

HUMAN SECURITY AND SMART SANCTIONS: TWO MEANS TO A COMMON END?

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This article provides an argument supporting the inclusion of “smart sanctions” in human security concepts that focus on protecting the individual from physical violence. The authors argue that when human security fails as a proactive conflict prevention policy, smart sanctions can serve as a reactive policy by preventing the further escalation of conflict. Thus, by combining both smart sanctions and human security, enforcement of a rule can be achieved by peaceful means, including the simultaneous protection of societal groups and the individual, without resorting to the use of military force.

Notwithstanding the growing importance of military hard power in international affairs following the attacks on September 11, 2001, debates on security issues since the 1990s have resulted in a broad consensus that the state-centric security thinking of the East-West Conflict era has become insufficient for coping with the sub- and transnational challenges of today’s security landscape (e.g. civil wars, transnational terrorism, and complex humanitarian emergencies).^a In addition, there

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seem to be relatively few scholars who contest the view that the meaning – and, hence, the breadth and depth – of security has changed since the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, broadened and extended security paradigms, such as the human security concept, have received considerable attention by academia and policy-makers in various countries such as Canada, Norway and Japan.^b However, a general and common understanding of what constitutes *human security* has not evolved; various actors prioritize different agendas or emphasize either the broad or

the narrow understanding of the concept. Consequently, as critics point out, the concept of human security lacks clarity and, thus, may not be a useful category for research.^c Proponents of human security, however, continue to face the same difficult task as all foreign policy-makers and analysts in the post-Cold War era. They face the same two questions of how to deal with and make sense of a radically different world order.

Our argument does not focus exclusively on the theoretical and methodological implications the concept of human security might have. Instead it takes into consideration actual policies that have been formulated by invoking the term *human security*. Indeed, we argue that a human security agenda coupled with a sophisticated use of smart sanctions can serve as a middle ground for strengthening international cooperation on varying security issues. Combining smart sanctions and human security concerns could mitigate the dispute between policy makers in favor of basing foreign policy on hard power and those in favor of soft power. We will analyze characteristics of different human security policies that have been conceptualized by Canada, Japan, as well as in multilateral frameworks by the Human Security Network (HSN), and the Commission on Human Security (CHS). Our aim is to circumvent the theoretical and methodological “trap”^d while at the same time trying to assess the potential of a human security policy orientation for conflict prevention. We argue that preventive — not reactionary — policies are necessary to make the world safer, especially in the context of human security. Finally, we identify a way in which smart sanctions could be

implemented and integrated into these frameworks as an instrument of conflict prevention.

The potential of human security lies in streamlining the international activities of different national ministries through a general normative perspective, which, at least in theory, can create a more coherent foreign policy and also free resources.^c Cooperation with key allies can be facilitated by establishing and following a common (political) *leitmotif*, in this case human security. The

challenge of (new) complex emergencies might stimulate thinking about new policy options and approaches. Combining *reactive* (smart sanctions) and *proactive* elements (derived from human security in general) in addition to the (existing) military potential might make the use of force unnecessary under certain circumstances.

The holistic perspective of human security facilitates the detection of root causes and events that fuel or prevent the outbreak of violence. Thus, the human security paradigm adds crucial knowledge to the study of international relations.^g It is necessary to develop a multi-level approach that incorporates societal, state, and global dimensions.

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VARIANTS OF HUMAN SECURITY

Although a commonly accepted definition of human security does not exist, there are basic premises that all definitions have in common, as well as specific criteria that relate to three prevalent models: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)–model (trying to bridge freedom from want and freedom from fear), the Canadian model, (focusing on freedom from fear), and the Japanese model (focusing on freedom from want).

The first official document to promote human security was the UNDP 1994 Human Development Report, which stated that

[f]or too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country's border. [...] For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysm.


mic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, [and] security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.^h

The report's plea for "freedom from fear" – the protection of the most vulnerable from physical violence – as well as "freedom from want" – an inclusive model for the gratification of basic human needs, stressed the complexity of human security. An additional aspect of the UNDP-perspective was the preventive character of the concept, "[h]uman security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention."ⁱ Overall, the analysis of interrelated threats provided in the UNDP report was met with general acceptance. Unfortunately, it failed to gain substantial support within the United Nations system due to a lack of a clear agenda and priorities, and a plan for concrete action on the problematic issues the report identified.

In Canada and Japan, the human security paradigm has received support at the national level as an approach to foreign policy. Nevertheless, neither country adopted the broadly defined concept outlined in the UNDP report. In order to substantiate our argument, we will compare and contrast both approaches in the following section.

THE CANADIAN APPROACH

The Canadian approach is based on a human rights and extended arms control nexus. Examples of the Canadian approach are illustrated in the country's human security agenda, which seeks to address problems faced by failed states. Thus, it is not surprising that the Canadian government has supported the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and efforts to stop the use of child soldiers and illegal trade in small arms, all issues that are intended to tackle problems prevalent in low intensity wars that mainly occur in failed states. Concentrating mostly on the "freedom from fear" perspective of human security, the overarching aim of this policy is based on initiatives that are intended to provide for (or re-establish) the physical safety of civilians, especially of women and children in conflict.^j Further, the Ottawa Convention and the Rome Statute of the ICC illustrate that strengthening international law, promoting human rights and micro-disarmament represents a pivotal feature for Canada.



THE HUMAN SECURITY NETWORK

The Human Security Network (HSN) consists of 13 countries and was initiated by the Norwegian and Canadian governments.^k Its agenda is not integrated into a multilateral body; instead, it resembles the concept of human security formulated by the Canadian government.

Recently, HSN members have begun to concentrate more on the promotion of education of human rights, which was directly influenced by the Austrian presidency of the network. Hence, one can contemplate that the long-term goal of sustainability has been emphasized over the short-term “solution” of the containment of physical violence. For the latter – as a matter of consequence –

would in the long run have to be bolstered by an approach to anchor the principles of democratic governance in a country,^l if the intention is to prevent a renewed outbreak of violence. The work by HSN exemplifies how Human Security as a political leitmotif can serve to coordinate foreign policy projects. The joint work in the HSN therefore

exemplifies that the Human Security paradigm serves well the idea of a political leitmotif that can be used to coordinate concerted foreign policy projects. In sum, different countries emphasize different policy

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priorities, which nevertheless serve the same overarching goal of human security.

THE JAPANESE APPROACH

The Japanese human security approach focuses on the connection between security, economic and social development (freedom from want).^m This approach was influenced by the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis,

‘Human security’ is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to the socially vulnerable - the poor, women and children, and the elderly - threatening their survival and dignity.ⁿ

According to Japanese prime ministers from Keizo Obuchi (1998-2000) to Junichiro Koizumi (2001-), human security should concentrate on the provision of economic perspectives and health care for the world’s poor through the use of multilateral efforts.^o The spectrum of activity ranges from education programs, HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, and repatriation of refugees, to the demobilization of former combatants. The *leitmotif* of these programs is a perspective that highlights the “potential” of the individual, which can be found in most official publications and statements.^p Consequently, one could argue that Canada’s policy for human security emphasizes *narrow* “protection” while Japan’s emphasizes *broad* “empowerment” and “protection.”

THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY

The Commission on Human Security (CHS), was created by the Japanese government, and its purpose was to “translat[e] the concept of human security into concrete policy programmes.”^q The Commission worked in consultation with numerous UN bodies including the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).^r The CHS definition of human security is conceptually similar to that of the Japanese government; both are based on the following concepts including empowerment (freedom from want) and protection (freedom from fear).^s

Table 1: Overview of Policy Issues in Conceptualizations of Human Security

Actor	Policy Sectors	Concrete Policy Issues/Activities
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disarmament • Peacekeeping / -building • Illegal Trade • International Humanitarian Law 	<p>FOREIGN MINISTER LLOYD AXWORTHY:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small arms • Landmines • International Criminal Court • Child soldiers • War-affected children <p>DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (NOW: FOREIGN AFFAIRS CANADA):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-dimensional peace support operations • Security sector reform • Transnational crime • Women in conflicts • Stopping the trafficking in conflict diamonds, drugs etc.
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic development • Human development • Education • Health care/nutrition 	<p>MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of the Commission on Human Security <p>ACTIVITIES AS ADMINISTERED BY THE TRUST FUND FOR HUMAN SECURITY:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of internally displaced people • HIV/AIDS-prevention, -assistance • Drug reduction policies • Sustainable primary health care • Ex-combatants reintegration • Malaria control • Food security
CHS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People in conflict situations • People on the move • Peacebuilding • Economic security • Health care • Education • (All sectors including a gender-based perspective) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy recommendations are to be found at the end of each chapter under the rubric “policy conclusions” of the report
HSN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rule of law • Human rights • Accountability of governance and security structures • Peacebuilding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIV/AIDS • War-affected children • Human rights education • Small arms • Peace support operations • Drugs • Penitentiary systems • Conflict resolution mechanisms

Sources: MOFA (2004), Axworthy (1997), (DFAIT 2002), HSPH (2001), CHS (2003), HSN (2003), Ogata (2004)²⁰

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

What lessons can we draw from the juxtaposition of the different human security conceptualizations and agendas? They are all intended to make the concept of human security functional through a process of formulating innovative and sustainable policies. Nevertheless, this is also the point most often directed against the proponents of human security.^u Despite the efforts to create a coherent human security policy framework, the issues in the policies discussed above stem from

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a randomly chosen list of interrelated issues. Consequently, the means emphasized to promote human security change in response to the highlighted human “insecurities.” Due to the large quantity of potential issues of human insecurity there is a clear need to prioritize issues in order to establish a human security agenda that is attainable on a medium- and long-term basis (five to ten years). A more focused agenda would allow for an uncoupling of

proactive human security policies from reactive current affairs politics where it is necessary to make quick decisions in response to urgent calls for actions.^v Herein, we argue, lays the potential of human security. The uncoupling of human security policies and politics may appear to contradict academics who propose that human security should be applied to foreign policy decisions in general. However, we contest the point of view that there is no thing such as an ad hoc foreign policy. Long-term strategic and ad hoc policy decisions very often have to be conducted differently, and constitute different kinds of challenges as well as stress to policy-makers.

The most important challenge is to harmonize the priorities of the four major players, which include economic development and the security of civilians within a global human security framework. However, as can be seen in the current crisis in Sudan, a willingness to *re-act* is easier to attain than the readiness to engage in preventive (non-violent) action

(pro-active policy). If policy-makers were to act increasingly proactively, the need for reactive and mostly short-term policies would decrease.

Hence, the question that arises is whether political measures such as sanctions might be incorporated into one of the existing human security frameworks in order to link reactive and proactive policies. There are two reasons why this question is important: 1) It introduces the basic assumptions of human security in creating short-term policy solutions and 2) It increases the arsenal of human security policies by efficient non-military means. While sanctions certainly do not fit into the Japanese and CHS conceptualization,^w as these conceptions are proactively oriented at the root causes of human insecurity, it remains less clear how well smart sanctions fit in the Canadian and HSN approach. The sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) upon UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) in the 1990s were considered part of Canada's human security policy.^x Yet, the naively assigned traditional logic of sanctions contradicts the human security concept in several ways. While the character of human security is focused on structural or sustainable prevention, the purpose of sanctions is to prevent the further escalation of conflict. In sum, the purpose of sanctions is less *proactive* in regard to prevent the deterioration of the root causes of human insecurity. Instead, they represent tools of a *reactive* (prevention) policy, e.g. by being imposed as a response to an escalation dynamic or by trying to influence a target to stop a contested policy to avoid things going from bad to worse. Therefore, one can restrictedly argue that they can be seen as part of an operative ad hoc prevention policy.

In short, the aim of sanctions is to coerce targeted states and elites to change their contested policies by challenging their cost-benefit analysis. Traditionally, one would argue clipped and precise that the purpose of sanctions is to coerce the political leaders to change their cost-benefit analysis, or in other terms, to make the defiance of international norms more costly than cooperation. Thus, a combination of human

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security (as a normative goal) and smart sanctions (as an instrument for and respecting the normative goal of human security) is feasible only if sanctions are understood as instruments of operative prevention policies.^y

As explained in detail below, however, a *smart* sanctions regime might be a promising tool for human security because of two reasons. Firstly, a smart sanction regime might be an acceptable and efficient tool for human security, because it could reduce the negative ramifications upon a civilian population, as smart sanctions by their very nature target the offending political elites and not innocent civilians. Secondly, the increased risk of becoming the target of a smart sanction regime, together with the assumed increased efficiency, might also increase pressure on authoritarian leaders and warlords to comply with the standards set by the UN and to refrain from a policy that creates human insecurity.

SMART SANCTIONS AND HUMAN SECURITY

It is ironic that ten years after the publication of the UNDP report *New Dimensions of Human Security*, most of the states that were found under the rubric “countries in crisis” remain hot spots for human insecurity. Angola is the only country in which the human security situation has slightly improved, while in numerous West African countries including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire, the situation has severely deteriorated. Furthermore, Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Sudan, and the Zaire (today’s Democratic Republic of Congo) are not recently considered states characterized by a high level of human insecurity.^z The UNSC has dealt extensively with most of these cases and many of these countries have witnessed the imposition of sanctions. Despite the progress in gaining theoretical knowledge about sanctions and the significant evolution of sanction regimes (from comprehensive unspecific to smart sanction regimes) previous and current sanction regimes show ambiguous results and effects. Nevertheless, we argue that the smart sanction concept makes the integration of sanctions in a human security framework feasible and interesting, since the impact on the population is taken into account. As former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy noted,

As a tool for enforcing international decisions against states that break the rules, sanctions are far less drastic than military intervention, but

severe enough to impart seriousness of intent, and so potentially can be very effective. [...] most people agree that sanctions are not a silver bullet. More often than not, they amount to doing peace and security on the cheap in places where troops and aid are considered too costly^{aa}

Here it is important to note that imposing a comprehensive sanctions regime on a particular country might be a means of conducting foreign policy on the cheap, when a more effective sanctions policy could be used that takes into account the impact upon the civilian population. Lessening the human suffering (or enhancing the security of civilians) is an important aspect that should definitely be taken into account when combining sanctions regimes into the human security framework. As there exists a link between human security and smart sanctions, it is necessary to study sanctions regimes through a human security perspective.

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THE SANCTIONS COMPLICACY

By the end of the 20th century, the UNSC had imposed sanctions against nearly a dozen targets. Consequently, the 1990s have been referred to as the sanctions decade^{ab} partly because since the end of the Cold War, sanctions have been frequently used as an instrument under UN authority. During the Cold War, however, sanctions were imposed only twice, against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, respectively.^{ac}

Most of the UN imposed sanction regimes have been controversial, both because of their humanitarian consequences and their failure in coercing changes in the “behavior” of targeted states. Three useful dimensions for the evaluation of the success or failure of sanction regimes are efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness. Political *efficacy* is understood as the influence that the political pressure sanctions have on enforcing compliance (in regard to legal and judicial policy changes) by the targeted state. Operational *efficiency* means that the sanctions regime is properly implemented into the administrative and legal frameworks of the sanctioning states in order to guarantee the maintenance of the

sanctions regime (e.g. monitoring and enforcement of arms embargoes, travel and/or financial sanctions, etc.). Finally, *effectiveness* is measured in terms of the congruence between intentions and effects (e.g. are the sanctions intended to stop the influx of arms into a state actually able to realize that goal?). Hence, this evaluation concept (constituted by these three “e’s”) contributes to the political success, which can be defined as the actual policy change in the targeted state.^{ad}

Sanctions regimes imposed by the UN have been controversial because they have failed to change the behavior of the targeted state and – even worse – have had severe humanitarian consequences.^{ae} However, a more comprehensive critique would also have to evaluate the “success” of sanctions in regard to different goals for which they might be imposed.^{af} These goals may include stigmatizing/signaling, containing,

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detering, and preventing a type of behavior not only in regard to the targeted state, but also in regard to other potential violators of international norms.^{ag} In sum, in order to efficiently evaluate sanctions regimes, it is necessary to incorporate goals and ramifications. In order to maintain the legitimacy and political support for sanctions regimes, it is important to consider the possible human toll and attempt to minimize it. Goals and the unintended

side effects have to be included in order to evaluate sanction regimes more effectively. In addition, ignoring possible unintended side effects might easily destroy the mandatory legitimacy and political support for a sanction regime.

Nevertheless, a look at the sanctions tool from a human security perspective is beneficial, as numerous studies have shown that sanctions may have unintended consequences, or so-called *collateral damages*.^{ah} For example, Geoff Simons, in the context of the sanction regime against Iraq, talks of “international measures of a genocidal nature.”^{ai} Political and economic sanctions have harmful effects on the efficient functioning of health and social support services.^{aj} Although certain concerns with regard to humanitarian consequences of sanctions between those who apply economic sanctions, such as policy-makers and sanctioners,

and those who seek to minister to the casualties of their application, or humanitarian practitioners, converge, it “has not resulted in consensus about recognizing when the adverse impact of sanctions on civilians becomes a humanitarian emergency.”^{ak}

Therefore, Thomas G. Weiss and others propose indicators for measuring the humanitarian impact of sanctions. Their goal is to improve the design of sanction regimes in better serving their function as a tool of *forceful* persuasion without producing unduly humanitarian harm (see Table 3). Apart from a strategic design,^{al} the scientific community and political practitioners hold the opinion that the lack of consistency and the absence of formalized and effective mechanisms for monitoring, enforcing, and evaluating sanctions regimes, constitutes the main obstacle for the effectiveness and efficiency of sanctions.

A brief look at these indicators highlights the humanitarian dimension of the sanctions instrument. Three areas of inquiry which link sanctions and humanitarian concerns can be highlighted:

- “[the] differential effects of various types of sanctions (e.g. trade embargoes, arms embargoes, oil embargoes, financial sanctions, communications and transportation blockage) on the most vulnerable and relatively less vulnerable populations;
- [the] kind of sanctions that hurt elites the most while having the least impact on vulnerable, nontarget populations;
- [the] types of sanctions that produce the most serious long-term impacts on an economy.”^{am}

All of the aspects should be taken into considerations before developing effective targeted, selected, and smart sanctions.

DEFINING SMART SANCTIONS

Simply assuming that “sanctions seek to promote respect for human rights by denying domestic groups access to foreign goods, services, markets, and capital”^{an} ignores the fact that sanctions themselves – as shown above – may be a danger to human security.^{ao} Specifically, “[t]he costs of sanctions have too often been borne by ordinary people, not by the authoritarian governments against which they were directed.”

^{ap} Accordingly, proponents of sanctions agree that sanctions should be subjected to moral and legal restraints. Therefore, “[f]uture sanctions

Table 3: Indicators of Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions

Economic	
<p><i>Physical Integrity</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • household purchasing power (cost of “basic food” basket) • changes in wage rate • changes in the number of people living at or below the poverty line 	<p><i>Quality of life</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • existence of black market • per capita GDP • consumer price index • percentage of industry operating at capacity • unemployment rate • inflation rate • trends in savings and investment government expenditures (e.g., education)
Socio-demographic	
<p><i>Physical Integrity</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • crime/ personal security • displacement • psychological well-being • housing/ shelter availability 	<p><i>Quality of Life</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • human rights situation • degree of civil society • changes in environment (non-health) • rationing programs • dropout rate in schools • changes in land use
Health and Medical	
<p><i>Physical Integrity</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • access to health care and basic drugs • availability of clean water and sanitation • morbidity and mortality rates • birth statistics for children 	<p><i>Quality of Life</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • environmental damage • adequacy of intermediate and advanced care • isolation • fuel sources
Socio-humanitarian	
<p><i>Physical Integrity</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • adequacy of support system for the vulnerable (women, children, the elderly) • family/ household violence 	<p><i>Quality of life</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • social services demand • INGOs present • migration rates of skilled personnel • access to transportation and communications • changes in government capacity to meet basic needs

regimes should be designed so as to maximize the chance of inducing the target to comply with Security Council resolutions while minimizing the negative effects of the sanctions on the civilian population and neighboring and other affected [s]tates.”^{aq}

Consequently, most authors consider sanctions as “smart” when (a) the humanitarian consequences the imposition of sanctions might have on the population of the targeted state are taken into account, and (b) the sanction regime is designed to have the highest effect on the targeted elite while reducing the hardships for civilians.^{ar} Nonetheless, this broad and general definition omits several important considerations, including that “[p]aradoxically, the political elites that compose the regimes themselves have often benefited economically from the black markets that sprung up to circumvent the sanctions intended to exert pressure upon them.”^{as} In addition, the political efficacy of a sanction regime has often resulted in a so-called *rally around the flag effect*. In these cases, once

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the severity of sanctions is so serious and intense that only the targeted political elite can guarantee survival and wellbeing of the citizens, political opposition groups lack support and eventually crumble. This effect can be observed most clearly in authoritarian regimes, e.g. Iraq under the Saddam Hussein regime.

Accordingly, a more general and comprehensive definition of smart sanctions must take into account the following five principles. Sanctions can be called “smart” when (a) attention is paid to humanitarian consequences; (b) when they target elites and not entire populations (as comprehensive economic sanctions often do); (c) when they are adequate in regard to the pain-gain-balance; (d) when they take into account the chances of success of various sanction strategies in the relevant case, thereby leading to a strategic design; and (e) when they are imposed as an element in a carrot-and-stick approach to avoid escalation trap. Therefore, smart sanctions should have a strategic design, which means that they should be used as one element of a carrot-and-stick approach. Whereas coercion^{at} and inducement shall alter the cost-benefit analysis of the targeted elite, the drafting of a strategic design in

advance shall enhance the chances for using sanctions as a bargaining tool.

COMBINING HUMAN SECURITY AND THE CONCEPT OF SMARTNESS

Having discussed some of the problematic elements of sanctions and the recently developed smart sanctions concept, this paper will now examine parallels, compatibility, and interoperability aspects of the human security paradigm and the smart sanctions concept.

The humanitarian concern for protecting civilians is inherent in both concepts – human security and smart sanctions. In this regard, they both follow the idea of a responsibility to protect. Whereas the human security paradigm is looking for ways to enhance the chances of individual safety and well-being, the smart sanctions concept focuses on having a maximum impact on targeted elites while at the same time minimizing the severity of sanctions for the non-targeted civil society. However, although human security has also been implemented by national policy-makers in Canada, Norway and Japan and within multinational contexts (HSN, CHS), sanctions may legitimately only be imposed by the UN.^{au}

Another overlap of human security and smart sanctions with regard to the UN comes into play when regarding human security as a (global) public good. That is,

(...) human security (defined in terms of basic human liberties, certain political and civil rights, and equity and social justice) is a global public good, i.e., it should reach across borders to *all* peoples regardless of their ethnic or national origins, socio-economic status, religious beliefs, or political persuasions. (...) However, given the current state of affairs, human security is very much an underprovided public good ^{av}

Especially, since the end of the East-West Conflict in 1989/90 the UN is increasingly at the forefront of most initiatives in promoting human security and human rights as global public goods.^{aw} Consequently, human security today represents a normative goal of the UN. In particular, UN policy-makers have to pay special attention to the way their decisions might affect the prospect for and advancement of human security. This evolution can also be exemplified when looking at the range of purposes and circumstances sanctions were imposed for by the UN, including:

to overturn direct aggression against another state; to promote the restoration of democracy; to condemn human rights abuses; and to punish the harbouring of terrorists and others charged with international crimes. In unprecedented action, the council also imposed sanctions on two non-state actors: the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (formerly Kampuchea) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).^{ax}

This short list illustrates how much human security concerns already have entered into the decision-making process of the UN bureaucracy. If one thinks of Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, or the Sudan, the human security perspective within the UN is more evident than ever before.

The liberal-internationalist perspective stresses the importance of international institutions for providing collective security. Most proponents of human security assume that the “principal threats to international peace and security come ‘from below’ in the denial of human security to the citizens in one or more states as a result of civil conflict, or from strife within states, or from transnational economic forces that have marginalized certain groups in the world economy.”^{ay} In addition, proponents of human security argue that the nature of international conflict has fundamentally changed exemplified by the fact that most of the wars in the second half of the 20th century have been within states rather than between states.^{az} However, intrastate wars have generated massive externalities,^{ba} which can endanger the peace and stability of a whole region. Accordingly, this paves the way for a UNSC resolution (UNSCR)^{bb}, which takes into account that intrastate wars can produce situations of human insecurity that represent a threat to international peace and security.^{bc}

Proponents of human security argue that the nature of international conflict has fundamentally changed exemplified by the fact that most of the wars in the second half of the 20th century have been within states rather than between states.

Even more importantly, when the UNSC imposes sanctions giving special attention to defend and protect human security, it enjoys a high degree of political legitimacy in the international community. In order for sanctions regimes to maintain international legitimacy, it is important for them to adhere to specific standards and ensure that they do

not aggravate conditions for the civilian population. In sum, it is important to remember that sanctions are not always effective. The design of the regime must ensure that side effects are limited and are successful in achieving political aims.

TWO MEANS TO A COMMON END?

Smart sanctions and human security may be integrated within the same foreign policy framework, though with several limitations. At first sight, none of the conceptualizations presented here can claim that the policy sectors would necessitate or allow for the use of sanctions because sanctions traditionally do not include any mechanism that pays attention to the consequences for the civilian population. Moreover, the UNSC can only impose sanctions if it finds the situation in a country to represent a breach of or threat to international peace and security. However, with regards to human security as a concept of conflict prevention, smart sanctions may only be considered an acceptable tool for stopping a further escalation of a conflict. Yet, when complex emergency situations occur in which human security as a proactive and early prevention policy fails (and where the tendency to use military force as a last resort is overwhelmingly strong), smart sanctions can become a useful tool for trying to combat some of the key factors that fuel and exacerbate conflicts. These factors are primarily the ruthless exploitation and export of precious commodities such as diamonds, crude oil, noble metal (gold, coltan, etc.) and the availability of small arms and more sophisticated weapon systems on the local black market which may be stemmed by effective selected and targeted sanctions. In that respect, the cooperation of governments and international organizations in the imposition of sanctions against rebel groups such as UNITA^{bd} should include cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. Such cooperation might lead to regulations, such as the Kimberley Process,^{be} which tries to put an end to the illegal trade in so-called *blood diamonds* in countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola where warring factions use the profits to sustain their ability to fight. These measures are intended to come to grips with aspects of these war economies.^{bf}

In addition to attempts to stop the financing of paramilitary and rebel groups and putting pressure on authoritarian leaders and elites, additional aspects of the use of smart sanctions within a human security framework include discrediting, stigmatizing, and deterring actors whose actions might represent causal factors for human insecurity. Smart sanctions can enforce compliance with international rules and norms because they may encounter less skepticism than other forms of coercion such as humanitarian intervention. This is particularly true for developing and non-Western countries that regard human security as a Western project that does not reflect and serve their own interests or values. Furthermore, sanctions can be used as a bargaining instrument in a negotiation process. This idea^{bs} fits the construction of sanctions as a tool of late prevention, because sanctions also entail a dimension of crisis management.^{bh} In this case, the policy that provokes the imposition of sanctions constitutes a dispute/conflict between the target state and the international community (represented by the UN) in view of the contested policy.

In sum, one can conclude that smart sanctions can prevent the *rapid* escalation of a conflict, thereby avoiding the escalation trap that might lead to a humanitarian intervention or to a war (e.g. the 1991 Persian Gulf War). In addition, smart sanctions as a bargaining tool offer the targeted elite the possibility to point out its position in and their solution to the conflict. Taking their offers and explanations into consideration might enhance the chances for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. For example, the sanctions imposed against Libya in 1992 were intended to bring two Libyan suspects to trial for involvement in the bombing of a civilian airliner. Yet, the sanctions “also served as a deterrent against future acts of terrorism and as a means of encouraging the Libyan regime to end its suspected harboring and support of terrorist organizations.”^{bi} The sanction regime against Libya can, to a certain degree, be called *smart* because it was targeted against aviation and armaments, and it established an effective bargaining framework.

^{bj} This was proven by the immediate and direct response of Libya, who

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offered to surrender the suspects to an international tribunal. Despite the offer, however, Western powers continued to insist on a trial in the United States, Great Britain, or France. Surprisingly, the final settlement, which emerged after more than six years of sanctions against

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Libya, was similar to Libya's original offer with the addition of several concessions on Libya's behalf. In the end, the Western powers only accepted a compromise when the growing impatience with the sanctions regime within the Arab world became more and more apparent. Therefore, one can draw the conclusion that although sanctions as such did not solve the dispute, they provided a crucial bargaining framework that made a final settlement more likely.^{bk} Time and again, it can be argued that the immediate and direct response of Libya to the imposition of the sanctions (offering to

surrender the suspects under certain conditions), clearly exemplifies the potential of a smart sanction strategy for achieving very specific diplomatic objectives.

CONCLUSION

The inclusion of smart sanctions into human security frameworks resembling the Canadian conceptualization constitutes two means to a common end. In the alternative, however, smart sanctions do not complement concepts that stress the importance of freedom from want, which is exemplified by the Japanese human security approach: this perspective of human security is too remote from the inclusion of coercive measures into their policy catalogue. Yet, even though smart sanctions may represent a useful tool within a human security framework (close to the Canadian perspective), they should only be used as a matter of last resort because the primary purpose of human security is to protect and empower the individual. Smart sanctions might be appropriate in certain conditions, as we have shown, though they might nevertheless endanger civilians. They also might sometimes be a trigger for a

conflict escalation. To avoid this outcome, smart sanctions should only be imposed to prevent things going from bad to worse. Furthermore, when imposing smart sanctions, priority should be given to implement them as a bargaining tool in a carrot and stick approach.

Finally, one has to be aware that integrating coercive measures – no matter how good the intentions might be – into a human security framework can be problematic when attempting to arrive at a commonly accepted definition of human security. However, the use of smart sanctions could possibly mitigate the ongoing dispute insofar as they remain below the threshold of military force. However, their inherent character is coercive or seductive enough to represent a strong instrument for underlining the significance of international norms. Thus, there is little doubt that human security and smart sanctions serve a common end: the flexible and creative enforcement of the rule of law by peaceful means, and the simultaneous protection of societal groups and the individual. 

NOTES

^a An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference “Constructing World Orders”, The Hague, Netherlands, 9-11 September 2004. We want to thank Jan Germann, Azucena Rodriguez, Leonor Velazques, and Mallika Good for their constructive comments.

^b For an academic appraisal of human security, see Rioux, Jean-François (ed.) (2001) *La sécurité humaine. Une nouvelle conception des relations internationales*, Paris: L’Harmattan; and, most critically, Paris, Roland (2001) “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, *International Security*, 26 (2): 87-102. On the practical implications of human security and policy, see Axworthy, Lloyd (2003) *Navigating a New World*, Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf and Ogata, Sadako and Cels, Johan (2003) “Human Security – Protecting and Empowering People”, *Global Governance*, 9 (3): 273-283.

^c See the various contributions in *Security Dialogue* 2005, 35 (3).

^d This is due to the fact that the discussion on what *represents* human security is less important than what *has been done* by invoking the term human security

^e If such a policy finally results into mere rhetoric instead of concrete political action for whatever reasons is another story, see David Chandler (2003) “Rhetoric without responsibility: the attraction of ‘ethical’ foreign policy”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (3): 295-316.

^f A leitmotif (leading motif) can be understood as a theme, or other coherent idea, more or less clearly defined so as to retain its identity if modified on subse-

quent appearances. The term is used here to describe a more or less coherent policy that is oriented to enhance the chances for human security. For example, Canadian and Japanese foreign policy can be described as goal-oriented behavior, whereby enhancing the chances for human security represents the goal. In sum, this means that human security would be the (political) leitmotif of Canadian and Japanese foreign policy.

^g An aspect often ignored by those scholars focusing on a too narrow defined research pattern, who study international relations solely by analyzing the interaction of states.

^h United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 1994. *Human Development Report: New dimensions of human security*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 24.

ⁱ *Ibid.* p. 22.

^j McRae, Rob/ Hubert, Don (eds.) (2001) *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*, Kingston, Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press; Hampson, Hampson, Fen Osler et al. (2002) *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.

^k Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa as an observer.

^l Human Security Network (2005) “Ministerial Meetings”, available at: <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.php>, accessed on 16 June 2005.

^m Edström, Bert (2003) “Japan’s foreign policy and human security”, *Japan Forum*, 15 (2): 209-225; Gilson, Julie und Phillida

Purvis (2003) “Japan’s pursuit of human security: humanitarian agenda or political pragmatism?”, *Japan Forum*, 15 (2): 193-207; Acharya, Arbinda and Amitav Acharya (2001) “Human Security in Asia: Conceptual Ambiguities and Common Understandings”, Paper presented at the International Conference “Beyond the Washington Consensus – Governance and the Public Domain in Contrasting Economies: The Cases of India and Canada”, Chandigarh, February 12-14, 2001.

ⁿ Obuchi, Keizo (1998) “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia”, Policy Speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, Hanoi, Vietnam (16 December 1998), available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policy-speech.html>, accessed on 31 July 2004.

^o Edström (2003: 216-218).

^p See e.g., The Trust Fund for Human Security, 2003. *For the “Human-centred” 21st Century*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/t_fund21.pdf, and the statements of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi and Shinako Tsuchiya at the 2001 and 2003 symposia on Human Security, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/, all accessed 01 August 2004.

^q CHS (2003: v).

^r *Ibid.*, p. 153.

^s Ogata (2004: 26).

^t Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA) (2004) *Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security*, Tokyo, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/, accessed on 01 August 2004; Axworthy, Lloyd (1997); “Canada and human security: the need for lead-

ership”, *International Journal*, 52 (2): 183-196; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (2002); *Freedom from fear. Canada’s foreign policy for human security*, Ottawa: DFAIT, available at: http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/pdf/freedom_from_fear-en.pdf, accessed on 01 August 2004; Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) (2001); *Comparison of Human Security Definitions*, Cambridge, MA, available at: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/list_definitions.pdf, accessed on 01 August 2004; CHS 2003; Human Security Network (HSN) (2004) *Events and Initiatives related to the Human Security Network*, available at: <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/events-e.php>, accessed on 01 August 2004; Ogata 2004: 25-28.

^u Paris 2001, Khong, Yuen Foong (2001) “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” *Global Governance*, 7 (3): 231-236.

^v With this in mind we do see parallels in the arguments of both Paris (2001: 92, 96) and Khong (2001: 232-33). Both academics argue that if the individual becomes the referent of security it becomes difficult to say which issues do not represent factors of human security because of the breadth of possible threats to individuals. Although we observe the same problem, which is the agenda-related problem of prioritization and the structural problem of the character of human security as either an exclusively proactive conflict prevention policy or a reactive day to day policy, we contest their argument that the “definitional elasticity” (Paris 2001: 92) is a problem for foreign policy-makers merely with regard to human security. Did a “definitional rigidity” during the East-West-Conflict really exist? Human security, notwithstanding the “definitional

elasticity”, is already changing the normative and political framework in which security discourses are being conducted. Thus, the real question is which definition of human security will begin to dominate multilateral negotiations on military and non-military threats in an increasingly interdependent world.

^w Although the CHS Report “Human Security Now” refers to documents that regard (*smart*) sanctions, both targeted and selected, as tools of conflict prevention, it, however, does not refer to it as an important aspect of its own human security conceptualization (CHS 2003: 31ff.).

^x Fowler, Robert and David Angell (2001) “Case Study: Angola Sanctions”, in Rob McRae, und Don Hubert (eds.). *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*, Montréal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press: 190-199.

^y Michael Lund criticizes Boutros-Ghali’s definition as too broad and defines conflict prevention as action that takes place before an actual outbreak of organised physical violence and not as *crisis management* and *war diplomacy*. According to Lund, the use of smart sanctions would not serve the purpose of a preventive policy tool because sanctions can only be imposed if violence has already occurred, see Lund, Michael S. (1999) *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. 3rd Ed., Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 37, 43.

^z UNDP (1994: 41-43).

^{aa} Axworthy (2003: 243-44).

^{ab} Cortright, David and George A. Lopez (eds.) (2000). *The Sanctions Decade. Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

^{ac} Cortright, Lopez (2000).

^{ad} Werthes, Sascha (2003) *Probleme und Perspektiven von Sanktionen als politisches Instrument der Vereinten Nationen*, Münster: LIT Verlag, pp. 40-42.

^{ae} See e.g. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde et al. (1990) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy*. 2nd Ed., Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics; Mack, Andrew and Asif Khan (2000) “The Efficacy of UN Sanctions”, *Security Dialogue*, 31 (3): 279-292; Naylor, R. T. (2001); *Economic Warfare. Sanctions, Embargo Busting, and Their Human Cost*, Boston: Northeastern University Press (Original Title: Patriots and Profiteers. Toronto 1999); Cosgrove, Erica (2002) “The Efficacy of Sanctions”, *International Security Policy Paper*, No. 82, April 2002; London: ISIS; Cortright, David and George A. Lopez (with Linda Gerber) (2002) *Sanctions and the Search for Security. Challenges to UN Action*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Jing, Chao et al. (2003); “Instrumental Choice and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions: A Simultaneous Equations Approach”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 40 (5): 519-535.

^{af} Mack, Andrew and Asif Khan (2004) “UN Sanctions: A Glass Half-Full?” in Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher (eds.) *The United Nations and Global Security*, Houndmills, Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

^{ag} These other goals might also in the long run enhance human security as they e.g. *deter* other states from conducting a (contested) policy which might attract the attention of the international community and force them to react by imposing sanctions.

^{ah} Bossuyt, Marc (2000) *The Adverse consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights*. Review

of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Subcommission Has Been or May Be Concerned. The Bossuyt Report. E/CN.4/ Sub. 2/2000/33, Economic and Social Council.

^{ai} Simons, Geoff (1999) *Imposing Economic Sanctions. Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool?* London: Pluto Press: 180; with regard to Iraq also see Hoskins, Eric (1997) “The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq”, in Thomas G. Weiss et al. (eds.) *Political Gain and Civilian Pain*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield: 91-148.

^{aj} E.g., equipment that is necessary for repairing water purification systems may not be imported, since they belong to items on a “dual use” list - meaning that they might be useful for both, military and civilian purposes. For more detailed information, see Weiss et al. (1997: 16), together with the case studies by Hoskins, Crawford, Devin and Dashti-Gibson and Zaidi in the same volume.

^{ak} Weiss, Thomas G. et al. (1997) “Economic Sanctions and Their Humanitarian Impacts: An Overview”, in Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) *Political Gain and Civilian Pain. Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield: 16.

^{al} A so-called strategic design implies that policy-makers have resorted to a method worked out in advance for achieving an objective.

^{am} Weiss, Thomas G. et al. (eds.) (1997) *Political Gain and Civilian Pain. Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 45.

^{an} *Ibid*: 21.

^{ao} The so-called *naïve theory* focuses but on the *internal opposition effect*. By sup-

posing a pain-gain equivalent, their supporters argue that inflicting pain on the population might lead to a stronger internal opposition thereby, putting the ruling elite under pressure for a policy change. Although this might to a certain degree be true and observable in democratic regimes, this effect is deniable in authoritarian regimes.

^{ap} Annan, Kofi (2000) Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, A/55/1, New York: United Nations.

^{aq} Annan (2000): para 100.

^{ar} In this regard targeted and selective sanctions can be part of a smart sanction policy. Sanctions can be defined as targeted when they have a significant impact on political elites. Selective sanctions differ from comprehensive sanctions in that they concentrate merely on certain aspects in different sanction fields (e.g. instead of a comprehensive economic embargo only luxury products are selectively sanctioned). Thus, although targeted, selective and smart sanctions are often used interchangeably, our definition of smart sanctions is more encompassing.

^{as} Annan (2000): para 99.

^{at} For an introduction to concepts of forceful persuasion or coercive diplomacy, see George, Alexander L. (1997) *Forceful Persuasion. Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. 3rd ed., Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

^{au} Although unilaterally imposed sanctions outnumber sanctions imposed by the UN the legality of the former are highly contested in international law.

^{av} Hampson (2002: 40).

^{aw} Kaul, Inge et al. (eds.) (2003) *Providing Global Public Goods. Managing Globalization*, New York: Oxford University Press.

^{ax} Weiss et al. (1997b): 4.

^{ay} Hampson (2002: 47).

^{az} Kaldor, Mary (2000) *Neue und alte Kriege*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [German ed. of *New and Old Wars*, Oxford: Polity Press.]

^{ba} Mendez, Ruben P. (1999) "Peace as a Global Public Good" in Inge Kaul et al. (eds.) *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, New York: Oxford University Press: 382-416.

^{bb} Under Chapter VII of the UN charter which allows for the use of non-military and military force.

^{bc} E.g. UNSCR 733 (1992) on Somalia, or UNSCR 788 (1992) on Liberia

^{bd} Fowler and Angell 2001.

^{be} "The Kimberley Process is a joint government, international diamond industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds - rough diamonds that are used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments. The trade in these illicit stones has contributed to devastating conflicts in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is an innovative, voluntary system that imposes extensive requirements on Participants to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are free from conflict diamonds. The Kimberley Process is composed of 43 Participants, including the European Community. Kimberley Process Participants account for approximately 99.8% of the global production of rough diamonds" available at: [http://](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/)

www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/, accessed on 11.07.2005.

^{bf} Grant, J. Andrew and Ian Taylor (2004) "Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems", *The Round Table*, 93 (375): 385-401.

^{bg} The idea of sanctions as a tool of persuasion or bargaining instrument stems from considerations by David Cortright and George A. Lopez.

^{bh} Michael S. Lund (1999: 36) rightly points out that policies called "late" preventive diplomacy (anything intended to keep a conflict from worsening) might sometimes better be called *crisis management*. None the less, this view might underestimate the stabilising long-term effects of certain late prevention policies.

^{bi} Cortright et al. (2000) "Taming Terrorism: Sanctions Against Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan" in Cortright, David and George A. Lopez (eds.) *The Sanctions Decade. Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 108-109.

^{bj} Ibid: 109.

^{bk} Ibid: 117.