms such as “climate refugees” and “environmental refugees” are “misleading and could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees.”²⁰ The problem with this stance is that it denies climate refugees the legal guarantees and protections afforded by official recognition under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Climate refugees’ continued lack of recognition and protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention does not mean that such individuals are entirely without hope for international legal cover. Of particular note here is international human rights law and even more specifically the principle of *non-refoulement*, which applies to all human beings and has been identified as a possible solution for displaced individuals not covered under the existing global refugee regime. Non-refoulement prohibits the forced return of migrants to, *inter alia*, “life-threatening circumstances” that theoretically could include those created by climate-related factors.²¹ Human rights law nonetheless remains of limited utility in this case as courts have yet to find that the impacts of climate change warrant application of the non-refoulement principle. Nevertheless, it is possible that this will change as judicial recognition of climate change’s impact on human rights grows.²² For the time being, it appears that climate refugees cannot rely on the non-refoulement principle to ensure that they cannot be turned away by states.

Lack of international legal recognition has not stopped individual states from granting asylum or opening up the possibility of asylum to those impacted by climate-related factors. As a result of a serious drought in the Horn of Africa from 2010 to 2011, hundreds of thousands of people migrated

from Somalia to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti and pleaded for entry on the basis that the drought had robbed them of the crops and animals they needed to survive. Rather than turning the migrants away, the three countries granted them refugee status despite the absence of any persecution and therefore legal imperative.²³ Meanwhile, since 2005 Swedish law has allowed for the provision of asylum to individuals deemed incapable of returning to their countries of origin due to environmental disasters.²⁴ Commendable as these individual state efforts may be, they ultimately amount to mere stopgaps in the absence of a more robust global refugee regime that encompasses climate refugees.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Continued lack of attention to “climate refugees” contributes to a clear and growing security issue insofar as it renders a large class of people, often hailing from some of the poorest parts of the world, vulnerable as they endeavor to migrate across borders. Absent legal avenues, climate migrants may look to human smugglers for assistance in gaining entry into another country, but this can be costly and offers no guarantee of success. For instance, “unusually severe droughts” that began in 2014 have resulted in an unprecedented number of starving Guatemalans paying human smugglers between \$10,000 and \$15,000 or even offering up their homes or lands as collateral for three chances at crossing the United States border.²⁵ IOM has uncovered similar smuggling from Cambodia to Thailand of drought-afflicted persons.²⁶ Those who cannot pay are seemingly left with no other option than to undertake dangerous journeys on their own or with their families in tow.

A related concern is the vulnerability of climate refugees to human trafficking. By resorting to illegal and unsafe migration channels, climate refugees risk being victimized by human traffickers posing as or collaborating with human smugglers. Already this issue has been observed in the Asia-Pacific region, an area particularly vulnerable to climate change. After Cyclone Sidr in 2007, a study in Bangladesh discovered that people seeking to migrate from affected areas to India in pursuit of employment and income had been picked up by human traffickers and subsequently forced into prostitution and hard labor. Following Cyclone Aila just two years later, a study conducted by IOM discovered similar trends, noting that women-headed households were especially vulnerable.²⁷

In some cases, rather than becoming the unwitting victims of human trafficking, people displaced by climate-related factors may willingly collude with traffickers or engage in trafficking as a means of survival. In India, there have been reports of families selling wives, female family members, and children to cope economically in the face of climate change.²⁸ Whether climate refugees ultimately end up as victims of human trafficking or as complicit actors, it is

clear that they offer criminal actors a pool of desperate individuals to prey on and profit from.

From an international security perspective, climate refugees are no less worrisome, since international climate migration could contribute to instability and even spark a conflict. The theory is rather straightforward: Influxes of climate refugees will aggravate competition for essential resources like food, water, and living space in transit and host communities, which could lead to violent or non-violent conflict, particularly in settings where resources are already stressed and political instability already exists. An important caveat here is that climate change or migration by itself is unlikely to cause conflict. Instead, it will act as a “threat multiplier” that together with other political, economic, or social conditions escalates situations to the point of conflict.²⁹

There has been a lack of research on the possibility of climate migration-induced conflict. Though not focused on migration specifically, Nel and Righarts looked at data pertaining to 187 states and other political entities from 1950 to 2000. They determined that through their social impacts, sudden-onset natural disasters “significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict in the short to medium term,” particularly where governments are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic and some fragility (e.g., in the form of income inequality) already exists.³⁰ Barnett and Adger meanwhile contend that large migrations could “increase the risk of conflict in host communities” and that “the influx of migrants into new areas has been a significant factor in many environmental conflicts.”³¹ In an interesting spin on the issue, the German Advisory Council on Global Change asserts that disagreements between states over what to do about the migration of climate refugees will likely aggravate political tensions and may become a major source of international conflict.³²

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Current projections suggest that climate change and associated international climate migration will only grow more serious. As the global mean temperature continues to rise by an estimated 2.5 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit (roughly 1.4 to 5.6 degrees Celsius) over the next century, natural disasters will become more common, or at least more intense. For example, while the total number of tropical cyclones may decline as the world warms, cyclones that do form are expected to be of a greater intensity, and this will be associated with a corresponding increase in the intensity of storm surges. More intense storm surges may be accompanied by a general increase in sea level by one to four feet caused by melting land ice and thermal expansion of seawater. Together with increases in precipitation in some areas of the world, this sea level rise would increase flooding. Other areas are meanwhile expected to suffer from worsening drought due to decreased or irregular precipitation.³³

While every part of the globe will be impacted to some extent by ongoing climate change, regions most lacking in climate resilience will likely be hit the hardest by natural disasters and are therefore also likely to produce the most climate refugees. For example, South Asia is particularly vulnerable to both sudden- and slow-onset natural disasters due to its deficient infrastructure, reliance on land resources, and high population density within at-risk areas. Sea level rise and associated flooding constitute the most pressing problems for the region. For instance, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka in 2016 exhibited some of the highest numbers of displacements caused by natural disasters.³⁴ Bangladesh has been especially hard hit and is expected to produce 20 million climate refugees by 2050 as 17 percent of its landmass is lost to climate change-induced flooding.³⁵

Because there remains no universally agreed upon definition of “climate refugees,” any efforts to quantify how many such individuals exist now or might exist in the future should be approached with some caution. Current forecasts of the number of climate refugees globally by 2050 paint similarly sobering pictures ranging from 25 million to 1 billion, with 200 million constituting the most common estimate.³⁶ Regarding Europe, where political dialogue on the issue of migration remains tense, a 2017 study determined that the average number of asylum seekers heading to the region each year could nearly triple by 2100, increasing from roughly 351,000 to 1,011,000 per year (an overall addition of 660,000 asylum seekers).³⁷ Taken together, projections involving future climate change and resulting international migration offer strong impetus for taking action now before the situation becomes unmanageable.

POLICY OPTIONS

Efforts to acknowledge the plight of, and encourage, protections for climate refugees moving forward have thus far been lukewarm at best. Last year, UN member states negotiated, and the UN General Assembly adopted, the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. While the hope was that these new agreements would establish a legal framework for dealing with climate refugees, they fell well short of this goal. Consistent with a preliminary statement given by one UN official that it “would not grant ‘specific legal international protection to climate-induced migrants,’” the migration compact only encourages member states to work on better understanding and exploring solutions for climate migration. The refugee compact for its part merely acknowledges climate “as one of many factors that may interact with the drivers of refugee movements.” Neither compact is legally binding.³⁸

A concerted, clear-eyed effort to address the growing issue of international climate migration would entail negotiating a new, international, and legally binding agreement that clearly lays out legal processes for managing climate

refugees or renegotiating an existing and well-established treaty—namely, the 1951 Refugee Convention—to encompass climate refugees. As noted previously, the 1951 Refugee Convention is restrictive insofar as it reserves the label “refugee” only for those who are fleeing persecution. It is thus something of a relic of its time, having been negotiated not long after World War II to address the global refugee crisis created by that conflict. But it has been many years since then, and today’s world is not like the world of the mid-twentieth century. Change is in order. The only concern now should be on the length of time it might take to negotiate a new agreement or renegotiate an existing one and the very real possibility that efforts to renegotiate the 1951 Refugee Convention might be taken advantage of by opponents of the treaty to weaken it.³⁹

An alternative option would entail UNHCR promoting and its member states adopting multilateral/regional arrangements that are implemented at the state level and offer relief to climate refugees on a more temporary basis. Such arrangements could be modeled on the concept of temporary protection or stay arrangements (TPSAs), which have served to complement the global refugee protection regime by filling legal “gaps” like the one climate refugees currently fall into.⁴⁰ These arrangements would ideally entail the identification, documentation, and accommodation of climate refugees in receiving states until environmental conditions in refugees’ home states improve or some other agreed-upon criterion is met. In addition to having a legal right to shelter and other freedoms like freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination in receiving states, climate refugees would thus be protected under the *non-refoulement* principle.⁴¹

How might states determine whether someone should be returned home under such arrangements? Drawing on Swiss law pertaining to subsidiary protection, Kälin and Schrepfer offer a useful litmus test entailing three criteria: permissibility, feasibility, and reasonableness. States should first ask whether the *non-refoulement* principle prohibits return. Is there reason to believe an individual would be exposed to life-threatening conditions if returned? If so, *non-refoulement* would apply. States should then ask if it is technically possible or feasible to send individuals back, which may not be the case when, for example, roads or airports have been closed or destroyed by natural disasters. Finally, states should ask themselves whether living conditions in a refugee’s home country, while perhaps not life-threatening, are below international standards. If so, it should be considered neither humane nor reasonable to send that person home.⁴²

Regardless of whether the preceding options are pursued, UNHCR could, in cooperation with development agencies, further work with vulnerable states to bolster their citizens’ resilience to climate change. As stated by IOM climate expert Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, “Most people don’t actually want

to migrate. They would rather stay where they are. But they need the means to stay where they are.” Providing this means could include training and equipping farmers to operate in arid or drought conditions; helping to protect communities against soil erosion and flooding through the creation of buffer strips, dikes, and other solutions; and contributing to improvements in natural disaster detection and emergency response measures.⁴³ Such efforts may prove costly in time and money, and it is unlikely that communities can ever achieve complete protection, but with external assistance those at risk of forced climate migration can better prepare themselves in the face of ongoing climate change.

CONCLUSION

The plight of climate refugees displaced across international borders by sudden- and slow-onset climate-related factors has not been afforded the attention it warrants in either international legal or security discourses. As global climate change continues largely unabated and its effects are increasingly felt in the world’s poorest, most vulnerable, and least able to adapt countries, it is likely that the number of people finding no choice but to migrate abroad due to climate impacts will increase markedly. Climate refugees nonetheless continue to occupy a legal “void” in which they are denied the recognition and protections they need. The importance of taking action sooner rather than later to address the growing concern posed by this class of individuals therefore cannot be overstated. A concerted effort to fill in the gap might involve either updating the existing global refugee regime to better account for climate’s contribution to forced migration or formulating new refugee arrangements to be implemented at the regional or multilateral level. It will also require taking greater steps to bolster climate resiliency where populations are at their most vulnerable in the interest of reducing the need to migrate in the first place. While such actions are likely to prove politically unpalatable and thus encounter resistance, the alternative path of continued neglect is far more worrisome.

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Fighting for Peace in Somalia:

History and Analysis of the African Union

Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017

by Paul D. Williams

A Review by *Jacqueline Schultz*

Dedication, diligence, and a data-driven process are three qualities to describe Dr. Paul Williams' book, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*. The African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was approved on January 19, 2007 and implemented in March 2007 by an initial group of Ugandan soldiers that has become the longest ongoing peacekeeping operation to date. Its mission was mandated by the United Nation Security Council Resolution 2372 to assist in establishing a peaceful political process from AMISOM to Somali security forces at all levels, reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and provide security to enable the political process, stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in Somalia. The AMISOM model was complex in its origin as the African Union provided the troops, the European Union supplied financial support, and the United Nations provided AMISOM its logistical support and bilateral partners. Williams, however, does not explore the complexities of international cooperation and coordination, but rather keeps his focus on the successes and failures implemented at an operational level.

In addition to being the largest and longest peacekeeping operation in history, AMISOM is also the deadliest. The number of civilian and peacekeeper deaths, although not openly publicized, is significant. Threats, such as the ones posed by al-Shabaab's regular use of terror technology and tactics has been a significant roadblock to AMISOM's organizational effectiveness. While al-Shabaab has lost much of its political influence and territorial control since 2010, it still remains a deadly force that consumes time, troops, and resources from AMISOM's primary mission.

Williams divides his book into two major sections. The first section covers AMISOM's history and how its mission has developed over time. The second half of the book addresses the operational challenges faced by AMISOM and

its key partners. Specifically, Williams assesses the effectiveness of AMISOM's implementation of logistics, security sector reform, civilian protection, strategic communications, stabilization, and its exit strategy. Even though AMISOM faced many challenges, particularly in its earlier implementation stages, the mission sets a precedent for future international peacekeeping missions. In Williams' book, the case study of AMISOM is highlighted to inform academics and the broader policy community of the successes and failures of the operation to guide future peacekeeping efforts.

In an interview with Williams on October 24, 2019, he discussed his motive and methodology for writing *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*. Williams' interest in peacekeeping operations in Somalia stems from his prior research background on Africa and international security. Equally remarkable to the amount of detail contained in his book is the lengthy process by which Williams conducted his research. This massive qualitative study required field research in Mogadishu, sifting through thousands of documents, and conducting numerous supplemental interviews to build a comprehensive analysis of the organizational history of AMISOM over a decade.

Williams faced several key challenges while conducting his research. The first was time. As AMISOM is still an ongoing operation, evaluating its overall merits is a premature judgment. To circumvent this issue, Williams decided to conclude his analysis after the first decade of AMISOM's implementation. The second challenge was tied to security, because his field research was located in a war zone. Williams' work was restricted to Mogadishu as he was prohibited from traveling outside of the capital due to security issues. Furthermore, AMISOM's peacekeepers are actively fighting against *al-Shabaab* and hesitated to provide him with information. The final challenge was psychological. This project required vast amounts of research with little assistance and would make anyone question whether they could complete the work or not.

After a decade of research, Williams is currently writing reports that pull out the key lessons learned in the Somalia peacekeeping mission and looking into key emerging security threats like artificial technology and biotechnology. Williams translates his vast knowledge of international security into the classroom with his "Emerging Threats" and "International Peacekeeping" courses. As such, Williams has valuable advice for students who are just starting their career. When conducting research, he acknowledges that there is the ideal world of study and the practical world. For students, better research is the result of access to information. Williams' access to documents and the fact that there was a lack of substantive research on the AMISOM mission already in existence led to his decision to write this book. Effective research and useful policy recommendations is tied to identifying gaps and analyzing potential solutions.