It appears that a history lesson taught is a history lesson learned for Israel’s foreign policy apparatus.
The recent Obama – Netanyahu summit, though panned as a mere photo-op by U.S. mainstream media and the blogosphere, is reminiscent of a previous U.S. escapade in the Middle East, albeit corrected in this case.
The Suez Crisis of 1956 harmed relations with America’s Cold War allies, Great Britain, France, and to a lesser extent, Israel. When then President Dwight Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, repudiated the Anglo-French attempt to seize control of the Suez Canal, they effectively elicited Britain and France’s withdrawal 48 hours after the invasion began. The disconnect between the U.S. and the Allies’ foreign policy was exploited by Nikita Khrushchev’s Soviet Union, which leveraged the widely trumpeted, selectively observed anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist rhetoric of America’s containment policy to differentiate and erode the unified front of the NATO members. This revealed an incongruity among the Allies and served as a strategic victory for the Soviet Union.
In this light, the recently tumultuous relationship between the United States and Israel was in dire need of fence mending, especially in the face of purported Iranian nuclear pursuits, lest the ‘unbreakable bond’, as Netanyahu recently put it, begin to tremble. The handshaking and back-patting rhetoric of Obama and Netanyahu’s meeting offered, at least superficially, the image of unity – something sorely lacking during Suez imbroglio.
While it seems Israel is moving closer to Obama’s position on Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, it is a near impossibility that Israel will ever tolerate an Iranian nuclear fuel swap agreement like that negotiated by Turkey and Brazil. To Israel, Iranian overtures such as these are merely delaying tactics designed to buy time for further nuclear enrichment and weapons research.
President Obama, however, does not take such a hard-line. On July 6th, Tehran called for September meetings with the so-called P5+1 powers – Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany - regarding its nuclear enrichment program and a possible fuel swap agreement. Proving again that Obama never disavows discussion and mediation, even when leveling unilateral sanctions, State Department spokesman Mark Toner told reporters, “If Iran is serious about talking to the P5+1, than I think we’re willing to meet. Obviously we’d have to evaluate the Iranian offer.”
Herein is the point of departure between Israeli and U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iran, and, just as Khrushchev did in 1956, Iran will seek to further wedge the divide between Israeli resolve and U.S. temperance. Neither the cynic nor the realist, nor the Israeli, will view Iran’s attempt at engagement as anything but an artful impediment intended to delay final resolution and extend the window for realizing a nuclear weapon.
The sincerity with which Iran approaches September P5+1 discussions, should they take place, will go a long way in determining the future of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. If the talks break down or are merely an Iranian tool for deferral, Israel will not quickly forgive the United States for essentially granting three months or more for Tehran to further their nuclear research.
There are no larger stakeholders than Israel and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear pursuits. A good working relationship and a complementary, if not unified, policy is essential to managing the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
The photo in this article is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.
